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DECLINE, CRISIS AND RESET

THE ONGOING TRANSITION
SUDHANSHU TRIPATHI
RAVI PRATAP SINGH
SHAHZADA RAHIM
ANDREY VOLODIN
PAOLO RAIMONDI

EVOLVING SOCIAL AND REGIONAL SYMPTOMS
TAYE DEMISSIE BESHI AND RANVINDERJIT KAUR
KANIKA SANSANWAL AND RAHUL KAMATH
SANCHITA BHATTACHARYA
SUYASH CHANDAK

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The Return Of History

WORLD POLITICS IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

This article focuses on global processes that took shape in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The logic of their continuation has decisively affected the megatrends of modern world politics and the role of Russia in the newly emerging international system. The demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar world order only suspended the natural evolution of the global system. "Truncated" globalisation resulted in a "reactive" accumulation of contradictions between the "supercivilisation" and the rest of humanity as well as within the societies that "won" the Cold War. The growth of radical anti-Western groups like the Islamic State, the strengthening of new international "influentials" and the gradual revival of Russia as a world power have all disproved the "end of history" thesis. Today, the existential problem faced by the world is the search for a new global consensus, with a collective security system covering all of humanity at its core.

ANDREY VOLODIN

When asked about the future of Western civilisation, Indian analyst Parag Khanna (*The Future is Asian: Global Order in the Twenty-First Century*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2019, p12) replied, "History has not ended but returned". To elaborate the point one must examine the last decades of the preceding century. The rise of Pax Americana as a new world political paradigm, substituting

Soviet–American bipolarity ("the end of history", as it seemed to many in the early 1990s), was considered by both the academic world and the average human being as a long-term trend in global development. However, according to Willy Brandt, one of the most outstanding statesmen of the second half of the twentieth century, history is a living, ever evolving process that at times does not obey the political elites' likes and dislikes. However, such an approach to sociopolitical analysis was more the exception than the rule, as institutional theories dominated Western social science discourse. For the Anglo–Saxon intellectual tradition, the presumption of stability of the emerging system remained the starting point of reasoning, while dynamic change was given secondary importance. This was the philosophical point of departure for concepts like "the end of history" that embodied the notion of Pax Americana/American neo-colonialism. As has been long noted, "Individual countries or peoples either appear in the foreground or temporarily fade into the shadows. There is nothing 'discriminatory' about this. There are no peoples immanently backward, as there are none immanently advanced". (EM Zhukov, MA Barg, EB Chernyak and VI Pavlov, *Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Global History*, Moscow: Nauka, 1979, p35) The evolution of the world system in the late twentieth–early twenty-first centuries followed this general historical pattern.

The dismemberment of the Soviet Union in 1991, which contemporaries thought of as a "geopolitical catastrophe", represented the initial stage of the restructuring of world politics in the direction of a polycentric configuration. The demise of the USSR which gave rise to the political and psychological complex of "triumphalism" in the West, obscured the understanding of the genuine processes in the world economy and international relations.

"THE END OF HISTORY" OR METAMORPHOSIS OF INTER-STAGE TRANSITION?

It is generally accepted that time puts everything in place. Thus, a retrospective analysis reveals that the dismemberment of the Soviet Union in 1991, which contemporaries thought of as a "geopolitical catastrophe", represented from the point of view of historical science, the initial stage of the restructuring of

world politics in the direction of a polycentric configuration. The demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which gave rise to the political and psychological complex of "triumphalism" in the West, *(As noted by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt)* obscured the understanding of the genuine processes in the world economy and international relations, which had already started to assert themselves in the mid-1980s. The regrouping of forces that took place on the global scale (not always noticeable to the media) led historian Paul Kennedy *(The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, p534) to draw certain conclusions in the second half of the 1980s.

> "Technological and therefore socioeconomic change is occurring in the world faster than ever before… the international community is much more politically and culturally diverse than has been assumed and is defiant of simplistic remedies offered either by Washington or Moscow to its problems… the economic and productive power balances are no longer as favourably tilted in the United States' direction as in 1945 … even in the military realm, there are signs of a certain redistribution of the balances away from a bipolar to more of a multipolar system".

To make his idea of the approaching multipolarity more tangible, Kennedy *(ibid)* emphasised, "the only serious threat to the real interests of the United States of America (US) can come from a failure to adjust sensibly to the newer world order". This point was supported by Walter Lippmann's classic phrase—to bring "into balance … the nation's commitments and the nation's power". *(ibid)*

States regarded as active influences of the new world order included Argentina, Brazil, Egypt (the undisputed leader of the Arab world), India, Indonesia, Nigeria, (the most populated country on the African continent), South Africa, Venezuela, etc. The absence of China and (to a lesser extent) Turkey from the list of "candidates" was significant, as some experts believed the accelerated growth of their economic systems had not adequately transformed their societies to grant new geopolitical status. For authors like Kennedy *(ibid,* pp447–58) however, the Celestial Empire was a full member of the "pentarchy" that controlled world politics and included Japan, the US, the USSR and Western Europe. A principle of categorisation for the newly emerging geopolitical entities was the quest for real sovereignty in the international system. However, the long-term interests of the newcomers did not always coincide with the motives of the then two

"superpowers"—the US and the USSR. The yearnings of the new "influentials" to diversify world politics and encourage the superpowers to be sensitive to their interests became a strategy of behaviour that subsequently manifested itself in the emergence of international dialogue formats like BRICS (Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa), IBSA (India–Brazil–South Africa), etc.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, resulting in the advent of a "unipole", slowed down the global processes that took shape in the second half of the 1980s. The participants in the new regrouping of forces in world politics faced tasks highlighted by British futurologist Hamish McRae. (*The World in 2020: Power, Culture and Prosperity: A Vision of the Future*, London: Harper Collins, 1995, p6) "One of the great issues of the first quarter of the next (twenty-first) century will be whether countries can learn from each other not just how to make their industries efficient but how to make their whole societies more efficient". The "development agenda" therefore became the main political paradigm not only for the new influentials but also for the "rest"—the vast majority of states/members of the world community. The collapse of the Soviet Union however was destructive to the new agenda.

Despite the "triumph" of the West, which "won" the Cold War, the parametric problems that had accumulated in the world system were not resolved but rather increased. These included the lack of drinking water, under consumption, intensified migration flows to the West, climate change, habitat degradation, deterioration of living conditions in cities in both the East and West and so on.

The dismemberment of the USSR marked the beginning of the "age of acquiescence", as American Left Wing authors described the ethical situation in the world. That is, until the end of the 1980s the second superpower effectively played the role of a dialectical counterbalance to the "collective West" led by the US. By its very existence, the Soviet Union created "operational space" for developing countries in world affairs and objectively expanded the possibilities for cultivating "nonconformist" views by a significant part of the intelligentsia on both sides of the Atlantic. Its collapse narrowed the field of liberty both for developing countries/transitional economies and for independent thinkers in the West, including the youth. The lack of alternative world development ("the end of history") worried eminent Western intellectuals. As Economics Nobel laureate

Jan Tinbergen once enquired—how adequately have the consequences of the USSR's self-liquidation been evaluated for Russia and the rest of the world by the most active participants in this process?

The breakup of the bipolar world and assertion of Pax Americana were institutionalised by the Washington Consensus—a set of principles and norms designed for regulating socioeconomic processes as an alternative to state intervention. These "maxims" reflected the strategic position of the US administration, international financial organisations (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and leading American think-tanks. The ideology behind the new world order was globalism—an unwritten set of rules that prescribed servile behavioural patterns to the "rest", that is, most of humankind. An ideologist of the new paradigm was Francis Fukuyama, (*The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992) whose central idea was "free market globalisation" as the driving force behind endless technological progress and effective satisfaction of "ceaseless" consumer demand. However, despite the "triumph" of the West, which "won" the Cold War, the parametric problems that had accumulated in the world system were not resolved but rather increased. These included the lack of drinking water, under consumption, intensified migration flows to the West, climate change, habitat degradation, deterioration of living conditions in cities in both the East and West and so on. Old contradictions were multiplied by new ones encouraged by the logic of post-bipolar development. As American researcher Manfred B Steger (*Globalisation: The New Market Ideology*, Boston: Rowman and Littlefield 2002, pp4–5) wrote, the "de-ideologised world", at the beginning of this century, is both naive and utopian. "The opening decade of the twenty-first century is quickly becoming a teeming battlefield of clashing ideologies. ... This ideological contest over the meaning and direction of globalisation will deeply impact the political and ethical issues of the new century". The conflicting visions of the coming world order, the prevailing norms and values as well as the "symbols of faith" of various geopolitical actors were affected by this struggle.

"Winners write history" was the driving idea of globalisation. The new "metaphor" guiding world development encompassed the primacy of economic growth and inattention to development including the imperatives of employment and the mitigation of social and property disparities; the decisive role of "free trade" as a stimulant of economic growth; unrestricted freedom of action for the forces of "supply and demand" unrestrained by the nation-state in the societies of the "second" and "third" world; the liberty of choice (for the Cold War winners);

a sharp reduction of interventionism by the state (for developing countries/ transitional economies) and the introduction of the Western political economic paradigm as unrivalled in any cultural or social environment. This led to the dismantling of the welfare state, in which a mixed economy and political pluralism balanced "spontaneous market forces" thereby supporting society in a state of dynamic equilibrium. The new market paradigm in academia was addressed as "turbocapitalism". (Edward Luttwak, *Turbo Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy*, New York: Harper Collins, 1999) Turbocapitalism and globalisation (the "new market ideologies") suggested limiting the scope of state activity to implementing a defence allocation and maintaining law and order by a social contract between the government and the people. Authorities were instructed to focus their energies on privatising state enterprises, deregulating the economy (liberating it from state custody), lowering taxes (including for top financial groups), tightening control over the labour movement and reducing social expenditure.

From December 2000 to December 2010, more than three million jobs were lost in the corporate sector of the US, the worst indicator since 1928–38, with more than one third of all jobs lost in industry. The states of New York and Ohio lost 38 per cent of jobs, while for New Jersey and Michigan the fall in employment was even more significant at 39 per cent and 48 per cent, respectively.

The triumphalism enjoyed by the "victors" prevented Western strategic elites from gaining a comprehensive understanding of the world that had become more complex after the Second World War. Operating with ideas and theories over two hundred years old was *a priori* doomed to failure. Submission to the logic of Western globalisation did not take into consideration myriad interests that did not disappear with the collapse of the bipolar world. These were manifest in ongoing local and regional conflicts and in the progressive aggravation of the previously mentioned parametric problems of mankind. In 1993, Russian scholar Alexander I Neklessa formulated the concept of the "orientalisation" of the West to shape the development trajectory of concerned societies for years to come. The forecast rested on the direction and intensity of migration flows after World War Two from the historical South to the industrialised societies.

The compression of time and space essential for globalisation also resulted

in the acceleration of crossborder flows of capital, labour and ideas that became relatively free from the control of nation-states. This side effect at the turn of the millennium had a contradictory effect on the economies and societies of the West. Furthered by new communication technologies, modern rentiers and financial tycoons operating in global markets made gains inconceivable in the bipolar age. Their profits grew as the banking and financial systems of transitional economies were weakened deliberately by the ideas and principles of the Washington Consensus. By the end of the 1990s, the cash equivalent of almost two trillion US dollars was circulating daily in global currency markets. (Peter Gowan, *The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance*, London: Verso, 1999, pp3–12) The demise of the Soviet Union indirectly contributed to the revitalisation of multinational companies in developing countries. No longer constrained by the limitations of national legislation, transnational corporations (TNCs) created their own deregulated global labour market, objectively increasing the territorial mobility of the latter. Controlling more than 70 per cent of world trade, the TNCs actively increased their global presence and the volume of foreign direct investment in the 1990s increased by about 15 per cent annually. (Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the Twenty-First Century*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p20) The Washington Consensus and unrestricted globalisation however had several important adverse long-term consequences.

First, the dismantling of state monopoly capitalism created by Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal resulted in the rejection of measures to protect the US's production potential, ensure the employment of American workers and improve their living standards. According to Patrick J Buchanan, (*Suicide of a Superpower: Will America Survive to 2025*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011 pp15–6) the index of America's industrial decline has been impressive. From December 2000 to December 2010, more than three million jobs were lost in the corporate sector of the US, the worst indicator since 1928–38, with more than one third of all jobs lost in industry. The states of New York and Ohio lost 38 per cent of jobs, while for New Jersey and Michigan the fall in employment was even more significant at 39 per cent and 48 per cent, respectively. During this period, the cumulative foreign trade deficit was 6.2 trillion dollars while the deficit in trade with China reached two trillion dollars. At different times, nations have gained vitality through increased production and zeal for economic nationalism while regressive development is an outcome of free trade. (Buchanan, *ibid*, p17) The persuasive conclusion is that deindustrialisation destroys vitality and erodes the creative energy of society,

ultimately weakening the geopolitical position of a given country.

Second, in the absence of an alternative world project (the USSR), globalisation aggravated the contradictions of the post-bipolar world, which erupted from time-to-time—the breakup of Yugoslavia, the events of 11 September 2001, the Iraq crisis, etc. In addition, trends with economic and political origins had a significant impact on polarisation within the world economy. As early as the beginning of the twenty-first century, it had been noted, "the growing complexity of the world economy and more intense competition are pushing an ever increasing number of less successful contestants out of the (globalisation) race". In addition, the deepening involvement in globalisation could "lead to an escalation of internal contradictions and the rise of all kinds of political risks". (AG Volodin and GK Shirokov, *Globalisation: Origins, Trends, Perspectives*, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2002, p141)

Migration has been instrumental in constituting a new social class structure in Western democracies. The widening space of the "islands" of the South in the North may result in the emergence of numerically strong communities that occupy the "grassroots" of the social pyramid. These groups, instigated by the demonstration effect of consumption, are likely to demand greater social welfare.

Challenged by acute domestic conflicts developing societies in general and Islamic ones in particular responded with movements and organisations whose goal was a radical revision of the Western "world project". The emergence of "revisionist" practices, schools and theories that rejected globalisation and globalism, like the Islamic State, was the responsibility of Western intellectual elites. The "end of history" concept completely ignored the qualitative differences in cultural, economic and social organisation between Western societies and non-Western entities.

The compulsory inclusion of predominantly pre-capitalist (at best early industrial) societies in globalisation provoked a natural rejection of its principles and practices in non-Western societies. The people there were hostile to "alien" forms of cultural and economic regulation and thus globalisation itself gave birth to the non-acceptance of the world order imposed by the West. The incomplete industrial diversification of non-Western societies as well as their cultural and social regulation has been described exhaustively in Russian third world studies. The connection between history and modernity in transitional societies became

conspicuous in the age of globalisation. The lack of a full-fledged genesis of the industrial mode of production predetermined the lack of a viable alternative to the guiding role of the state. In the second half of the 1970s, Soviet economic history expert VI Pavlov had written:

> "The genesis and development of capitalism acquire formation spontaneity and systemic irreversibility only under the condition that they are preceded by the formation of equally spontaneous and systemic mode of production background. The less mature and active these prerequisites are, the more the role of the state as an industrially stimulating factor. The state essentially compensates for the lack of spontaneity and the ability to self-develop. … In historical reality, the genesis of the most viable types of capitalism like the Dutch or English ones did not do without the active support of the state. It did not stop bloody violence either during the expropriation of the working population within the country or during the execution of overseas conquests".
> (Zhukov, Barg, Chernyak and Pavlov, *ibid*, p314)

In short, the dismantling of the guiding role of state interventionism in accordance with the canons of the Washington Consensus brought many transitional societies (primarily African) to the brink of cultural and social disruption and engendered a response such as aggressive political "heresies" and increasing migration flows towards the industrially advanced countries of the West.

Third, under Pax Americana, the rejection of globalisation acquired two basic dimensions. On the one hand, the radical organisations that emerged set themselves the twofold policy target of not only stopping the internationalisation of Western culture, economics and politics but also of subverting public institutions in countries that were the driving forces of globalisation. On the other hand, the protest took the form of intensified migration flows, potentially capable of drastically changing the ethnic and national composition as well as the civilisational matrix and evolutionary paradigm of Western societies.

THE "ORIENTALISATION" OF THE WEST

In understanding the "orientalisation" of developed societies, the case of the Netherlands is most illustrative. Experts admit that historically the country had been one of the most tolerant societies of the West. The initial migration

flows (Huguenots from France, Sephardic Jews from Portugal, etc) contributed significantly to the economic growth and social prosperity of Dutch society. However, after the Second World War, the attitude of the Dutch people towards migration gradually began to change.

> "The image of the Netherlands as a liberal society has become increasingly contradictory to the current sociopolitical climate in the Netherlands. The beginning of the new millennium has seen the rapid uprising of Right Wing populist parties, causing Dutch society to polarise. The big issue in this development has been the multicultural society. The accommodation and assimilation of immigrants, mainly non-Western people of Islamic descent and the problems this poses to Dutch society, has grown into the foremost important topic in the Dutch public debate". (K van Zoon, *Of Pluralisation, Assimilation and Polarisation: An Enquiry into the Development of the Multicultural Society in the Netherlands*, Mimeo, University of Vienna, Vienna, 2009, p1)

The statistical expression of the migration flow to the North has been the growth of an "alien" civilisational substrate in the ethno-demographic structure of Western societies. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands are some of the industrialised nations potentially susceptible to an eventual "clash of civilisations" in the not so distant future. Migration has been instrumental in constituting a new social class structure in Western democracies. The widening space of the "islands" of the South in the North may result in the emergence of numerically strong communities that occupy the "grassroots" of the social pyramid. These groups, instigated by the demonstration effect of consumption, are likely to demand greater social welfare. It is increasingly difficult to separate migrants for economic reasons from arrivals who are dissatisfied with the political order at home. In addition, the poor quality of education, the low level of professional capacity, the inability to join the host society (behaviourally, culturally, linguistically) are important reasons for the involvement of migrants in criminal activity and/or in the "grey" economy, "which inevitably strengthen repressive measures of the state in advanced countries". (Volodin and Shirokov, *ibid*, p132) Western globalisation destroyed centuries old civilisational foundations of industrialised societies in the mid-1990s, prompting experts to question their integrity and vitality. McRae (*ibid*, p272) critically assessed the ability of the US to maintain the position of avant-garde society under conditions of migration and

demographic stalemate.

> "Managing a peaceful transition from a US which is dominated by white European culture to one which is truly multiracial and very different from Europe, will be the greatest single challenge the US will face in the coming generation. Failure would destroy the American dream, but the transition will test the tolerance and adaptability of the nation more sternly than perhaps any other change in its remarkable history".

As to the countries of Western Europe that found themselves in a migratory whirlpool, McRae (*ibid*, pp271–2) predicted the probability of "ethnic cleansing" similar to what took place after the collapse of the once united socialist Yugoslavia.

TRUNCATED GLOBALISATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The interrelationship between post-bipolar globalisation and the intensification of migratory movements to Western countries has been obvious. As early as the 1990s, globalisation had taken the shape of "triadisation" with Japan, the US and Western Europe as its main beneficiaries, while there was no real, systemic involvement of developing countries in the process. Noted economist Baldev Raj Nayar (*The Geopolitics of Globalisation: The Consequences for Development*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005) academically classified this model of globalisation as "truncated". According to him, the main actors in globalisation were the TNCs from France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland and the US. The concentration of economic power at one "pole" was complemented by the pauperisation of most of humankind, giving rise to the radical restructuring of the world economy and international relations. However, in addition to the concentration of economic power with TNCs and the marginalisation of a significant part of humanity (primarily in transitional societies), globalisation gave birth to yet another process, the consequences of which the West experienced at the beginning of the third millennium. The polarising effect of globalisation, embodied in the principle of "the winner gets all", benefitted the economic interests of the newly industrialised countries (as they were collectively named in the scholarship of the 1970s–1980s) of the Far East and Southeast Asia. The economies of Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, the leaders of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast

Nations) group, benefited from globalisation due to the "exodus" of industries from the US, West Europe and partly Japan.

As Buchanan (*ibid*, p12) remarked, America opted for "the interdependent, global world envisioned by nineteenth century dreamers such as David Ricardo, Richard Cobden, Claude-Frédéric Bastiat and John Stuart Mill". This experiment with free trade had been a fiasco in the nineteenth century, when its main adherent, Great Britain, was pushed onto the backstage of the world economy, initially by the US and later by Germany. The liberalisation of the world's largest market (the US) had several long-term consequences. First, from the late 1950s to the first half of the 1960s, West European and Japanese manufacturers rushed into this space and later the tigers of East and Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) began to feel more at ease in the American market. However, the Celestial Empire benefited the most from the Washington Consensus. In 1994, Beijing made a "strategic move" of devaluing its national currency by 45 per cent, thereby cheapening its already low-priced labour force and inviting "earners" (TNCs) to China for maximising their profits. By 2008, the US's trade deficit with China amounted to $266 billion.

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(Buchanan, *ibid*, p13) Second, neoliberal "theology" coupled with the non-resistance of the Bill Clinton and George W Bush administrations with minuscule interest in economic matters turned into a kind of indulgence for American entrepreneurs who started shifting their enterprises to developing countries, where the price–quality ratio of labour forces created lucrative opportunities for the extraction of surplus value. The inevitable sequel of this process was deepening deindustrialisation of the national economy and the decomposition of high quality labour in America and other Western societies.

In the US, the deteriorating quality of the labour force had a strong polarising effect and two types of "belts" crystallised—the "sun belt" (cities south of the thirty-sixth parallel) and the "rust belt", which included former industrial centres like Detroit and Cleveland. According to American scholar Richard Florida, (*The New Urban Crisis* (in Russian), Moscow: Tochka, 2018, pp5–6) the new urban

crisis, "extends even further and penetrates deeper than the previous one (of the 1960s and 1970s). … This crisis is hitting both the old industrial cities of the US Rust Belt and the declining post-industrial northeast of England. … A new crisis is affecting growing cities with unsustainable economies dependent on energy, tourism and real estate. ... It turns out that the new urban crisis is also a crisis of the suburbs, urbanisation itself and modern capitalism in general". Cities as guardians of historical traditions and catalysts for social change in American social sciences have been always regarded as the most important sources of life energy ("passionarnost", to use the vocabulary of the eminent Russian historian Lev N Gumilev) of the people, directly affecting the US's proactive foreign policy.

According to Walt W Rostow (1916–2003), (*The Great Population Spike and After: Reflections on the Twenty-First Century*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p159) migration has changed the ethno-demographic configuration of American society. In Texas, one of the key states of the "sun belt", the ethnic composition of the population has undergone rapid change. If the existing trajectory persists, by 2030 the Anglos, who were about 60 per cent in 1990, will fall to 37 per cent, while Hispanics will make up 46 per cent of the state's population. The inevitable consequences of such shifts are population growth below the poverty line, declining household incomes and further social and property polarisation. Rostow (*ibid*) added that about 40 per cent of the American population that annually steps into the economically active age is composed of immigrants. On average, their qualifications are significantly inferior to the intellectual and professional levels of Anglophones, reducing the viability of the American economy. The civilisational "rift" of American society, which manifest itself with particular force in the 2016 presidential election, is the transition of quantitative changes to a new qualitative state. In fact, a serious political struggle has commenced to preserve the European foundations of American culture and society. Similar processes with a certain time lag may be observed in other developed countries of the West as well.

In the 1990s, the West was referred to as a "monopolar universal supercivilisation". (MV Ilyin and VL Inozemtsev (Eds), *Megatrends of World Development*, Moscow: Economica, 2001, pp29–59 and pp235–60) However, by the beginning of the third millennium, it had become clear that uncontrolled population growth accompanied by intensive migration to the North would be the main "design" of the global order to come.

"Demographic trends are already triggering irreversible shifts in the social composition of developed countries, since control over migration is beyond

the capabilities of nation-states in the West. ... The 'Tiermondisation' (that is, third worldization) of advanced societies seems to be an irreversible drift. It is with this megatrend that all other trends will have to be co-related. It is from this angle that one should probably clarify the very ideas of 'supercivilisation' and 'counter-centre' (forces opposing Pax Americana). Much more typical than the external and geographically emphasised contrast between civilisation and barbarism, core and periphery, typical of bygone times, today the internal contradiction is becoming more and more revealing. 'Supercivilisation' is split and its own 'third world' emerging inside can become a much more dangerous 'counter-centre' than could be imagined in the logic of the outgoing century".

(Ilyin and Inozemtsev, *ibid*, pp290–1)

In principle, ethno-demographic shifts may be instrumental in revising foreign policy directions, as Rostow (*ibid*) had maintained in the mid-1990s.

Under the influence of "Southern" migration, the permanent destruction of the cultural, linguistic and institutional foundations of homogeneity and integrity of the "North Atlantic civilisation" provoked interventionist reactions from the US and its allies in the form of "expeditions" to Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). The administration of George W Bush tried thereby to extend the "unipolar moment" (as the American political scientist Charles

Migration has changed the ethno-demographic configuration of American society. In Texas, one of the key states of the "sun belt", the ethnic composition of the population has undergone rapid change. If the existing trajectory persists, by 2030 the Anglos, who were about 60 per cent in 1990, will fall to 37 per cent, while Hispanics will make up 46 per cent of the state's population.

Krauthammer described the state of humanity in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries) and at the same time convince the rest of the world that the US remained its leading guiding force. The failure of "pacification" in Afghanistan and Iraq seemed to be the starting point of a new global regrouping of forces to institute a different, polycentric configuration of the international system.

"FIGHTING BETWEEN TWO SYSTEMS": A SOURCE OF VITALITY FOR THE WEST

The "North Atlantic civilisation" drew its vitality and energy from a powerful source, that is, from the existence of a capable "counter-centre"—the Soviet Union and the socialist community. Not to be the strategic loser, the "struggle between the two systems" forced both sides to improve constantly their economic systems, scientific, technical and military potential and invent sophisticated methods of ideological dispute. Thus, a peculiar positive inertia of the West moving forward arose, in which the Soviet Union played a considerable (albeit indirect) role. In a meaningful sense, the self-destruction of the USSR became the real end of history for the West, since it deprived the entire North Atlantic system of external impulses for internal self-development. The spontaneous modernisation forces of Western societies were insufficient for the maintenance of Pax Americana.

The extinction of the dialectical impulses of inter-systemic rivalry resulted in a number of negative consequences for the US and the West. The collapse of the USSR negatively affected the vitality of American society and the era has been sarcastically named the "age of acquiescence". Pressure on organised labour (which started in the presidency of Ronald Reagan) and universities as potential sources of free thought increased. Equally harmful for the future of America (and the collective West) were the gradual disappearance of public opinion and independent discourse (an effective tool for feedback from society to government) and the adoption of conformist patterns of behaviour on all "floors" of the political system. As a result, politics began to lose its competitive content and the competition of ideas was gradually substituted by the confrontation of personalities. Negative changes also affected the criteria for recruitment into the elites of Western societies. Dull, colourless figures occupied the political space, ready if necessary to act on the servile principle of "what/who are you pleasing". Western societies also underwent major changes in the distribution of national income. In the US, globalisation resulted in the increased polarisation of society. In 2018, according to opinion polls, 78 per cent of Americans survived on a "paycheque-to-paycheque" mode. According to the estimations of American economists, only 20 per cent of the economically active population succeeded in "integrating" with globalisation, while the remaining 80 per cent felt excluded from the developmental process. Thus, in the US itself, globalisation turned out to be truncated and increased internal disunity and tensions in society. Similar processes were underway in Western Europe as well.

The increasing complexity of the international situation (or the unipole crisis) revealed the helplessness of Western elites to take adequate decisions and act effectively when new brainteaser issues required creative and nontrivial methods and immediate reaction. It seems that for modern Western elites,

strategy is an unknowable and speculative category, while their decisions are ruled by instinctive reactions, tactical in the best case. This helplessness has generated a search for external enemies that do not obey the logic of the "end of history" and do not want to fit into the behavioural patterns prescribed by Pax Americana. The "triumphal procession" of the Western project is ending and establishing a new global setup has become a political urgency. The initial chronological watershed is difficult to outline. The failed interventions of the West in Afghanistan and Iraq may be regarded as an imagined "red line" between the old and new geopolitical ages. A retrospective analysis of those events reveals that the Iraqi expedition instigated the creation of a radical and aggressive anti-Western project, which soon took the form of the Islamic State.

In October 2006, with the merger of several radical groups, a new political entity, the Islamic State of Iraq, was created. The total area of the territory it controlled in 2014 was more than hundred thousand square kilometres, with a population of about eight million people. The IS has an ideology, a political programme and in its conquered territory carries out the Sharia's socioeconomic agenda. The Islamic State was the first visible evidence of a systemic crisis of truncated globalisation. In fact, the "counter-centre" it represented sought

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to redistribute material and financial resources at the global level. It also rejected the polarised world development that asserted itself after the demise of the USSR and demanded freedom of behavioural and cultural orientations. In other words, globalisation from above would be replaced by globalisation from below, which would improve the social and property status of marginalised and pauperised groups in Muslim and other transitional societies. The anti-globalist agenda, in forms intellectually accessible to the masses of the population, led to broad support for IS ideas in a number of countries in West Asia as well as amongst Muslim minority communities around the world.

ANTI-GLOBALISM: TRENDS AND ACTORS

The phenomenon of the Islamic State (and other radical Islamist organisations) has evolved in the context of constantly growing global ideological and political diversity. Active participants of these developments have been economic nationalists such as Patrick J Buchanan in the US, supporters of Jörg Haider and his Freedom Party in Austria, Jean-Marie Le Pen and his National Front in France, the German People's Union of Gerhard Frey, the Italian National Alliance headed by Gianfranco Fini, etc. National populist organisations expressed their opposition to "globalisation from above" which they said was destroying the nation-state and imposing supranational (conformist) models of consciousness and behaviour on the rest of the world through "cultural globalisation". Left Wing populist regimes and movements challenged truncated globalisation, especially in Latin America (the party of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico, the government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti, etc). Some nongovernmental organisations seeking to protect the environment, achieve gender equality and address acute problems of employment and social justice also launched active efforts to dismantle the Washington Consensus. (Steger, *ibid*, pp84–5) Naturally, these forces relied on different support groups in society. However, the intensity of their activities unequivocally pointed to the discontent of the people in various countries and regions, ultimately posing the problem of a conceptual revision of the world order established after 1991. During a visit to China in 1999, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez pointed out that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not mean, "Neoliberal capitalism had to be the model followed by the people of the West". (Richard Gott, *In the Shadow of the Liberator: Hugo Chavez and the Transformation of Venezuela*, London: Verso, 2000, p190) At the time, the Bolivarian leader called for joint action by the countries of Latin America, the Middle East and Asia, as an effective tool for resisting the neoliberal version of globalisation.

The efficiency of "development populism" was measured ultimately by living standards. For example in 1973, the income level difference in the most and least developed countries was 44:1 but by the beginning of the third millennium the gap between the "centre" and the "periphery" had become an egregious 74:1. According to the United Nations, the number of people living below the poverty line increased from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion by the beginning of the twenty-first century and 25 per cent of the world's population had a per capita annual income of less than US $140. (Thomas W Pogge, "The Moral Demands of Global Justice", *Dissent*, Fall

A "fundamental" response to the challenges of neoliberal globalisation came from the activities of civil society organisations worldwide. The consolidation of the opponents of globalism gradually gave rise to an alternative discourse, contributing to the formation of a new identity on a transnational basis, that is, an egalitarian anti-globalist political consciousness and culture, encouraging the formation of crossborder alliances over geographical, ethno-national and professional/class barriers. Alternative globalisation included the following pivotal principles—the return of ethical values in international relations; equal opportunities/globalisation for all; real participation of "peripheral" countries in the development and implementation of strategic decisions on a global level and recognition of the diversity of humankind as a unity of "classical" and "non-classical" civil societies. Opponents of neoliberalism proceeded from the fact that the existing model of globalisation had provoked universal chaos and resulted in "parametric" consequences uncontrolled by the US and its allies.

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These included the transformation of local and regional conflicts into global ones, the irreversible degradation of the environment, uncontrolled migration from transitional societies to the West accompanied by inevitable changes in the civilisational/cultural matrix of Western societies, etc. A demonstration of anti-globalist intentions was the clash of approximately forty thousand demonstrators with police during the World Trade Organisation conference in Seattle, Washington on 30 November–1 December 1999.

The Battle of Seattle, as the event was later named, became the culmination of events initiated by the Asian economic crisis of 1997–98, economic default in Russia in August 1998, mass strikes in France in the winter of 1998 and the collapse of a number of large American and West European investment

funds. An indicator of the seriousness of the situation was the appeal by George Soros, one of the "shepherds" of globalism, to abandon the devastating "market fundamentalism" and construct a global "new deal". Thus, on the eve of the third millennium, a coalition of forces, heterogeneous in cultural, ideological, political and social origins, a sort of a new "counter-centre", gained momentum. It included various civil society organisations and anti-globalist movements affiliated informally with such formats as the World Social Forum. Finally, in the late 1990s, after the Asian financial crisis, globalisation became instrumental in reviving the Nonaligned Movement, inspired by the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad. Thus, theoretically, the institutional platform of the "counter-centre" was established at the interstate level.

THE GLOBALIST CAMP: COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE

The realignment of forces at the global scale raised questions on the composition of those "guiding" the coalition. The most general (and superficial) answer was that at the head were transnational corporations and the ruling groups, regardless of party affiliation, of the three gravitational centres of globalisation (Japan, the US, Western Europe) as well as the dependent states of the North Atlantic and parts of the Asia–Pacific . However, events such as the 1999 Battle of Seattle demonstrated the existence of concrete opposition to the neoliberal globalisation project within advanced societies themselves.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, ardent supporters of globalisation "from above" were classified as "transnationals" (Samuel P Huntington, *Who are We: America's Great Debate*, New York: Penguin Books, 2004) or "cosmocrats". (John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalisation*, New York: Crown, 2000, pp241–2) What were the cultural, economic, national and political boundaries/parameters of this unconventional community? According to Huntington, (*ibid*, p268) "The new global elite" included representatives of "academia" engaged in practical activities, employees of various international organisations, senior personnel of transnational corporations, entrepreneurs in internationalised high-tech industries, chief executives of major banks, stockbrokers, international lawyers, consultants of large corporations, etc. In 2000, their number around the world was estimated at 20 million, while by 2010 it was expected to double numerically. About 40 per cent of this transnational group was of American origin. The behavioural models of

these transnationals/cosmocrats were based on values of globalisation while the nation-state in their vision was an "archaism" in an ever-tightening world. They were formally attuned with values of multiculturalism but were not connected "emotionally" with either their country of origin or residence. The commonality of interests between transnationals and globalists was not only economic (indifference to national markets) but also had deep cultural foundations. However, the cooperation and consolidation of various clusters of the new global elite remained effective only under three preconditions. First was the undeniable economic, scientific and technological superiority of the collective West over the "rest". Second was the availability of superior military potential and the political will to use it "if necessary" against states that refused to obey the "guiding principles" of globalisation. Third and last was the non-resistance of "the rest" in accepting decisions emanating from the "programming centre".

Pax Americana functioned until the beginning of the "expeditionary mission" of the US and Great Britain to Iraq in 2003. The failure of that venture triggered processes potentially detrimental to the US and the Western world, which had so far been in a latent state. That is, "temporary difficulties" gradually transformed into the "retreat of the Empire". Retrospectively, it may be argued that Western elites became

On the one hand, while aggressively imposing truncated globalisation on the rest of the world, the West created with its own hands a counter-centre to its policy. On the other hand, the triumphalist ideas and concepts disarmed the "golden billion" ideologically and physically by demobilising active groups of society through fantasies about the only viable path of human development.

hostage to their own illusions. Triumphalism, as a particular legacy of a "victorious" Cold War, stuck in the minds of the ruling circles of the US and its allies. This notion was intellectually fuelled by the academic world there, in the form of "the end of history", "there is no alternative" (TINA) development and similar concepts. On the one hand, while aggressively imposing truncated globalisation on the rest of the world, the West created with its own hands a counter-centre to its policy. On the other hand, the triumphalist ideas and concepts disarmed the "golden billion" ideologically and physically by demobilising active groups of society through fantasies about the only viable path of human development. Over centuries, a superiority complex or colonial style of thinking had been

introduced systematically into the mass consciousness of some Western societies. This was associated with the attitude of the British towards the Indians, which Jawaharlal Nehru (*The Discovery of India* (in Russian), Moscow: Foreign Literature Press, 1955) drew attention to at the time.

> "These people (officials of the Indian Civil Service) are the most tenacious labour union in the world and everything that infringed on their interests was inevitably considered harmful to India. … This idea spread to one degree or another to various sections of the English people … even to the English worker and farmer … fell under its influence and despite their subordinate position in their homeland, felt the pride of their owners and sovereigns. … In the best case, he (a worker or farmer) was full of vague benevolence but one that does not go beyond the strict framework of this system".

Time has shown that the mechanism of the indoctrination of mass consciousness has remained virtually unchanged. Only the tools for processing public opinion have become more modern and sophisticated.

CONCEPTS AND FORECASTS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER

In Western political discourse of the post-bipolar age, there was also a sober and realistic view of both the "triumph" of the Cold War and the prospects of the collective West in the world economy and politics. One of the architects of the Marshall Plan, Charles P Kindleberger, (*World Economic Primacy: 1500 to 1990*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p190) responded sympathetically to the suggestion made by future Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman in the early 1990s that America could expect a time of "sclerosis and decline". Although he went further in his forecasts of the future global economy, he avoided a direct answer to the question of which country would become the leading society in the near future. (Kindleberger, *ibid*, p228) At the end of the twentieth century, economist and sociologist Lester C Thurow (*The Future of Capitalism: How Today's Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow's World*, London: Nicholas Brealey, 1996) placed the problem of the future of America and the West in a wider context of the viability/vitality of these societies.

> "The danger is not that capitalism will implode as communism did. Without a

viable competitor to which people can rush if they are disappointed with how capitalism is treating them, capitalism cannot self-destruct. Pharaonic, Roman, Medieval and Mandarin economies also had no competitors and they simply stagnated for centuries before they finally disappeared. Stagnation, not collapse, is the danger". (Thurow, *ibid*, p325)

In the early years of the third millennium, Western social science discourse was focused on the fate of Pax Americana and the prevention of the West's decay. Rostow's goal setting seemed reasonable, conceptually and practically. Having elaborated the paradigm of "critical margin" he emphasised, "The United States does represent a significant margin of power and influence when it both expresses the majority will and is prepared to back its rhetoric with action. … The United States cannot impose its will on others as a hegemonic power, but big things are difficult to do in the world community without our active participation". (François Crouzet and Armand Clesse (Eds), *Leading the World Economically*, Amsterdam: Dutch University Press, 2003, p273) An identical idea in a polemically polished form was expressed by the Russian scholar Nodari A Simonia.

"Despite the efforts of a powerful American propaganda machine and many foreign and Russian experts who champion the idea of a 'unipolar world', the 'superpower' status of the United States belongs to the historical past—being the legacy or relic of this past. The lucrative perspective for the United States is to evolve into the first, but among equals, power of the world. All attempts to prove the opposite by strengthening the military aspects of its power projection in the international arena will not bring victory … turn out to be ineffective, but costly and therefore only exacerbate the already unenviable position of the United States as the world's largest debtor". (A Petrov (Ed), *"Catch-up Development" and what it is catching up with: A Search for Conception*, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2011, p11)

Kindlberger, Rostow and Thurow as part of America's "strategic elite"—their ideas intellectually supported the US policy line—were naturally cautious in their vision of the future. Deindustrialisation in the West created anxiety among both the ruling class and the business community. French President Jacques Chirac in evaluating the increased role of financial capital in the world economy in 1995 articulated his attitude unequivocally. "Speculation is the AIDS of our economies". (John Ralston Saul, *The Collapse of Globalism and the Reinvention of the World*, New York: Penguin

Books, 2005, p144) Post-bipolar globalisation has weakened the viability of capitalism and subverted the West as its conceptual embodiment. The behavioural principles of truncated globalisation essentially denied capitalism as an industrial mode of production. Large corporations avoided creating new enterprises that could result in lower prices for manufactured goods, strengthened their grip over markets thus reducing competition, increased their profits by again subduing competition and tried to minimise financial risks by limiting the number of market actors. (Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, "Dominant Capital and the New Wars", *Journal of World Systems*, vol10, no2, Summer 2004, pp255–327) Such conspicuous non-market behaviour ultimately brought about the expected demonstration effect in many developing countries/transitional economies. The reverent and sometimes servile attitude towards America and the West gradually gave way to a sober minded look at current events, pushing the "rest" to search for an alternative international relations paradigm.

The political, psychological and social attitudes in Africa, Asia and Latin America began to change. Simonia believes the turning point, invalidating the American version of capitalism, was the crisis of 2007–09.

> "Before the crisis, many politicians and intellectuals in Asia still had a belief that, despite a number of blunders, Western economic theory and practice were the most efficient tools globally, but … the crisis and worldwide recession forced many Asians to question Western competency". (Petrov, *ibid*, p25)

Doubts about the viability of American style globalisation were articulated in the West as early as the end of the twentieth century. A change of mood was inferred from the "closed" design of the business community and the resultant reluctance to deviate from corporate ethics, which were not exposed to comprehensive "thematic" debates even on existential issues. As Saul (*ibid*, p144) argued, the world of business "is a world of a pyramidal order, obedience within structures and solidarity among senior figures".

The financial and economic crisis of 2007–09, became both an instrument and a driving force for the destruction of the interstate coalition, which in 1991 had declared the principles of the Washington Consensus as its political "mission". The trajectory of this complex evolutionary process (which was rapid by global history standards) may be described schematically as follows. Truncated globalisation eroded the very foundations of the Western project, on the one hand and provoked and exacerbated conflict with the "rest" and between

developing countries (as well as within the latter) on the other. The crisis of globalisation eroded the capacity of both national (transitional societies) and international institutions. The weakening of international institutions together with the increasing polarisation of world development created an environment ready for international conflict and the extreme manifestation of such hostility took the form of a "clash of civilisations". The vacuum of power and control arising from destruction and decomposition (social structures) required newer actors and ideas. The claim that there could be no "alternative development" was proven false. A newer model of world politics, as well as the need for newer elites for competent management of the "new quality" international system became a necessity.

The collapse of the counter-centre, the Soviet Union, had twofold repercussions for the US and its allies. On the one hand, the dismemberment of the USSR "eclipsed" active economic growth and development in China, India, Indonesia and other non-Western societies, thereby loosening the vigilance of the Western elites and weakening the vitality of Western societies for which the former Soviet Union had been a strong and permanent incentive. On the other hand, the lack of historicism in the perception of world development, the visible manifestation of which were the "end of history" and related concepts, deprived the ruling classes of the West of a sober perspective on the evolution of Russian society after the collapse of the Soviet "Empire".

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Entities of imperial origin (Ancient Rome, Byzantium, Britain, Austria–Hungary, the Soviet Union and its historical predecessors) for political and economic reasons may be classified as "classical" and "non-classical". Classical empires, the conceptual embodiment of which was Great Britain, were organised on the principle of exploitation by the "centre" of the "periphery"—the latter, due to non-equivalent exchange, strengthened the metropolis economically and politically. The disruption in relations

resulted in Great Britain losing its global geopolitical status and its subsequent transformation into a state of auxiliary significance. The internal mechanisms of reproduction in non-classical empires worked somewhat differently, in particular in Austria–Hungary and monarchical Russia/the Soviet Union. The ruling classes in both empires, pressed by the influence of numerous outside challenges introduced the existential idea of an external security contour. The meaning of this notion was to protect the core of the system (Alpine and Danubian Austria and Russia proper) from external challenges with the assistance of territories that were treated as subsidiaries and dependent on imperial centres. Subsequently, the termination of subsidiary relations, despite the inevitable contraction of territory, did not entail irreversible economic and (geo)political consequences. "Decolonisation" theoretically created the conditions for the concentration of internal material resources and intellectual energy of society, that is, the former economic and military–political core of the empire, on the execution of a "development agenda".

In the West, the collapse of the Soviet Union was interpreted unambiguously as a harbinger of a further weakening of Russia and the country's inevitable loss of world power status. This view was implicitly supported by methods of institutional analysis (still adhered to in Anglo–Saxon countries), designed for a static, unchanging state of the international system, thereby ignoring dialectics and dynamics as guiding principles of societal evolution. Dilip Hiro (*After Empire: the Birth of a Multipolar World*, New York: Nation Books, 2010, pp5–6) has described the mobility and cyclical nature of international life at the beginning of the third millennium. "Developments … have cumulatively led to an international order with multiple poles, cooperating and competing with one another, with no single pole being allowed to act as the hegemonic power. Quite simply, the age-old balance of power is back at work". Thus, the beginning of the 2010s materialised the ideas of Kennedy (*ibid*) about new influentials (now regional leaders). In the early twenty-first century, this group was joined by Turkey and Iran with claims for regional leadership being articulated by Saudi Arabia as well. In addition, the ASEAN geoeconomic group made its presence felt as a geopolitical community. The "Leftist turn" in Latin America was directly related to the regrouping of forces on a national statist basis and reflected the collective desire of several states to defend their economic and political interests. Although the integration trends in Africa have not yet matured, the desire to unite efforts has become clearer

there as well.

The movement towards a new, polycentric world order has been a reflection of the ever-growing structural complexity of modern humankind. New countries joined this process of historical dimension as genuine actors but needed assurances of security. However, expectations of "global governance" to regulate globalisation in the interests of the "rest", as prominent intellectuals in the West and East had hoped for, have been shattered. (Deepak Nayyar (Ed), *Governing Globalisation: Issues and Institutions*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002) The time has come to transform "global governance" into a global collective security system. The construction of such a system should begin with the Eastern Mediterranean currently the main "incubator" of numerous inter and intrastate conflicts, originating in cultural, ethnic, historical and religious contradictions. It is an existential necessity to negotiate these controversies to bind the Eastern Mediterranean area as well as neighbouring territories into a single "set"— a system of collective security. If this model proves workable, its principles and arrangements could be extended to the rest of Asia and subsequently to other continents, including Europe.

In the polycentric global order, much will ultimately depend on the efficiency of the new influentials as well as Russia. The agenda for the latter has been outlined by the "Crimean Consensus", a collection of behavioural patterns spontaneously designed by the public mind. The consensus consists of two central principles, complementary to one another. First is a proactive foreign policy based on principles of sovereignty and "strategic autonomy" and the second is vigorous economic growth to resolve social dilemmas and push the advancement of science and technology, encouraging the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The polycentric organisation of humankind is too general a definition to reveal particular though

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important features of the new world order and regional politics. In principle, one may agree with Neklessa that the model of the future global structure will have a multi-tiered character. (Ilyin and Inozemtsev, *ibid*, p145) However, the process of globalisation has shaken the foundations of classification based on the usual principles of historical and political cartography. The algorithms of globalisation have changed under the influence of parametric troubles. These include the degradation of the environment, uncontrolled demographic growth in the South, increasing pressure on the Earth's resource potential, alarming levels of unemployment, overpopulation of urban centres (including in the "golden billion" area), migration as a new "natural calamity" turning into economic and social disaster, sharp deterioration in educational and professional standards everywhere, etc. The international architecture of the near future, reflective of the processes that were put into action in the mid-1980s, will preserve the hierarchical order. As French analyst Côme Carpentier de Gourdon, (Quoted in Alexei Kuznetsov's "Contours of Global Transformation" Moscow, Russia) has argued:

> "A brief era of unipolar American hegemony is now waning fast partly as a consequence of inner processes of decay and disintegration in the US and partly because of the rapid rise of the Asian giant states of China, Indonesia and India—on which many countries such as Australia and even the US are becoming economically dependent—the revival of Russia, the increasing autonomy of Latin America … and the undefeated defiance of a few 'resistant' states such as Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Syria, backed to a certain extent by the new great powers of the East and South".

Given the trends emerging in world politics, one may distinguish between two groups of states ("A" and "B") as supporting structures for the future global architecture. Group A would include Brazil, China, India, Japan, Russia the US and the states that form the historical and economic core of Western Europe. These states are expected to become new gravitational fields maintaining the integrity of world space, despite the interstate contradictions that exist between them. Group B would be composed of new regional leaders, like Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela (despite the persistence of domestic political turmoil), Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Indonesia, Iran, Turkey etc. The main function of the second group would be to sustain regional order and stability compensating for the inefficiency of regional and international

peacekeeping institutions. Calls for a transformation of the United Nations indirectly indicate uncertainty about the observance of principles and norms of global and regional security. The newer world order, no matter how blurry its future outlines, would rely on multilateral cooperation between states on a horizontal basis. Today, reform of the United Nations has become urgent and inevitable. However, for large-scale transformation to materialise, a new global consensus is needed, built on state–state relations, accompanied by a far-reaching transformation of the global financial architecture. Transition to a polycentric organisation of humankind will take time. In the transition period, the world would need supporting structures of global and regional stability in which the existing fora of international relations (ASEAN, BRICS, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, etc) would play an important role. Coordinating the activities of such interstate formats could reduce the economic and geopolitical costs of the "perilous passage" (Amiya Kumar Bagchi, *Perilous Passage: Mankind and the Global Ascendancy of Capital*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006) from a bankrupt Pax Americana to a polycentric global space, reflective of the genuine diversity of the modern world. W

BRICS AND THE THREAT OF A NEW GLOBAL SYSTEMIC CRISIS

This article lays out a comprehensive panorama of the global economic situation as it was on the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic and points out major weaknesses and crises brewing in the public and private sectors of the world's biggest economies. Although many of the problems predate the 2007–08 financial "great recession", they have become more acute in the last ten years. The current health emergency has compounded them and accelerated the looming breakdown of the economic and financial system. Thus, today there is a greater need for the creation of a new global monetary architecture.

PAOLO RAIMONDI

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic marks an epoch-making economic, political and social turnaround in the world and relations between peoples, populations and states will no longer be the same. Although there is as much rhetoric in this statement, there is much reality as well. As we have not lived through such an experience in human history, we cannot compare and draw on past examples and tested solutions. All of this could expose the world to risks worse than even the pandemic. Evaluation errors as well as leaps forward in the geopolitical and geoeconomic fields could trigger unwanted and unplanned conflicts, including those of a military nature. Before everyone's eyes, dangerous frictions are growing in numerous commercial, cultural, health and technological sectors. As detailed below, the pandemic crisis overlaps with a

global financial and banking crisis ready to explode. The growth of debt bubbles and various speculations far outweigh what led to the Great Crisis of 2008. The economic and financial effects of the pandemic will only exacerbate the risks of a new global systemic crash.

There are many cultural, educational, occupational and social effects of a lockdown of peoples and families. The production lockdown in turn will also have impacts that are difficult to quantify in the medium and long-term. What is certain for the moment is that reductions in the commercial and industrial sectors, in the long run will be in double figures. This is also true of job losses. It is no exaggeration to say that the effects of the ongoing crisis will be worse than those of the crash and the economic depression of 1929. Today, we can affirm with certainty the fundamental and virtuous roles of states and central banks as creditors of last resort. At the same time, markets have been put out of play with no real impact on economic processes. In fact, the preliminary estimates presented by Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, speak of over 8,000 billion dollars made available by governments to support their economies and employment and of an unlimited availability of liquidity by central banks, such as the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Board, to ensure some financial stability. The real problem lies in the fact that all these resources have to pass through the current, old, banking and financial system before reaching productive businesses and sectors. The banking system, particularly the "too big to fail" banks, is in great difficulty for its own faults and its exaggerated risk appetite and overexposure to financial speculation. It is a strangely silent international banking and financial system, eager to manage the gigantic flow of central liquidity in its own way—a never reformed system that operates the same way as before and after the Great Crisis.

Another sign of concern is that while governments have stopped the

> **The COVID-19 pandemic marks an epoch-making economic, political and social turnaround in the world. The pandemic crisis overlaps with a global financial and banking crisis ready to explode. While people are working frantically to develop a vaccine against the Coronavirus, the destructive virus of speculative finance has been operating undisturbed for too long with its effects dangerously underestimated.**

productive economy, financial markets have continued to operate freely as usual. Speculation, short-term financial transactions, over the counter derivatives, virtual futures on goods neither produced nor physically traded, stock exchange games, etc have not been put in lockdown. This perhaps is the most obvious demonstration of where world power really stands—the untouchables. There was even a shock and silent witnessing of the madness of the negative oil price bargained for minus 40 dollars a barrel, with the producer paying the buyer to buy and keep oil in stock. While people are working frantically to develop a vaccine against the Coronavirus, the destructive virus of speculative finance has been operating undisturbed for too long with its effects dangerously underestimated. These are the problems and shortcomings that should concern us the most.

The eleventh summit of the heads of state and government of BRICS (Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa) countries, held in Brasilia on 13–14 November 2019, prioritised "Economic Growth for an Innovative Future". (*BRICS: Final Declaration XI Summit,* Brasilia 2019, online at https://infobrics.org) In this regard, the preparatory work centred on strengthening cooperation in fields such as digitalisation, innovation, science and technology, as applicable to all sectors of the economy as well as the continued fight against organised crime, drug trafficking and money laundering. The meeting stressed the strategic role of the New Development Bank (NDB) and its close cooperation with the BRICS Business Council, the agency of consultation and programming comprising economists and industrialists. In their analysis of the overall economic situation, BRICS leaders, in their final declaration in Brasilia, raised concerns for the system's resilience. This was in contrast to previous meetings, where they had expressed appreciation for the improvements underway in the global economy and for a certain degree of acquired stability.

> "Since our last meeting, global economic growth has weakened and downside risks have increased. Trade tensions and policy uncertainty have taken a toll on confidence, trade, investment and growth. In this context, we recall the importance of open markets, fair, just and non-discriminatory business and trade environments, structural reforms, effective and fair competition, promoting investment and innovation, as well as financing for infrastructure and development. We stress the need for greater participation of developing countries in global value chains".

There has been a constant focus on the evolving international economic situation. It is important to remember that the group of BRICS countries was

established in the aftermath of the financial crisis and subsequent global recession of the first decade of the 2000s. The economic and political leadership of BRICS seems well aware of the risks of a new global crisis. Until Brasilia however, it had seemed unwilling to shed light on facts and details that evidenced the dangerous path that global finance has been again following. Contrary to ten years ago, the focus today should be on the trends of the financial markets and debt bubbles at an international level, particularly in the United States of America (US), since they still determine global financial processes. There is thus a need to understand current happenings as well as have the will to avoid past errors of omission and commission. This article is based on studies and reports published by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other official agencies.

THE DEBT BUBBLE

The world's aggregate debt (public and private) by end 2019 amounted to 255 trillion dollars. In 2018, it had been 177 trillion dollars—an increase of almost 80 trillion dollars in one year. The US and China together represent 60 per cent of the total. The aggregate debt of emerging economies has reached 71.4 billion dollars or 220 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP). The world debt, excluding the banking and financial sector, which in 2008 was 200 per cent of GDP has risen to 250 per cent. Of this debt, the part made up by bonds is particularly relevant. In ten years, there has been an increase from 87 to 115 trillion dollars. In this context, sovereign bonds (issued by states) have also risen from 40 per cent to 47 per cent of the total. Moreover, the share of emerging countries in the last decade has also risen from 17 to 28 trillion dollars. Since 2007, the world's public debt has more than doubled from 28.7 to 70 trillion dollars. In the same period, the American debt has tripled

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amounting today to one third of the total. According to the IMF, 85 per cent of the 24 economies involved in the bank crisis of 2008, 18 of which are in the advanced sector, have been manifesting negative deviations in respect of the pre-crisis trend. Their productivity level of 60 per cent is still below the level it had been before the crisis. (Wenjie Chen, Mico Mrkaic and Malhar S Nabar, *The Global Economic Recovery 10 Years After the 2008 Financial Meltdown*, IMF Working Paper 19/83, 26 April 2019, online at https://www.imf.org)

CORPORATE DEBT

The corporate bond bubble has become the biggest threat to the world's economic and financial systems. (Susan Lund, Jonathan Woetzel, Eckart Windhagen, Richard Dobbs and Diana Goldshtein, *Rising Corporate Debt: Peril or Promise*, McKinsey Global Institute, June 2018, online at https://www.mckinsey.com) It may be even worse than the subprime and real estate mortgage bubble of 2008. Corporate debt has reached a peak of 72.600 billion dollars, equal to 91.4 per cent of the world's GDP. These are bonds issued by companies for funding. The use of the capital market is undoubtedly a positive and important way to gain access to capital if used with great care. It is a way to gain liquidity necessary to innovate and modernise productive structures as well as extend the market perimeter. Unfortunately, as in many other financial and economic situations, abuse and lack of thoughtfulness will lead to disasters. In the last ten years, the world corporate bubble has risen by 27 trillion dollars. A particularly sharp rise has been registered in emerging economies with corporate debt increasing from twenty thousand to thirty thousand billion dollars. In relation to GDP, their corporate debt has risen from 56 to 105 per cent. In China, it has reached 15.4 trillion dollars. Beijing defends this trend by pointing out that the underlying assets are equal to 20 trillion yuan—a far better ratio than in many Western countries.

The facts and concerns about emerging economies outlined above have been confirmed by a study published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (*Trade and Development Report 2019*, online at https://unctad.org) According to the study, these economies have disproportionally indebted themselves, especially in the private sector, by the Federal Reserve's zero interest rate policy. Their percentage of corporate debt on a world level has increased from seven per cent in 2007 to 26 per cent in 2017. The IMF has underlined that 19 trillion dollars of corporate debt within the major economies—the US, China, Japan, Germany,

France, Italy and Spain—is at risk of defaulting in the face of a new economic crisis. In the US, the corporate debt bubble has reached 15.5 trillion dollars, surpassing the real estate one that amounts to approximately 11 trillion. The US could become the centre of a new and worse global financial crisis. Since 2008, the number of corporate bonds within the US has risen by 75 per cent. This has made the IMF recognise the possibility that a rise in interest rates could increase the risk of collapse of one-fifth of large American corporations. (*Financial Stability Report*, Federal Reserve Board, May 2019, online at https://www.federalreserve.gov)

SHADOW BANKING

The world of finance has also changed profoundly—banks are no longer in the first place. According to the Financial Stability Board (once headed by Mario Draghi) (*Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2018*, online at https://www.fsb.org) at the end of 2017, global financial assets amounted to 382.3 trillion dollars—five times more than the global GDP. Of these financial assets, 182 trillion dollars are managed by non-bank financial institutions, 151 trillion dollars by banks, 30 trillion dollars by central banks and the rest by public financial institutions. Non-bank financial institutions "entities and activities of credit intermediation that operate outside the normal banking system", are considered as and called shadow banking by the FSB.

> **At the end of 2017, global financial assets amounted to 382.3 trillion dollars—five times more than the global GDP. Of these financial assets, 182 trillion dollars are managed by non-bank financial institutions, 151 trillion dollars by banks, 30 trillion dollars by central banks and the rest by public financial institutions.**

Non-banking activities comprise insurance companies with 33 trillion dollars in assets centred in Europe and the US, pension funds with 33.6 trillion dollars, 60 per cent of which are in American hands and other financial intermediaries (OFI) with 116.6 trillion dollars. The last include various types of financial holdings, hedge funds, investment funds as well as other financial organisations, usually very "creative" and speculative. The Euro area of OFIs amounts to 32 trillion dollars, surpassing the US and China, with the latter going through an

extraordinary increase. Within OFIs, there is a sector in continuous development called the narrow measure of shadow banking, representing 51.6 trillion dollars in assets. According to the FSB, narrow measure operations are riskier than other instruments as they rely heavily on leverage—they operate with large numbers but little proper capital. A similar situation had been created on the eve of the 2008 crisis. Regarding narrow measures, the US is still in first place with 29 per cent, followed by Europe with 23 per cent and China with 16 per cent. Particularly relevant is the fact that the Cayman Islands, the quintessential tax haven, represents 10 per cent of the total.

Shadow banking within the US has increased vastly from 28 trillion dollars in 2010 to 45 trillion dollars today. Sheila Blair, former president of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the public agency that guarantees citizens' savings, fears an impending new economic crisis. "We are in a bubble … in such a situation it is absurd that the rules and requirements of bank capital have been watered down". She affirmed that it was not true that bubbles could be only recognised retrospectively, that is, after they burst. Rather, the only thing not possible to forecast was the moment of the burst. She also pointed out that the policy adopted by the Federal Reserve had done everything possible to sustain the bubble.

INDEX FUNDS

One of the most aggressive manifestations of shadow banking is represented by exchange trade funds—investment funds that operate according to a reference index. They collect capital and savings from different entities and invest in a portfolio of titles from corporations included in the Wall Street index. A study by Harvard University, (*The Spectre of the Giant Three*, online at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu) shows the growing power of the three American exchange trade funds—BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors and Vanguard. In this context, an emblematic case is that of Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500). The three giants together handle 14 trillion dollars in financial assets (assets under management). Their growth has been huge. In the last ten years, 80 per cent of all capital that has gone to investment funds has been concentrated in their hands. In twenty years, their share of big American corporations, that are part of S&P 500, has quadrupled from 5.2 per cent to 20.7 per cent. Black Rock and Vanguard effectively hold

more than five per cent each of shares from all American companies listed in the S&P 500. The Harvard study (*ibid*) estimates that the "three giants" represent 25 per cent of votes on the board of directors of the companies in question. After the too big to fail banks, whose hazardous nature was denounced by different investigations conducted by various commissions within the American Congress, there is now the rising problem of excessive financial and managerial concentration in these exchange trade funds.

THE OTC DERIVATIVES

The financial derivatives sector has also avoided the control and containment attempts of American financial reform through the Dodd-Frank Act. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel has published a series of studies on the over the counter (OTC) derivatives market. (*BIS Quarterly Review*, December 2019, online at https://www.bis.org and previous reports) It highlights that over the years their notional value, at a global level, has been between a minimum of 500,000 billion dollars and a maximum of 650,000 billion dollars. A number not particularly distant form the 700,000 billion dollars of the great crisis. OTCs are financial derivatives that are not regulated, are exchanged outside the regular markets, are often kept out of budgets and maybe regarded as the most dangerous fruits of financial deregulation. The European Securities and Markets Authority in its annual report on the situation of derivatives has stated that at the end of 2017, the European market alone had registered a notional value of 660 trillion euros, of which more than 542 trillion were OTCs. From the report, it is clear that

> **Over the counter financial derivatives are not regulated, are exchanged outside the regular markets, are often kept out of budgets and maybe regarded as the most dangerous fruits of financial deregulation. At the end of 2017, the European market alone had registered a notional value of 660 trillion euros, of which more than 542 trillion were OTCs.**

regulated derivatives, the less risky ones, represent only a fraction of the market. The analysis is based on data provided by the BIS. At the end of 2017, the bank had quantified the total number of derivatives at the global level at 622 trillion dollars of which 532 trillion dollars were OTCs. BIS has highlighted that the

"European component" of the derivatives market amounts to one-fourth of the total. If such an estimate were confirmed, then the OTC bubble would be much bigger than anticipated. In this regard, it is important to stress that in the past, the big American banks always held the top places within the OTC market. Today surprisingly, the German Deutsche Bank holds the first place with OTCs for a notional value of 43,500 billion euros.

TURBULENCE IN THE MONETARY SYSTEM

Since the default of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the international monetary system has been in continuous and sometimes tumultuous turbulence. Even an economist of the American bank JP Morgan, the biggest too big to fail bank, has admitted that the era of the dollar as a currency for international transactions may be ending. "The dollar might lose its status as the main international currency". (Craig Cohen, *Is the Dollar's "Exorbitant Privilege" Coming to an End*, JP Morgan, 10 July 2019, online at https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com) This shows that important changes have been taking place within the international monetary system, as the dollar has been the dominant currency for almost a century. (Mark Carney, *The Growing Challenges for Monetary Policy in the Current International Monetary and Financial System*, Speech by the Governor of the Bank of England, Jackson Hole Symposium, August 2019, online at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk)

More than 70 years after the Bretton Woods agreement, the world's economy has changed drastically. New economic actors have emerged, among them BRICS countries and the European Union. The dollar is still the currency used in more than 60 per cent of commercial operations worldwide and is still the principle reserve currency, but the influence of the American economy compared with the rest of the world has declined. China, for example, has been using the yuan in many international trade agreements and has been moving to bypass the dollar even in the energy market. The international stock exchange in Shanghai has launched yuan denominated crude oil futures. In just a few months, the share of deals concluded in the yuan reached ten per cent of total exchanges. The composition of monetary reserves has been undergoing a transformation as well. In the last ten years, the share of gold in Russian reserves has increased tenfold. The Bank of Russia in Moscow holds 2190 tonnes of gold with an approximate value of 90 billion dollars—one-fifth of all Russian reserves. In 2018, the bank halved its dollar reserves from 45.8 per cent of total reserves to 22.7 per cent— dollars were substituted with euros that went up from 21.7 per cent to 31.7 per

cent and yuans that rose from 2.8 per cent to 14.2 per cent of total reserves.

Every month China buys tonnes of gold, a part of which is used to increase the country's reserves. The total quantity of gold amounts to approximately two thousand tonnes and there is still a high margin of growth since gold amounts to only 3.5 per cent of total Chinese reserves. The concentration of gold is still higher within the US, which holds 8200 tonnes of gold, equal to 70 per cent of total American reserves. A similar percentage is true for Germany while in Italy with almost 2450 tonnes gold represents 66 per cent of the country's reserves. The trend, both at a global level and in Western industrialised countries to replace the dollar in the composition of reserves with gold and other currencies, has been ongoing swiftly. The progressive loss of confidence in the "dollar system" has been confirmed by the distancing of many institutional investors from American government bonds as well. In the past, Russia was one of the main investors in Treasury Bonds. In 2010, it held 176 billion dollars of American bonds. Today its share has dropped to 12 billion dollars. Month after month, China, the biggest investor in Treasury Bonds, has been selling bonds worth tens of billions of dollars. In the last two years, it has reached a minimum with less than 1100 billion dollars in Treasury Bonds. A similar trend is visible in other countries such as Great Britain and Japan as well.

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TARIFF WARS AND THE USE OF PARALLEL CURRENCIES

Every action has a reaction that sometimes surprises those that start the action. This has been the case of tariff and sanction policies. These engendered conditions for the birth of a parallel monetary system based on the yuan, usable

both in commercial exchanges and as a reserve currency. China and Russia have signed an agreement for the use of financial instruments in roubles and yuan to cover up to 50 per cent of bilateral trade in the next few years. The realisation of the Belt and Road Initiative (*Belt and Road News*, online at https://www.beltandroad.news) and the financial role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (online at https://www.aiib.org) would be essential to internationalise the yuan. A group of economists from BRICS countries have prepared a detailed study (*Use of National Currencies in International Settlements: Experience of BRICS Countries*, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017, online at https://en.riss.ru) which states that up to 2016, the volume of China's trade in renminbi was 22 per cent and that of Russia's in roubles was 20 per cent. The currencies from other BRICS countries are still far from such values. Regarding total international inter-bank transactions, the Chinese currency represents only 1.6 per cent, the South African rand 0.8 per cent and the Russian rouble 0.25 per cent. Although these numbers seem insignificant, ten years ago nobody in the Western world would have imagined such developments. These trends strengthen the idea of replacing the dollar as a reference currency with a basket of currencies. This would be an equitable, pacific and rational evolution towards a new monetary system reflecting a new multipolar world. Meanwhile, the IMF in reviewing its participation fees has recognised China's increased economic role. From October 2016, the renminbi has been part of the IMF's special drawing rights currency basket—the monetary reserve currency created by it.

CONVENTIONAL ANSWERS ARE NOT ENOUGH

In a possible new crisis, the BIS believes a bailout from central banks might not be enough as the parameters for action have changed drastically. Today the causes for a possible recession are linked more to the financial system, as it is a protagonist of unsustainable growth. The BIS acknowledges that expansive monetary policies were necessary to bring the economies of the most advanced industrial countries out of the crisis. Quantitative easing policies, with the injection of new liquidity for the purchase of public bonds and other investments, such as the asset-backed securities owned by banks, have produced a series of effects that in the long-term might be destabilising. Among other things, they have had the effect of inflating the budgets of central banks. The Federal Reserve's budget has risen from 800 billion dollars in 2008 to 4050 billion dollars today. That of the Central European Bank has risen from 2000 billion euros in 2008 to 4700

billion euros today. Together, the four most important central banks, the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the People's Bank of China have collected assets of more than 20 trillion dollars. That is, more than 100 per cent of Japan's GDP, 40 per cent of China and the Eurozone and approximately 20 per cent of the US.

The policy of zero interest rates, coupled with the availability of huge amounts of liquidity have degenerated the capital market. (Carlo Altavilla, Lorenzo Burlon, Mariassunta Giannetti and Sarah Holton, *Is there a Zero Lower Bound: The Effects of Negative Policy Rates on Banks and Firms*, European Central Bank Working Paper series 2289, June 2019, online at https://www.ecb.europa.eu) In this regard, estimates by the IMF show that 17 trillion dollars of both public and private bonds register negative interest rates. This situation has put a strain on institutions that operate on long-term basis, such as life insurance companies and pension funds, while reducing the profitability of many banks, especially in Europe. Such a trend cannot keep expanding and be sustainable over time without causing upheavals in the markets. Expansive monetary policies have generated situations of moral hazard unleashing a strong search for profit and excessive risk-taking. Such permissive conditions for funding have also kept alive "zombie companies"— companies that that are not profitable enough to pay interest. (*Global Financial Stability Report: Lower for Longer*, IMF, October 2019, online at https://www.imf.org)

> **Estimates by the IMF show that 17 trillion dollars of both public and private bonds register negative interest rates. This situation has put a strain on institutions that operate on long-term basis, such as life insurance companies and pension funds, while reducing the profitability of many banks, especially in Europe. Such a trend cannot keep expanding and be sustainable over time without causing upheavals in the markets.**

In case of a worsening economic situation, central banks today have few instruments with which to intervene—all the instruments of different and non-conventional monetary policies have been used to exhaustion. A major concern for central banks is the risk of a rise in inflation—in a situation where it would be necessary to contain inflation, interest rates would have to rise. This could shut down an economic system already under stress, especially with regard to the corporate bond sector and other bubbles previously mentioned. At such a point, the effect on the global debt would be difficult to handle. (*Unconventional Monetary Policy Tools: A Cross-Country Analysis*, BIS, Committee on the Global Financial System Paper 63, October 2019, online at https://www.bis.org)

WARNINGS AND CONCERNS

Many economists have raised concerns about the new economic crisis. According to Jacques de Larosière, ("Sortir la Politique Monétaire de l'impasse", *Les Echos*, 12 September 2019, online at https://www.lesechos.fr) former governor of the central bank of France, former director of the IMF and author of a 2009 report of the European Union Commission for the construction of the European Systemic Risk Board, accommodative monetary policies of central banks have undermined the financial system, making possible future adjustments impracticable. The idea that central banks must keep the inflation level at two per cent, intended as a manifestation of the right course in managing monetary policies and the economy, is wrong. People that adhere to this idea, affirm that under this level there would always be the risk of deflation, that is, a fall in prices. Larosière believes that the annual inflation target should be lowered to one per cent. This is because certain structural factors profoundly change the data that determine consumer price, including the ageing of the population, technological advancements that reduce the cost of production and globalisation that has allowed the worldwide proliferation of cheap goods produced in areas with low salaries and static labour markets. Therefore, the one per cent target would in no way be a deflatory target. Larosière has also highlighted how the protracted and exaggerated zero interest rate policy has produced other serious consequences. These include a strong inclination towards debt, a weakening of the banking sector, a worsening of the budgets of pension funds with investments in government bonds with no returns, the proliferation of "zombie companies", as interest rates have stopped playing a role as a discriminating "quality index" and finally the push towards investments and financial products with high risks and a disincentive for governments to enact structural reforms. Moreover, with zero interest rates, companies, instead of making new investments, are pushed to produce more debt with which they buy their own stocks in the market. Larosière admonishes that this creates an illusion of stability.

THE ROLE OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK

BRICS countries are aware of the current situation. In this regard, in their final declaration of the Brasilia 2019 summit, they made an explicit reference for

the necessity of coordinated reform action in all sectors of the economy.

> "We will continue to cooperate within the G20 and advance the interests of emerging market economies and developing countries. While noting that the BRICS countries have been the main drivers of global growth over the last decade and currently represent close to a third of global output, we are convinced that continued implementation of structural reforms will enhance our growth potential. Trade expansion among BRICS members will further contribute to strengthening international trade flows. We further advocate for continued use of fiscal, monetary and structural policies to achieve strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth. We call on major advanced and emerging market economies to continue policy dialogue and coordination in the context of the G20 and other fora to advance these objectives and to address potential risks".

To show the concrete contribution of BRICS countries to the growth and development of key sectors of the real economy, the 2019 summit enhanced the role of the New Development Bank (NDB). Founded in 2014, its main objective is to finance the development of infrastructures. The NDB can now count on a fifty billion dollar capital to be made fully available by 2027 of which ten billion dollars have been already deposited. Around fifty projects have been already financed for a total of 15 billion dollars. The bank has been very active. In Brazil, it has funded the construction of logistic hubs for physical connections with remote areas. During the Brasilia summit, funding was signed for the North Region Transportation Infrastructure Improvement Project aimed at improving the capacity to move raw materials from mines to ports.

The New Development Bank has in Brazil funded the construction of logistic hubs for physical connections with remote areas. In Russia, in addition to infrastructure, financing has been given to projects designed to improve access to historical and cultural centres. In India, investments are centred on water management projects and connecting rural areas with markets. China has been using bank funds to improve the environment, while South Africa has been focusing on energy and water projects.

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The management of the NDB has confirmed to BRICS countries and the world, its commitment to issue credit in local currencies—40 per cent of its portfolio in South Africa is in rands. The demand for loans in yuan, for Chinese projects, has been rising quickly as well. The organisational structure of the bank has been expanding. It already has offices in Johannesburg, Shanghai and Sao Paulo while offices in Moscow and New Delhi are in the offing. The bank also intends to admit new associates from emerging countries to reach a base capital of ninety billion dollars by 2027. This important credit institute also intends to develop innovative credit instruments that are both non-speculative and guaranteed by capital and investments. Moreover, with help from China's Central Bank, the NDB has already collected six billion yuan through the issue of bonds in the Shanghai market. (KV Kamath (President NDB), *Report of the President on the Status of the New Development Bank*, XI BRICS Summit 2019, Brasilia, November 2019, online at https://www.ndb.int)

In Brasilia, discussions were also held on the progress of the BRICS Local Currency Bond Fund for the development of local bond markets. These operations focus on the necessity to elude progressively the control of a system dominated by the dollar. Along with the NDB, a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) was also created with the task of protecting BRICS' economies and finances in case of the instability of markets or currencies. During the Brasilia meeting, it was highlighted that the alert system of the CRA had successfully conducted a second test of preparedness to counter a possible external economic crisis.

The final declaration of Brasilia also reaffirmed the commitment to overcome growing threats to multilateralism, with a special focus on the role of the United Nations in international affairs. It also stated the need to reform international organisations such as the IMF, the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation to give a bigger role to both emerging and developing countries as part of a fair and inclusive multilateral international order. The latter organisation should play a more independent role in the conflicts over trade. At Brasilia, concerns were also expressed over continuous commercial tensions that "have taken a toll on confidence, trade, investment and growth" at the world level. The other commitments undertaken by BRICS encompass a broad field

ranging from the protection of biodiversity, the environment and soil, to the fight against desertification and peaceful development in space.

Finally, BRICS countries again lamented that another year had gone by without a redefinition of IMF quotas since 2010. That the US and its dollar system fear losing their current economic and monetary power is comprehensible—that the European Union and other countries are willing to play Washington's game is less understandable. It is surely self-harming. Europe with other partners should play a central role in the process of systemic global reform in the areas of currency, economy, finance, trade and international relations.

CONCLUSION

Based on data and the situation as detailed in this article on debt bubbles and reckless finance, this paper concludes with preliminary considerations on necessary interventions. The ongoing planetary crisis has created many challenges but also given a historical opportunity to plan the creation of a new global architecture of commerce, the economy and finance. Similarly, the pandemic could be easier to overcome through a joint commitment by all governments and economic and social forces whose future is at stake. The current situation is often compared with the period of institutional reconstruction after the Second World War. Today however the need is not for a "new Bretton Woods" but rather a new global architecture. The Bretton Woods system built by a few great powers, mainly Britain and the US, was an important but unfortunately partial project, as it left out most of the countries in the world—emerging nations and the socialist sector—where the vast majority of people live. To maintain peace and defeat the coming winds of wars, it is necessary to face the challenge of redesigning global institutions of civilian life, respecting the principles of cooperation, development

> Today the need is for a new global architecture. To maintain peace and defeat the coming winds of wars, it is necessary to face the challenge of redesigning global institutions of civilian life, respecting the principles of cooperation, development and freedom. Current institutions are worn and dated and require revision based on cultural, political, social and technological changes.

and freedom. Current institutions are worn and dated and require revision based on cultural, political, social and technological changes.

Among the new institutions, it is imperative to lay the foundations for a new fair and just international monetary system built around a basket of currencies. It is clear that today's world and economic and political actors are not of 75 years ago. The dollar alone is no longer able to support the entire monetary, commercial and reserve system. In the meantime, new important players have emerged, including China, India, the BRICS grouping, the European Union and the Eurasian Union. Sharing responsibilities in a multipolar way is the sine qua non condition to resolving the new challenges in a cooperative and peaceful way. A redefinition of the role of the state and of public–private relationship is also inevitable, increasingly in the direction of the principles of the social market. The rediscovery of a productive credit system would be fundamental to finance long-term investments as opposed to finance that has become too speculative, short-lived, high risk and without controls. The entire banking system must be standardised along this reality principle. A necessary step is the separation of banking operations, as previously established by American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Today more than ever, we need to appreciate the importance of a creditor and a guarantor of last resort who has the strength and competence to stabilise the market. Until yesterday, markets were considered the new Olympians, committed to keeping away any institutional correction or reform. Today however, we see them again queuing to knock on the doors of states and central institutions in search of aid and support. The most important question is—do governments, institutions and citizens possess the virtues required to build a new fairer and more just order after the pandemic shock? ▨

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The Imperatives Of National Security Vis-À-Vis Globalisation

The economic rationale has become the predominant factor for all countries today. Accordingly, the overall interactions between nations are shaped by economic imperatives governed by the ongoing processes of globalisation and liberalisation. However, the present age of fast expanding internet facility provides greater space to cyber-criminals. Hackers access private personal data, industrial and strategic secrets and steal or destroy important confidential information in critical sectors like defence, finance and telecommunications. Such actions have raised the alarm about national security in most countries.

SUDHANSHU TRIPATHI

INTRODUCTION

Today, in the age of fast expanding internet facility, cyber-crime has increased whereby hackers using computers peep into private personal documents, national secrets and even change or destroy important confidential information related to services essential for critical sectors like defence, finance and telecommunications. As ongoing research and development has become increasingly dependent on information technology and computer science, it has become prone to a variety of cyber-threats. Computer hackers target important government institutions, private mega business enterprises and security related establishments with the objective of stealing their intellectual property and sensitive information to earn billions of dollars by passing them to "enemies".

There is a need to deepen knowledge on national security in contemporary circumstances, more so as the term "national security" is often misused to connote

different perspectives by both academics and policymakers to serve their own concerns and vested interests. While some use it to refer to conventional statist threats, others employ it as a broad catchall phrase for anything that may create or imply threats against anyone in a particular polity. Still others use the term to support populist and politicised policy choices with apparently little to justify the link between the threat and the referent object (the state) in the context of international relations. In such a confusing scenario, state capacity in identifying, categorising and responding to different threats has been stretched by the process of globalisation and advancements in technology, apart from a host of dangers ranging from transnational actors to natural disasters. (Matthew Sussex, Michael Clarke and Rory Medcalf, "National Security: Between Theory and Practice", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol71, no5, 2017, pp474–8)

> National security is often misused to connote different perspectives by both academics and policymakers to serve their own concerns and vested interests. While some use it to refer to conventional statist threats, others employ it as a broad catchall phrase for anything that may create or imply threats against anyone in a particular polity. Still others use the term to support populist and politicised policy choices with apparently little to justify the link between the threat and the referent object (the state) in the context of international relations.

The present article discusses the ongoing debate over the mounting challenges before national security against a backdrop of the sweeping wave of globalisation and liberalisation. It explores probable threats to national security while historicising and contextualising contemporary views and discussions on globalisation. The paper also analyses the potential threats to global peace and security that may affect the national security of different nations and disrupt the accruing benefits of the ongoing globalisation process. It concludes by suggesting some options to ward-off the threats.

EXPANDING GLOBALISATION

The current ongoing process of globalisation is an entirely new paradigm of complex cultural, politico-military and socioeconomic relations. It includes different kinds of relationships, linking places and people to an extent qualitatively

and quantitatively different from any other historical phase of global integration or interaction. The political transformation is the culmination of the growth of the power of multinational corporations and the increasing role of global financial markets. However, grave dangers to state power have already emerged due to cyber-invasions in almost all areas of human endeavour, particularly in the field of counter strategy, economics, the military and national security. These adversely affect the political and sociocultural stability of a state. The uniqueness of the globalisation process lies in the spontaneity of the transformations it engenders through satellite based information and communication technology as well as quick cashless electronic money transfer around the world at the click of a mouse.

While the effects of the ongoing globalisation in the contemporary world remain contested, there is no doubt that in the last few decades the unprecedented growth in global relations has been dominated by a neoliberal approach. This comprises deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation with a view to pushing forward trade and commerce and in theory promoting economic prosperity, infrastructural growth and general wellbeing around the world. Logical and sophisticated discussions on globalisation converge around interactions between local specifics and national politics accompanied by economic demands while deriving support from widespread social movements for the correction of existing anomalies, deficiencies and discrepancies. These are related largely to cultural cooperation, global peace, prosperity and security, the protection of the environment and the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights. The promotion of soft power has been paving the way towards global emotional integration by encouraging the rationalisation of diverse national interests without affecting local specificities.

The neoliberal policy approach was first put into practice by countries like Britain and the United States of America (US) to protect their respective economic interests against the backdrop of the rising economic activities of other fast developing countries. They wanted to increase their share of the world economy, particularly international trade and consolidate their position in regional and global economic fora. Small and middle developing powers such as Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, South Africa and Vietnam initially viewed globalisation with suspicion, as an economic monster invented by the US led developed world for integrating smaller national economies with the global economy dominated by major Western powers. This process was carried out through multiple channels of governance, including

multilateral international agencies and institutions, national governments as well as private institutions. The adoption of this policy approach resulted in the radical transformation of the regulation of economic, political and social interactions. Dicta such as the "phasing out of the state", the "retreat of the state" and even the "end of the state" were pronounced across the world in the face of the unrelenting powerful forces of globalisation, governance, institutions and markets. (Peter Newell, "Global Challenges to the Future State", *Seminar*, no503, July 2001 and World Bank, *World Development Report: The State in a Changing World,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, online at http://documents.worldbank.org)

These process have led to the emergence of "a new dynamic between the local and the global", with a greater awareness of the importance of "glocalisation" or the "the interaction and merger between local cultures and global processes". (Bryan S Turner (Ed), *The Routledge International Handbook of Globalisation Studies*, London: Routledge, 2010 pp1–6) Globalists today argue in favour of shedding international barriers and transforming the international community of nations into one global community or even a world state. "Political power or governance has been or is being progressively altered in the movement of politics from a primarily national scale towards an increasingly transnational global scale". (Chamsy El-Ojeili and Patrick Hayden, *Critical Theories of Globalisation*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p97) Although the state has not become utterly powerless nor has it "withered away", as Karl Marx had argued, most services essential for critical sectors like defence, finance and telecommunications have become increasingly dependent on information technology, which in turn has left them open to different kinds of cyber-threats. Moreover, differences and conflicts between the developed (powerful), developing and underdeveloped (poor) nations of the world have become more pronounced. The trend has been "towards a reconfiguration of power or governance rather than simply the end of the state in the face of the expansion of capitalism". (El-Ojeili and Hayden, *ibid*)

Despite such factors adversely affecting the powers of the political community, the state has retained sovereign authority in the face of grave threats to national security and in exercising foreign policy based on its own judgment of international issues. For example, India has adhered to a policy of nonalignment since independence. Today, it enjoys good prospects and opportunities brought by the current phase of globalisation with implications for the dynamic nature of the nation-state with regard to its citizenry, democracy, economic progress, external ventures as well as global peace and security. Globalisation has increased connectivity around the world with easier, faster, open access to and flow of all information and communication processes. It has led to the emergence of free trade areas and regions with rapid infrastructure build-up, increasing the volume of trade and traffic around the world.

GLOBALISATION: A COMPLEX PHENOMENON

The ongoing politico-socioeconomic process of globalisation has different connotations in varying academic disciplines, making it a complex juggernaut phenomenon. In the field of economics, it entails challenges ranging from a reduction of trade barriers to the unrestrained flight of capital and cutthroat competition. In the area of politics, there is a perpetual quest for minimising mistrust among communities within nations and maximising avenues for reciprocally beneficial cooperation between nations. Sociologists have woven together the contours of economics and politics, particularly in the context of strong linkages between globalisation and extremism, including global terrorism. As terrorism continues to wreak havoc around the world, the current discourse on organised violence has vociferously raised the issue of national security in the internal and external affairs of polity in almost every country. The concept of national security today focuses on finding ways and means to deal with these threats. As stated before, globalisation has diluted the sovereignty and power of states through technological advancements and the easy availability of funds as well as small yet lethal firearms. As an obvious outcome, non-state actors and organised cartels have mushroomed, challenging the peace, security and normal life of innocent people, apart from threatening the very existence and sovereign power of states. The crimes committed by al-Qaeda and ISIS/Islamic State in the recent past make one question the survival of humanity itself.

Although, of late globalisation has faced political wrangles with qualitative

differences in the way people relate to one another, the transition has been too slow to comprehend in clear terms.

"Globalisation 1.0 began with Columbus' journey in 1492 and lasted until 1800, when the agent had been physical power. In Globalisation 2.0 from 1800 to 2000, the driving force had been multinational corporations. In the current phase of Globalisation 3.0, the defining force is the individual and the lever that is enabling individuals and groups to go global so easily … is not hardware but software". (Thomas L Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Globalised World in the Twenty-First Century*, London, Allen Lane, 2005)

The ever-developing technology of software design and rising computer power, including the revolution in information technology have made the security concerns of almost every nation more complex. This necessitates a better understanding and analysis of the concept of security in the arena of international relations and global affairs.

THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Security in the field of international relations today, is a broad concept encompassing all aspects of interactions between nations with regard to addressing potential threats that directly or indirectly affect them. Unfortunately, the concept remained neglected until the 1980s due to diverse factors. These included a lack of interest among scholars and strategists, particularly critics of realism and an overlapping of the concept with "power". Moreover, security experts focused more in developing technology and strategies instead of delving into conceptual evolution and its enrichment. At times even concerned policymakers, deliberately let the concept degenerate into ambiguity and confusion to suit their vested interests. However, due to several disturbing upheavals and resultant changes in the global scenario during the late 1980s and early 1990s and thereafter, growing academic interest led to the emergence of various schools in connection with the concept of security. These include critical theory, feminist theory, globalism, liberalism, realism and neorealism and third world theory to name a few—all interpreting the concept of security in different ways in accordance with their perceptions.

Prominent among the various theorists are a host of experts and scholars

like Ken Booth, Bernard Brodie, Barry Buzan, WB Gallie, Klaus Knorr, Richard Smoke, Kenneth N Waltz, Arnold Wolfers, American Secretary of Defence Harold Brown and many more. While Gallie ("Essentially Contested Concepts", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, vol56, 1955–56, pp167–98) considers security an "essentially contested concept", for Wolfers ("'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol", *Political Science Quarterly*, vol67, no4, 1952, p483) it is too confusing and inadequately explicated a term to be defined as a clear policy objective. To add to the dilemma, Wolfers also distinguishes between the subjective and objective dimensions of security. As David A Baldwin ("The Concept of Security", *Review of International Studies*, vol23, no1, 1997, pp5–26) has argued, "the purpose of discussion is not to settle the issue, but only to point out that the question is more difficult to answer than those who classify security as an essentially contested concept imply". There is a need to pay attention to alternative security policies with a view to lessening the degree of threat perception for a state, which varies in the hierarchical present day world order. As aptly stated by some experts, "The threat matrix for virtually all the major powers has changed markedly alongside the securitisation of numerous challenges that are transnational, environmental and effectively 'intermestic' in nature". (Sussex, Clarke and Medcalf, *ibid*)

Nonetheless, given the current configuration of states, the domestic and external forms of national security in the global community may be considered on national parameters—as integral and vital parts of the domestic interests of nations. The term "national security" is confusing as it is interpreted in a loose manner in discussing and defining various situations to connote all possible meanings. It ranges from different forms of human security to the security of nations. It broadly comprises energy security, environmental security, environmental and ecological balance, food security, human security, human rights security, military security, safety from nuclear weapons, potable water security and other such extant aspects or even those likely to emerge in the future.

Along with the concept of security, the concept of national security has also evolved over time due to a combination of domestic and external factors depending on global cultural, economic, political and social conditions and their impact on the national priorities of states. Security was considered in terms of conflict/ war and peace until the onset of the current era of globalisation that brought new dimensions to the concept of national security. In fact, national security is presently at a crucial juncture amidst a nexus of domestic and international forces. Such compulsions also provide a conceptual approach to understanding and articulating emerging challenges in the interconnected world including

the cyber-domain, where sovereignty is challenged by transnational actors that threaten with biological and nuclear weapons, civil war, heinous crimes, human bombs, military interventions, organised violence, the deliberate polluting of the environment including potable water and food, terrorism and other unimaginably grave dangers. The evolution of the concept has revolved around the material and physical threats to individuals and states as autonomous independent entities.

According to Baldwin, (*ibid*) such efforts are concerned more with redefining the different policy agendas of nation-states than with the concept of security itself. They often prioritise crucial issues like the violation of human rights and the suppression of democracy, global economic recession, environmental pollution, drug trafficking, epidemics and unknown infections, organised crimes, civil wars and various sociocultural injustices prevailing in feudal or dictatorial systems particularly in poor developing countries, apart from traditional security concerns like external military aggression and today's gravest threat of all terrorism including global extremism and religious fundamentalism. Such agendas are usually upheld by invoking normative and conventional imperatives of ensuring the protection of the people at large or diverse groups of people and empirical arguments on the nature and magnitude of different perils and their threat to the values that need to be taken into account and analysed for preventive measures to be determined. However, relatively little attention is devoted to conceptual issues that may help in theorising the concept as a meaningful tool of independent or autonomous research, thereby leading to the emergence of new aspects or interpretations that may enrich it as a theoretical concept undergoing independent and rigorous analysis with a view to exploring preventive measures. It is therefore necessary "to separate the concept of security from the surrounding normative and empirical connotations, despite manifesting reasonable as well as legitimate grounds of similarities causing considerable complications". (Baldwin, *ibid*)

While many scholars emphasise conventional challenges or risks leading to physical injury or material loss, others use a broad fulcrum for causes that

National security is presently at a crucial juncture amidst a nexus of domestic and international forces. Such compulsions also provide a conceptual approach to understanding and articulating emerging challenges in the interconnected world including the cyber-domain, where sovereignty is challenged by transnational actors that pose grave dangers.

may result in deprivation, destruction, dissociation or that may be agonising, detrimental, painful or traumatic to anyone in a polity or political society. Information technology and the diffusion of the internet that have evolved as marked features of the ongoing globalisation process provide opportunities for computer hackers and cyber-criminals to distort, destroy or steal data to sell for profit causing grave danger to the national security of a country. Although this process has gradually affected an increasing number of societies and nations, its impact has been varied and uneven, particularly in third world countries. "National security is no more purely about domestic issues such as civil wars or counterterrorism, confined to old-fashioned considerations focusing on armed or paramilitary forces. In fact, in the current interdisciplinary study of national security, no nation or discipline can be totally isolated as an independent entity or an island having no interactions with the outside world". (Sussex, Clarke and Medcalf, *ibid*) Nonetheless, the nation state remains the referent object of the defence mechanisms of security. The concept of national security today stands for a particular kind of security arrangement by which all stakeholders may live in peace and go about their normal daily routine without anxiety and panic or suffering mental trauma by being preoccupied over security of any kind. Some experts argue that it has now become common to refer to a "traditional" national security paradigm in which the state is irrelevant or redundant and incapable of adapting to the desired change. (Rudra Sil and Peter J Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)

The concept of national security acquires an operational dimension when a real threat is identified. In discussions on security, from the personal to the international, there is an implicit or explicit element of threat. "Security against recession, against illegal search and seizure, against military attacks, against inflation, against erosion of security, etc—all assume a threat". (Richard H Ullman, "Redefining Security", *International Security*, vol8, no1, Summer 1981, p129) Without losing the core concerns of security the scope of the debate needs to be widened. An excessively militarised definition of national security portrays a profoundly wrong image of the concept, (Ullman, *ibid*), as it draws attention away from non-military threats, which include cultural, economic, environmental, human and social issues and values. Wolfers' (*ibid*) characterisation of security as "the absence of threats to acquired values" captures the basic intuitive notion underlying most uses of the term security but remains unclear as it fails to rule out the ambiguity implied with the absence of threats. However, ignoring these issues would be harmful and dangerous to the security of nations. (Ullman, *ibid*)

On the concept of national security, neorealists as assert that "no theory of international politics emphasises security more than neorealist asset posits it as the primary motive of states". (Baldwin, *ibid*) Another scholar has stated that it is "foolish to depict national security as an old-fashioned, ambiguous, narrow concept". (Edward Newman, "Critical Human Security Studies", *Review of International Studies*, vol36, no1, 2010, pp77–94) In the contemporary world, it is wrong to limit the concept to the exclusive domain of *realpolitik* and the outmoded conceptions of national interests. Others however believe that in the current complex scenario, "the observation held by TV Paul and Norrin Ripsman (*Globalisation and the National Security State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) seems reasonable and justified that states are indeed the basic security actors in international relations". (Sussex, Clarke and Medcalf, *ibid*) Thus, there is a need for a deeper exploration of knowledge on national security in the present contemporary situation of rising insecurities of states, especially due to mounting threats of global terror. There is a real threat today of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists who could cause inmense damage to

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mankind and the planet with the push of a button. This is particularly so since the capacities of states to identify, categorise and respond to such threats from transnational actors have been scattered in many directions, lacking a desired focus.

Dietrich Fischer (*Non-military Aspects of Security: A Systems Approach*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 1993, p8) too emphasises the non-military aspects of security as the insecurity of individuals and groups leading to disorder and instability. Neville Brown (*The Future Global Challenge: A Predictive Study of World Security*, London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1977) also criticises a narrow focus of national security and advocates a wider perspective than that covered by the traditional focus on national military policy. National security as a concept may be considered "a companion of power rather than a derivative of it and as a prior condition of peace rather than a consequence of it". (Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, New Delhi: Transasia, 1987, p18) In the course of its evolution, the concept has been used in different contexts. According to Morton Berkowitz and PG Bock, ("National Security", *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, Volume II, 1968, p40) politicians

have used it as "a rhetorical phrase and military strategists have used it to describe a policy objective". Some experts have described the concept as the "maintenance of the status-quo" (Norman J Padelford and George A Lincoln, *International Politics*, New York: Macmillan, 1954, p289) while others see it in terms of "national interest". (Stanley R Hoffman, "Security in the Age of Turbulence: Means of Response" in Christoph Bertram (Ed), *Third World Conflict and International Security*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981) At times, it has been used in terms of "military strength" (Alastair F Buchan, *War in Modern Society: An Introduction*, London: CA Watts and Company, 1966, p24) and even as something close to "survival". (J Walsh, "National Security", *Military Digest*, April 1969, p40)

On the one hand, despite the differing views, the essence of "national security" remains politico-military security. On the other hand, the interdependence of the economic, military, political and social dimensions cannot be overlooked while formulating policy decisions. It is therefore both realistic and inevitable for economic, environmental, political and sociocultural factors including military readiness to be taken as integral to national security decision-making. The consequent preparedness must also take into account the process of digitalisation being pursued by all nations as an essential requirement for preserving data in digital form in the interest of citizens. While the right to information is imperative for true democracy and fundamental freedom with human dignity, there are grave risks in this process as are discussed in the following section.

THE RISKS AND CHALLENGES OF DIGITALISATION

In the present digital age, information and communication technology has become an integral part of governance and business in India and around the world. Consequently, the issue of cyber-security has assumed considerable importance among the national security concerns of all nation-states. Although digitalisation is the need of the hour for ensuring transparency in establishing good governance, there are grave inherent dangers in implementing a process that results in greater connectivity and reliance on the internet and the computer industry. Information technology is essential to carry out tasks, but the open and wide platform of the internet is no longer safe. (Prabhakar Pillai, "History of Internet Security", *Buzzle*, 2012, online at http://www.buzzle.com) Software enables the criminal mind to cause major disruptions and even destruction anywhere in the world in various forms. These range from provoking communal violence, stealing confidential data, computer hacking and secret monitoring of personal lives, to economic crimes, leaking national secrets to enemies, terrorists and insurgents and disseminating

pornography. All these corrupt minds and subvert the ethical and moral cultures of countries like India that are based on strong ancient traditions with an evolved value based ethos. Cyber-attacks in India have been growing consistently— from 23 in 2004 to 62,000 by mid-2014. (N Manoharan, "India's Internal Security Situation: Threats and Responses", *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*, vol69, no4, 2013, pp367– 81) These criminal activities adversely impact the nation's economy, political stability, public safety, social cohesion and national security. The rising cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure lead to heavy losses and disruptions. This has made nations realise the significance of immediately protecting and securing their critical assets from such attacks.

Although digitalisation is the need of the hour for ensuring transparency in establishing good governance, there are grave inherent dangers in implementing a process that results in greater connectivity and reliance on the internet and the computer industry. Cyber-attacks in India have been growing consistently—from 23 in 2004 to 62,000 by mid-2014.

Thus, the protection of cyber-infrastructure has become a national priority and the concern for cyber-security has emerged as a new critical component of national security.

CONCLUSION

As the world increases its dependence on digital information devices for developing infrastructure and manufacturing as well as in the delivery of products and services, securing critical information from cyber-attacks has become essential. Cyber-crimes and related criminal and nefarious activities have increasingly become major threats to national security. To ensure the security of the country's critical infrastructure, in the era of speedy globalisation and liberalisation, an effective, reliable, secure, stable, yet indigenous system of digitalisation must be evolved and monitored regularly to check for attacks, risks and loopholes. ▨

Combating Different Facets Of International Terrorism

A FORMIDABLE TASK IN A COMPLEX SCENARIO

Terrorism remains an enigma in today's globalised complex world. It will not disappear anytime soon but rather will continue to bedevil our lives. Even so, its impact and lethality may be limited by strengthening the intelligence and security apparatus. This paper details the different types of terrorism and explains the genesis of Islamic terror both as a product of the internal conditions of Muslim countries and the interventionist approach of Western powers, especially the US. It provides an in-depth analysis of the international ramifications of terrorism and the differences between "new" and "old" terrorism. The paper also explores the equally dangerous trend of right wing and leftist terrorism, discusses the various consequences of terrorism such as its economic impact and highlights the limitations of democracy when confronted by terrorism. At the end, it makes a case for a multipronged strategy inclusive of the de-radicalisation of groups susceptible to terrorist ideology as long-term means to combat terrorism.

RAVI PRATAP SINGH

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is the use, threat or method of violence as a strategy to achieve certain goals. It aims to induce fear in victims and publicity is an essential component of terrorist strategy. Terrorism is ruthless and does not conform

to any humanitarian norm. It is the organised use of violence for political ends, primarily directed at soft targets. Terrorist groups are usually defined as non-state actors employing unconventional techniques of violence to attain certain political objectives. As a political instrument, both the oppressor and the oppressed have used terror. Normally one's friends or allies are called "freedom fighters" and one's enemies or opponents are described as terrorists. The methods used by terrorists vary considerably. While aircraft hijacking became common after the 1960s, assassinations, bombings and suicide bombings, the wanton destruction of property, hostage taking, kidnapping, etc go much further back in time. For the terrorists the more spectacular the method, the more attention the act and cause receive. The goal of terrorism is psychological—it is meant to induce alarm, fear and panic in the general population. In so doing, it puts pressure on its real target (usually the government) to capitulate to demands. Since terrorism gains from publicity, the mass media has become its unwitting ally. (Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan, *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, London: Routledge, 2002, p308)

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The history of terrorism goes back to ancient times as seen in the assassination of tyrants in Ancient Greece and Rome and in its use by the zealots of Palestine and the Hashashin of medieval Islam. In the nineteenth century, terrorism became associated with the bombings of anarchists as well as murders and destruction of property by nationalist groups such as the Armenians and Turks. Terrorists have numerous diverse motives. While the Bodos in India wanted a separate Bodoland, the Manipur People's Army and the People's War Group wanted to end state oppression. The Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Basque in Spain and the Chechen rebels in Russia all sought a separate state. At times religion rationalises terrorist activities as was the case with a group seeking to establish Khalistan. Over the decades, Hamas has tried to destabilise Israel in the name of religion while in November 1995, a right wing Jewish fanatic killed Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

TYPES OF TERRORISM

There are several types of terrorism. (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, *ibid*, pp307–8 and Andrew Heywood, *Global Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Foundations, 2011, p285–6)

- **Ideological Terrorism:** is used to change a given domestic policy or overthrow a particular government. Examples include the Red Army faction in Germany and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
- **Insurrectionary Terrorism:** aims at the revolutionary overthrow of a state and examples include anarchist and revolutionary communist terrorism.
- **Loner or Issue Terrorism:** is used for the protection of a single cause, examples include the 1995 Sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo.
- **Nationalistic Terrorism:** aims to overthrow colonial rule or occupation with the goal of gaining independence for an ethnic, national or religious group.
- **State Sponsored Terrorism:** Afghanistan, Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), Libya (under Muammar Gaddafi) and Pakistan are considered sponsors of international terrorism. Pakistan has been promoting crossborder terrorism in India for decades by providing sanctuary, support and training to terrorist groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen.
- **Transnational or Global Terrorism:** aims to inflict damage and humiliation on a global power and transform global civilisational relations. Examples include al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups.
- **Transnational Organised Crime:** is used by drug cartels to protect their private interests by attacking governments and individuals who attempt to curtail their activities and influence.
- **Narco-Terrorism and Cyber Terrorism:** are important concepts in the current lexicon of international terrorism. In the present world scenario, an increasing number of terrorist organisations finance themselves through narcotics trafficking in partnership with transnational drug cartels, mafias and other criminal organisations. Improvements in technologies and telecommunications systems have also changed the face of terrorism. Attacks are no longer confined to the real world but have made inroads into the virtual world as well. Security risks emanate from disruptions in the workings

of computer systems and networks and the internet with the objective of harming, shocking or threatening target individuals, groups or a particular government. These are tantamount to cyber terrorism. (Peu Ghosh, *International Relations*, Delhi: PHI Learning, 2016, pp360–1)

Terrorism is also used to describe the acts and deeds of governments rather than just non-state actors. The term state terror refers to the actions of officially appointed groups such as Nazi Germany's Gestapo, the Soviet Union's KGB, the Stasi of East Germany, the Israeli Mossad and the American CIA and Special Forces in Vietnam and Iraq, etc against dissidents or ethnic minorities. (Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, *Concise Dictionary of Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p526) Rulers like Maximilien Robespierre and Adolf Hitler resorted to state terrorism to eliminate opponents while Pol Pot of Cambodia and Idi Amin of Uganda resorted to terror tactics to frighten their own people into following governmental dictates. (Aneek Chatterjee, *International Relations Today*, Noida: Pearson, 2010, p282)

> **State sponsored terrorism is defined as the conduct of governments in assisting, directly or indirectly, perpetrators of violent acts in other states. This is a form of low-intensity undeclared warfare among sovereign states. Many countries of divergent ideologies have engaged in this activity while in some cases simultaneously condemning others for the same practice.**

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OLD TERRORISM, NEW TERRORISM

With the 11 September 2001 attacks, the world realised that it was facing a "new terrorism" whose first clear manifestations had been visible only in the early 1990s. In contrast, "old terrorism" had been at its peak in the 1960s

and 1970s. Then the emphasis had been on territorial grievances involving demands for independence from imperialists or the revision of allegedly unjust frontiers. The successful examples of such terrorism include the French being driven out of Algeria and the British from Cyprus. On other occasions, terrorists obtained compromise concessions that failed to resolve the dispute but kept the level of violence contained. The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna were in this category, while others like the Baader-Meinhof in West Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy failed and faded away. (McLean and McMillan, *ibid*, p526) The commonality among "old" terrorists was that their operators focused on a limited geographical area, they wanted many people watching rather than many people dead and their aims were rationally defensible.

"New" terrorists are nihilistic, inspired by fanatical religious beliefs and are willing to seek martyrdom through suicide. Their aims usually are not even remotely attainable. They give no warning, do not engage in bargaining, find compromise solutions unappealing and seem eager to carry out the mass slaughter of non-combatants. (McLean and McMillan, *ibid*, pp526–7) New terrorism was first seen in 1993 when an abortive attempt was made to bring down the World Trade Centre. The American authorities had blamed Islamic extremists for it. Next, was Christian fundamentalism, which in 1995 led to the death of 168 people when a government building was blown up in Oklahoma City. The American white supremacist Timothy McVeigh was found guilty of the attack. The emergence of new terrorism was finally put beyond question with the 9/11 attacks. The Americans blamed al-Qaeda and then embarked upon the "war against terror". The United States of America (US) then led international military action against Afghanistan, whose Taliban controlled regime was supposedly harbouring parts of the al-Qaeda network, in particular Osama Bin Laden. (McLean and McMillan, *ibid*, pp526–7)

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Terrorist activity involving citizens of more than one country with a global impact constitutes international terrorism. The 9/11 terrorist attack on the US was one such act. It was masterminded by people from several countries and had a profound impact not only on US security and foreign policy but

also on international politics. Al-Qaeda was aided by splinter terrorist groups in Europe and the US as well as the Taliban in the 9/11 attacks. (Chatterjee, *ibid*, p282) The birth of international terrorism may be traced back to the advent of airplane hijacking in the late 1960s carried out by groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation. However, the development of terrorism into a genuinely transnational global phenomenon is generally associated with the advance of globalisation. Modern terrorism is portrayed as the child of globalisation for several reasons. First, increased crossborder flows of people, goods, ideas, money and technology have benefitted non-state actors at the expense of states and terrorist groups have skilfully exploited this hyper-mobility. Second, increased international migration flows have helped sustain terrorist campaigns as diaspora communities have become important sources of funding, as in the

> **"Old" terrorists focused on a limited geographical area, wanted many people watching rather than many people dead and their aims were rationally defensible. "New" terrorists are nihilistic, inspired by fanatical religious beliefs and are willing to seek martyrdom through suicide. Their aims usually are not even remotely attainable. They give no warning, do not engage in bargaining, find compromise solutions unappealing and seem eager to carry out the mass slaughter of non-combatants.**

case of the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka. Third, new terrorism either has occurred as a backlash against cultural globalisation and the spread of Western goods, ideas and values or has been a consequence of the imbalances within the global capitalist system that have impoverished and destabilised parts of the Global South. (Heywood, *ibid*, pp289–90)

ISLAMIST OR *JIHADI* TERRORISM

Globalisation may have provided the backdrop against which terrorism has acquired a transnational character but it does not itself explain the emergence of Islamist or *jihadi* terrorism. Although Islamist terrorism has been portrayed as a nihilistic movement or a manifestation of religious revivalism, it

is better understood as a violent response to political conditions and crises that have found expression in a politico-religious ideology. Emerging from the 1970s onwards, Islamic terror has been shaped by three developments. (Heywood, *ibid*, p290) In the first place, a growing number of Muslim states experienced a crisis of governmental legitimacy, as popular frustration mounted against autocratic and corrupt regimes that had failed to meet the economic and political aspirations of the citizenry. In the light of the defeat of Arab nationalism, this led to growing religion based movements to overthrow the apostate (a person who forsakes his/her own religion) Muslim leaders in countries from Egypt and Pakistan to Saudi Arabia and Sudan. Second was the simultaneous expansion of US influence in the Middle East, filling the power vacuum created by the United Kingdom's post-1968 withdrawal from military bases east of the Suez Canal. Washington thus came to be seen as an enemy. Policies such as the unstinting support of Israel, the deployment of American troops in the Muslim holy ground of Saudi Arabia and support for apostate Muslim leaders across the region made the US appear to be a threat to Islam. Third, was the growth in politically engaged forms of religious fundamentalism in many parts of Islamic world, a trend radically accelerated by the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution.

DOMESTIC *JIHAD* VERSUS GLOBAL *JIHAD*

During the 1970s and 1980s, domestic *jihad* predominated over global *jihad*. Hostility to the US merely provided a backdrop for attempts to achieve national power. This changed from the mid-1990s onwards with the failure of political Islam to achieve its domestic goal. (Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, London: IB Tauris, 2006, cited in Heywood, *ibid*, p290) Apostate regimes often proved to be more stable and enduring than had been anticipated and in Algeria and Egypt military force was used successfully to suppress Islamist insurgency. It was in this context that *jihad* went global. Growing elements within Islamic movements realigned their strategies around the "far enemy", that is, the West in general and the US in particular and their policies. In a sense, the rise of global *jihad* was a mark of Islamism's decline, not of its resurgence. (Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, cited in Heywood, *ibid*, p290) The 1979–89 war in Afghanistan to expel Soviet troops played an important role in facilitating the shift to globalism. The emergence of a transnational Mujahideen resistance helped forge a corporate

sense of belonging among Islamist groups of disparate backgrounds and even doctrinal beliefs, strengthening the conviction that domestic struggles were part of a wider global struggle. (Heywood, *ibid*, p290) It was in these circumstances that al-Qaeda emerged as the most potent example of global terrorism. The group sought to purify and regenerate Muslim society by both overthrowing apostate Muslim leaders and eradicating Western/US influence. Al-Qaeda has been associated with terrorist attacks across a number of states from Kenya, Saudi Arabia and Spain to the United Kingdom, the US and Yemen. Islamism is a form of terrorism that strikes anywhere and at any time.

GLOBAL TERRORISM MAY BE OVERSTATED

An alternate view is that the global character of modern terrorism is overstated. First, Islamist or *jihadi* terrorism is by no means a single, cohesive entity but encompasses groups with different beliefs and goals and many are just religious nationalists. Second, although terrorism has affected a broad range of states, the vast majority of attacks take place in a relatively small number of countries, rife with intense internal political conflict such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, India, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, etc. Third, the image of Islamism as global terrorism stems less from its own intrinsic character and more from how others respond to it. "The global war on terror may have done much to sustain the idea that there is such a thing as global terrorism". (Heywood, *ibid*, p291) Modern terrorism has been at times also dubbed as catastrophic terrorism (Ashton Carter, John Deutch and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger", *Foreign Affairs*, vol77, no6, 1998, cited in Heywood, *ibid*, p293) or hyper-

> For Islamism, the 1979–89 war in Afghanistan to expel Soviet troops played an important role in facilitating the shift to globalism. The emergence of a transnational Mujahideen resistance helped forge a corporate sense of belonging among Islamist groups of disparate backgrounds and even doctrinal beliefs, strengthening the conviction that domestic struggles were part of a wider global struggle. It was in these circumstances that al-Qaeda emerged as the most potent example of global terrorism.

terrorism. (Ehud Sprinzak, "The Lone Gunmen: The Global War on Terrorism Faces a New Brand of Enemy", *Foreign Policy*, 2009, online at https://foreignpolicy.com, cited in Heywood, *ibid*, p293)

Due to its nature, terrorism is particularly difficult to defend against. It is a clandestine activity often carried out by small groups or even lone individuals who unlike regular armies go to considerable lengths to be indistinguishable from the civilian population. These difficulties have been compounded by the growth of suicide missions. Second the potential, scale and scope of terrorism has increased as a result of modern technology, particularly the prospect of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists. The prospect of nuclear terrorism is not a fanciful idea. Third, since the rise of new terrorism, modern terrorists not only have easier access to weapons of mass destruction but also a greater willingness to use them. They are less constrained by moral humanitarian principles than previous generations of terrorists.

Terrorism poses difficult challenges to established societies—there are no readymade answers. While main counterterrorism strategies include military repression, political deals and strengthening state security, the basic causes of terrorism need to be addressed as well. In any society, necessary measures must be undertaken to end conditions of material deprivation and political oppression. Any effective war against terrorism must aim at alleviating the social conditions that breed terrorism in the first place. At the same time, powerful states such as the US must look at their own record of covert involvement with terrorism and reject it as a tool of foreign policy in the future. (Stephanie Lawson, *International Relations*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, p96)

TERRORISM – A PRODUCT OF BIG POWERS

Investigative journalist and documentary filmmaker John Pilger has been critical of American hypocrisy and double standards. According to him, the war on terror launched by former President George W Bush in 2001 has resulted in the death of millions of people, mostly Muslims. The US and Britain have developed terrorism as a strategic weapon and the support for *jihadism* in Libya and Syria are examples. (Jipson John and Jitheesh PM, "New Cold War and Looming Threats", *Frontline*, vol35, no25, 21 December 2018) A part of terrorism is also the product of states. When governments stop promoting terrorism, the backlash in their own cities

is likely to cease. The US ironically has coined the concept of "good and bad terrorists". The designation rests on whether the fight is against the US, its latest ally or enemy. For instance, Yemen has been subjected to unrelenting acts of terrorism by Saudi Arabia but currently the Saudis are "good" terrorists. The Kurds historically have been both good and bad terrorists—in Iraq they were good, in Turkey they were bad. (*ibid*) According to John Pilger, the Mujahideen in Afghanistan might have remained a tribal influence had it not been for Operation Cyclone—the US plan aimed at expelling Soviet troops and bringing down the Soviet state. In the Middle East, the West opposed Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabism. It feared the Arab people throwing off the shackles of feudal tribalism and controlling and deploying their own resources. A principal aim has been to keep the Middle East divided, uncertain and unstable. The design centre of this policy is Israel. (*ibid*)

Unless the US brings about a fundamental change in its foreign policy, the world will only become more unstable. It also needs to understand the real character of Pakistan as a "terror state" and not be ambivalent in its policies towards it. President Donald J Trump is not wrong when he says that Pakistan has misused all the aid given to it and the US has not received any advantage in return.

The US will have to change its approach to international relations if terrorism is to be contained. It has to become less interventionist in Third World countries. Unless the US brings about a fundamental change in its foreign policy, the world will only become more unstable. It also needs to understand the real character of Pakistan as a "terror state" and not be ambivalent in its policies towards it. President Donald J Trump is not wrong when he says that Pakistan has misused all the aid given to it and the US has not received any advantage in return. Carlotta Gall, who has covered the Afghan War for *The New York Times*, in her book *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014) points a finger at Pakistan for the mess that Afghanistan is in today. She states that on the one hand Pakistan offered support for the US's war effort in Afghanistan and on the other provided clandestine support to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. According to Gall, supporting militant groups

is part of Pakistan's "thirty years of strategic thinking" and the US failed to grasp this reality. By the time Washington realised the double game, it was reluctant to take action, as it wanted Islamabad's continued support in the war. Gall adds that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency had supported Osama Bin Laden throughout his years in hiding from 2001 onwards. (Stanly Johny, "The War that Never Ends: How it went wrong for the US in Afghanistan", *The Hindu*, 19 March 2018, online at https://www.thehindu.com) Again as part of its strategic thinking, for decades Pakistan has adopted the same strategy in its support of militants in Kashmir. It should be realised that Islamabad is the epicentre and greatest exporter of terrorism in the world today. A nuclear armed Pakistan promoting terrorism as an instrument of state policy has made South Asia "the most dangerous place on Earth". Even though world leaders admit that terrorism is a common threat to mankind, differing national priorities override their concerns and prevent them from adopting common, sustained policies to break the spine of terrorism. For instance, China is sympathetic towards Pakistan and only gives lip service to the terrorist threat emanating from Islamabad. In addition, the US will have to review its "war on terror" to minimise civilian casualties. Jeremy Scahill in his book *Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield*, (New York: Nation Books, 2013) argues that the strategy of fighting terrorism through targeted killings is flawed. He writes that drone attacks and the consequent high casualties have increased resentment among the local populace, be it in Afghanistan, Mali, Pakistan or Yemen where the ensuing chaos has been a boon for militants. (*ibid*)

The manner in which international terrorism has been playing out coupled with the duplicity of several countries, such as Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, has impacted the South Asian region. Because Iran is Saudi Arabia's chief adversary in West Asia, their Shia–Sunni rivalry is being played out across the region from Syria to Yemen. Islamabad perceives Riyadh as a valuable interlocutor on its behalf with Washington while its relations with Tehran hit a new low following a terrorist attack in the Sistan–Baluchistan province that killed 27 Revolutionary Guards. Iran has issued a stern warning to Pakistan on its terrorist activities. As relations deteriorate, Pakistan is likely to move further into the Saudi orbit. Increasing Sunni fundamentalism bordering on Wahhabism in Pakistan makes it a natural ally of Sunni Saudi Arabia and an ideological foe of Shia Iran. (Mohammed Ayoob, "The Saudi–India–Pakistan Triangle", *The Hindu*, 20 February 2019, online at https://www.thehindu.com)

THE REPERCUSSIONS OF TERRORISM

Terrorism has triggered problems of international dimensions for instance humanitarian crises in the form of mass migrations. The Islamic State (IS/ISIS) poses a real threat to people across the world. Terror induced displacement, national security issues and refugee resettlement have unfolded new challenges. The humanitarian protection system is under severe strain due to the unmanageable scale of international exodus. The Syrian crisis has led to large-scale migration to Europe. Four million refugees have spilled out of Syria and overwhelmed bordering nations. Europe is struggling to manage the problems of refugees with massive infiltration from violence ravaged states. Many European countries have expressed unwillingness to accept refugees and grant them citizenship, adding to uncertainty and fear among those fleeing atrocities. Refugees across the world are facing challenges in rebuilding their lives due to a lack of safe and welcoming communities and countries. Depleting resources and the chronic issue of unemployment even in developed countries have increased citizenship problems for refugees. (Joshua S Goldstein and Jon C Pevehouse, *International Relations*, London: Pearson, 2011, p197 and p202)

The economic consequences of terrorism for small countries are far reaching. For example, better educated citizens migrate to safer countries while investments leave for less risky places. As gross domestic product declines, fewer resources are allocated by governments for counterterror operations.

Terrorism also has far-reaching economic consequences. For most economies, the macroeconomic consequences of terrorism are modest and short-term in nature. Advanced economies have automatic stabilisers (like unemployment insurance) that offset short-term employment losses in cases of massive terrorist attacks. Large diversified economies are able to withstand terrorism and curb economic losses as their economic activities shift away from terrorism impacted sectors to less impacted ones. The recovery efforts following large-scale terror incidents create short-term employment that partly offsets employment losses associated with the attacks. In the long term, terrorist threats result in new jobs in law enforcement, homeland security and

intelligence as well as in rebuilding destroyed property. These new employment opportunities act as automatic stabilisers. Well-developed institutions also soften the impact of terrorism. (Todd Sandler, *Terrorism: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp130–1)

Small countries plagued by terror activities are more vulnerable and display worrisome macroeconomic consequence in terms of losses in consumption, economic growth, the gross domestic product and investment. Institutionally challenged failed states are the worst hit. They lack or have weak institutions to offset macroeconomic costs resulting from terror attacks. Thus, the economic consequences of terrorism for small countries are far reaching. For example, better educated citizens migrate to safer countries while investments leave for less risky places. As gross domestic product declines, fewer resources are allocated by governments for counterterror operations. (Axel Dreher, Daniel Meierrieks and Tim Krieger, "Hit and (they will) Run: The Impact of Terrorism on Migration", *Economics Letters*, vol113, no1, 2011, pp42–6, cited in Sandler, *ibid*, p131) At the microeconomic level, the most vulnerable sectors are exports, foreign direct investment and tourism. The immediate costs of most terror attacks are localised, thereby causing a substitution of economic activity away from the vulnerable sector to relatively safer sectors. Changes in interest rates, prices and wages may quickly redirect capital, labour and raw material. While advanced economies are adept at the stabilising process, they experience more economic stress at the sectoral level from terrorism. (Sandler, *ibid*, p131)

RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

There are no readymade answers to terrorism. It has to be dealt with through a multipronged strategy. Apart from dialogue and political and social measures, military strategy must be continuously upgraded. Terrorism is like a chronic disease that cannot be cured but may be managed by regular medication. For terrorism, the medicine is a constant fight to weaken and subdue the enemy. Without this, terrorists will continue to inflict unacceptable losses. Terrorism is a long drawn out battle in which the costs of not responding are much higher than of responding. According to former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, to assess the success or failure of terrorism, one must look at things differently.

"For a hundred successes that you have in preventing terrorist incidents from taking place, there is always the possibility of one failure. That is the nature of the whole phenomenon of terrorism. This fact needs to be appreciated, while we do all we can to make it more and more difficult for a terrorist to plan and carry out an attack. This is also the reason why we must focus on the vulnerabilities on our side. For example, if we are not completely successful in stopping drug smuggling across the India–Pakistan border, it should come as no surprise that a terrorist could also slip in. Here counterterrorism is not merely military operations, but also governance". (Varghese K George, "India really needs to enhance its Counterterrorism Capabilities: Interview with Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran", *The Hindu*, 6 March 2019, online at https://www.thehindu.com)

It is fashionable to decry the use of the term terrorism—well-meaning people often assert that a terrorist is simply a freedom fighter of whom one disapproves. Terrorism however does have a meaning—it means the deliberate targeting of the innocent whether carried out by state or non-state actors, for whatever reason. In war, the innocent always suffer but they are not always deliberately targeted—when they are, it is a policy of terror. The 9/11 attacks were a very destructive act of terror. While the attack on the Pentagon in Washington DC may be described as an attack on a military target, the World Trade Centre was definitely a civilian target and the people who died there were truly innocent victims. (Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, *Understanding International Relations*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p241) In the fight against terrorism,

After losing nearly all its territories in Iraq and Syria, the IS has resorted to insurgency tactics with more than 1200 attacks launched in 2018. The group is estimated to have around 30,000 fighters scattered across West Asia and North Africa. Any long-term fight against international terrorism must take note of the fact that ISIS as a force dispersed throughout the world is far more dangerous than ever before, as its field of operation becomes widespread and not limited to a particular region.

the international media must play a more responsible role and adopt an unequivocal stand against it. According to Alyssa Ayres, ("American Media should stop Soft Pedalling and call a Terrorist a Terrorist", *The Times of India*, 10 March 2019, online at https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com) the US media has relied on the word "militant" to describe terror

groups. An article in *The Washington Post* examines why Pakistan has not been able to rein in anti-India "militants". *Reuters* employs the term to discuss Pakistan's renewed resolve to come down heavily on such groups. An *Associated Press* report covering an interview with former Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale substitutes "militants" for "terrorists". In *The New York Times*, a story on the Financial Action Task Force uses "militants" in the headlines and alternates between "militants" and "terrorists" in the article. There is no doubt that the Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba are a menace to security in South Asia. International public opinion, an important component of the fight against terrorists, should be so moulded by the media so that they are not given any benefit of doubt. (Ayres, *ibid*)

In addition, the fight against terrorism in South Asia should be wary of ISIS fighters. After their defeat in Iraq and Syria, ISIS fighters have been fleeing the region and regrouping in South Asia although until now the incidents connected to ISIS in India have been few. In Afghanistan and Bangladesh, the influence of ISIS has been more prominent, endangering the stability of the wider region. The situation in Afghanistan is by far the most complex. The Islamic State in Khorasan, the Afghan avatar of ISIS, has territorial presence in the vast ungoverned borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan along the disputed Durand Line. ISIS's influence in South Asia is divided according to the local economics, politics and the sociocultural complexities of each state. As far as Pakistan is concerned, some analysts claim that ISIS has not chosen the Indo–Pak quagmire deliberately due to its perception that its quest for the caliphate will not be accepted by Pakistani *jihadi* groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Hizbul Mujahideen, as the basis of their foundation is nationalism and patriotism. (Kabir Taneja, *The Fall of ISIS and its Implications for South Asia*, Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief 220, January 2018, online at https://www.orfonline.org) The involvement of ISIS in the catastrophic terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka that killed more than 250 people should be an eye-opener in the renewed fight against terrorism in South Asia. The strategy to contain ISIS must be a mixed one. There should be on ground engagement between communities and governance as well as robust online anti-terror apparatus keeping track on pro-ISIS movements on social media, in banking, travel etc. A well-operated online intelligence network in India will not only be beneficial domestically, but will be useful for the neighbourhood through intelligence sharing as well. However, such efforts

within the South Asian region will be limited by the impediments created by Pakistan's unrelenting hostility towards India. (*ibid*)

In the long-term fight against terrorism, the potential of a defeated IS should not be underestimated. After losing nearly all its territories in Iraq and Syria, the IS has resorted to insurgency tactics with more than 1200 attacks launched in 2018. The group is estimated to have around 30,000 fighters scattered across West Asia and North Africa. In Greater Sahara, it has masterminded attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria and made an impact in Yemen as well. The IS's allied groups include the Boko Haram in Nigeria with less active affiliates operating in Algeria, Russia's Caucasus region and Saudi Arabia. ("IS seeking Comeback", *The Hindu*, 6 February 2019) Any long-term fight against international terrorism must take note of the fact that ISIS as a force dispersed throughout the world is far more dangerous than ever before, as its field of operation becomes widespread and not limited to a particular region.

Wherever autocracies have been transformed into transient and partial democracies or anocracies, political violence, including terrorism and civil war, has resulted. Libya and Syria are glaring examples of intrastate civil wars. Before ousting an autocracy, adequate checks and balances must be put in place to prevent the eruption of terrorism and other forms of political violence.

Domestic terrorism is easier to deal with than transnational terrorism. Italy eliminated the Italian Red Brigades, Japan dealt with Aum Shinrikyo, Belgium disbanded the Combatant Communist Cells, the Sri Lankan military defeated the Tamil Tigers, Peru ended the Shining Path and France captured Direct Action members. While proactive measures are effective against domestic terrorists, they are less effective against transnational terrorists who enjoy sanctuary in remote areas of failed states. (Sandler, *ibid*, pp78–9) Failed or beleaguered states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen cannot/do not exercise control over their entire territory and lack the ability to govern. Their rule of law and governing institutions are weak. Terrorist groups converge in failed states that have limited capacity to control them. From there they send operatives to other countries to launch transnational terror attacks. (Sandler, *ibid*, p43)

The role of an efficient intelligence apparatus in fighting terrorism is of utmost importance. In August 2006, the British government arrested two dozen al-Qaeda inspired individuals who were planning to blow up several transatlantic flights. The arrests led to the conviction of those caught. During 2017, acting on intelligence about an alleged ISIS plot to use laptops and iPads as bombs, the US government banned large electronic devices from the cabins of passenger flights originating from Middle Eastern countries. The plot was unearthed when US intelligence learnt that ISIS had been testing the passage of laptop-rigged bombs through airport screening devices. (Sandler, *ibid*, p137 and p138) There are several ways to deal with terrorism such as enhancing surveillance, redesigning the urban architecture, tightening security around airports, etc. A common perception, though not proven, is that people living in conditions of instability and poverty are easy targets of radicalisation. Therefore, the conditions of poverty and underdevelopment should be addressed. Another response is to go after the terrorist in acts of retaliation and annihilation or of prevention. (Christopher S Browning, *International Security, A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp112–3)

One response as proposed by Charles Townshend (*Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) is to do nothing. If the figures of deaths resulting from terrorism are compared to those caused by various other factors, then devoting extensive time and resources to tackling terrorism seems irrational. (Browning, *ibid*, p112) However, a state can desist from responding to any major terror attack only at the risk of being seen to have capitulated to terrorists, which would mean losing legitimacy and the ability to protect citizens. Terrorist acts embarrass governments and require the state to re-establish its honour. After 9/11, many Americans, especially the US state, felt that the attack on the twin towers was a challenge to the hegemonic position of the superpower and therefore the government had to respond proportionately to restore its pre-eminent position. (Browning, *ibid*, p112) Instead of carrying out an anti-terrorist operation, the US launched a regional war in Afghanistan, which is still ongoing eighteen years later.

THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY IN FIGHTING TERRORISM

Democracy possesses characteristics that both promote and inhibit terrorism. Some factors that facilitate terrorist operations are freedom of association

and movement, right to due process and privacy, restraints on executive powers, etc. Some democracies also protect the right to bear arms that facilitate terror attacks. Another strategic factor is the freedom of the press, which allows media coverage of terrorist attacks and grievances. (William L Eubank and Leonard B Weinberg, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol13, no1, 1994, pp155–64 and Joe Eyerman, "Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems", *International Interactions*, vol24, no2, 1998, pp157–70) Democracies also have two features that inhibit terrorism. First, they provide political participation to citizens for expressing their preferences through voting. Second, it is liberal democracy's mandate to protect the life and property of citizens. Full democracies can deploy extreme measures following a terrorist attack or enforce a state of heightened threat to maintain the confidence of the electorate that the government will ensure safety. In grave situations, the electorate tolerates the loss of some civil liberties. Following 9/11, the Bush administration established the Department of Homeland Security, while the Patriot Act suspended certain liberties by allowing for greater surveillance. (Sandler, *ibid*, pp40–1)

In the US from 2012–17, the number of white supremacists attacks more than doubled. The ADL attributes 73 per cent of extremist related killings in the US from 2009 to 2018 to the far right. An FBI study on terrorism in the US between 1980 and 2005 has found that 94 per cent of the acts were by non-Muslims. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace, between 2006 and 2016, 98 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in the US resulted from attacks carried out by lone actors.

In preventing terrorism, mature full democracies are better than anocracies, which are regimes that fall somewhere between autocracies and democracies. By limiting political access compared to full democracies, autocracies offer their citizens reduced means to air their grievances. Without such means, these grievances could result in terrorism. Wherever autocracies have been transformed into transient and partial democracies or anocracies, political violence, including terrorism and civil war, has resulted. Libya and Syria are glaring examples of intrastate civil wars. Before ousting an autocracy, adequate checks and balances must be put in place to prevent the eruption of terrorism and other forms of political violence. (Sandler, *ibid*, pp40–1)

THE SUCCESS RATE OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is highly disruptive of the peace, stability and social fabric of any society. It creates disproportionate fear by the media coverage it gets. However, its record in achieving its target is far from impressive. The Malayan communist insurgency was one of the earliest left wing terrorist movements to be stamped out. Other than Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba in 1959 and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979, there were few successes in the Hispanic world. The terrorist campaign of the Irish Republic Army did not succeed in separating Northern Ireland from Britain and joining the Republic of Ireland. Sikh and Kashmiri terrorism as well as various other terrorist campaigns have not attained the separation of targeted areas from India, though they have extracted concessions from the union government including various peace deals with insurgents from the Northeast. Maoists in Nepal were more successful than their Indian counterparts but even they had to lay down arms and join the democratic process. The Liberation Tigers in Sri Lanka ultimately failed to achieve an independent Tamil state. (Kanti Bajpai, "Global Terrorism" in Bhupinder S Chimni and Siddharth Mallavarapu (Eds), *International Relations Perspectives for the Global South*, Delhi: Pearson, 2015, pp324–5) ISIS has been completely routed in Iraq and Syria, with its goal of establishing a global caliphate shattered, though the possibility of scattered fighters regrouping elsewhere in the future is high. It is unlikely that terrorism as such will ever end despite most individual terrorist campaigns having ended so far. A Rand Corporation analysis of 648 terrorist groups operating between 1968 and 2006 found that 10 per cent had achieved victory while a slightly smaller proportion had been crushed by direct military force. (Townshend, *ibid*, pp141–2) Even though the record of terrorism has been poor, there is little prospect of it disappearing as a political form.

RIGHT WING TERROR

An understanding of transnational terrorism is incomplete unless the gravity of the emerging trend of right wing terror is given due consideration and examined. Over the years, terror incidents involving white supremacists or the right wing have increased in the US and Europe. In the US from 2012–17, the number of white supremacists attacks more than doubled. The Anti-Defamation League attributes 73 per cent of extremist related killings in the US from 2009

to 2018 to the far right. (Charlie Campbell, "Hatred and Healing", *Time*, 1 April 2019, p24) A Federal Bureau of Investigation study on terrorism in the US between 1980 and 2005 has found that 94 per cent of the acts were by non-Muslims. According to the Australia based Institute for Economics and Peace, between 2006 and 2016, 98 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in the US resulted from attacks carried out by lone actors. (Neeraj Kaushal, "Our War against Terrorism", *The Economic Times*, 28 March 2019, online at https://economictimes. indiatimes.com) In Europe, immigration from Muslim communities has exposed rifts in societies with the political shift to the right being accompanied by supremacist violence. In 2016–17, far right attacks in Europe increased by 43 per cent. (Campbell, *ibid*) The most outrageous right wing terrorist incident involved an Australian, Brenton Tarrant, who on 15 March 2019 gunned down 50 people in New Zealand—one of the most peaceful countries in the world. The shocking incident revealed that right wing terrorism is as threatening and lethal as Islamic terrorism. Tarrant's attack was triggered by Islamophobia.

The war on terrorism will be a long protracted one. Apart from military measures, strengthening the intelligence apparatus, promoting economic development and a sustained counter narrative of de-radicalisation must be undertaken to wean away the youth from the propaganda of regressive ideas.

In the dossier he submitted to coincide with the attack, he complained against immigration and multiculturalism and lamented the decaying culture of the white European world. (John Cherian, "Rascist Terror", *Frontline*, vol36, no7, 12 April 2019, p101) Some European countries today are being run by leaders who do not hide their xenophobic ideas and the same may be said of American President Donald Trump and his administration. In France, Germany and the United Kingdom, ruling parties have introduced legislation, which encourage policies that openly discriminate against Muslim citizens. (Cherian, *ibid*). On the other hand, radical left wing groups like the Antifas and the Black Block are resorting to violent atlantes on ideological opponents and public as well as private property.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism remains a complex phenomenon in which violence is used to obtain political power to redress grievances that may have become more

acute through the process of globalisation. Globalisation has improved the technical capabilities of terrorists and given them global reach but has not altered the fundamental fact that terrorism represents the extreme views of a minority of the global population. (James Kiras, "Terrorism and Globalisation" in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (Eds), *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p378) The war on terrorism will be a long protracted one. Apart from military measures, strengthening the intelligence apparatus, promoting economic development and a sustained counter narrative of de-radicalisation must be undertaken to wean away the youth from the propaganda of regressive ideas. Throughout the 1990s in Kashmir, Pakistan worked towards displacing a traditional inclusive thinking and supplanting it with a more exclusivist, puritanical and radically oriented ideology controlled by *mullahs* in charge of mosques. (Syed Ata Hasnain, "Radical Ideology got Ingrained in Kashmir Over Time, now it has to be Neutralised Slowly, Smartly and Continuously", *The Times of India*, 14 May 2019, online at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com) In one of the most successful models of counter radicalisation in the world, Singapore focused on its small Muslim population to protect it from extraneous influence. It identified clubs, educational institutions, labour camps and prisons as places where radicalisation occurs. It placed surveillance over such people and tackled them by employing select clerics with proven secular credentials. The threat pattern in Singapore was far smaller than in Kashmir. Nevertheless, the key to countering radicalisation lies with a certified pluralist clergy. The Indian state should harness institutional support from important seminaries such as Darul Uloom Deoband and the media to undertake a narrative to counter the radicalisation of youth. (*ibid*)

It will not be easy to blunt the sharpness of terrorism in the twenty-first century. Developments in technology have altered the character of twenty-first century terrorism. In the Pulwama attack, a suicide bomber is reported to have used a "virtual SIM" to contact his Jaish-e-Mohammed handlers in Pakistan.

> "The concept of enabled terror or remote control terror, that is, violence conceived and guided by controllers thousands of miles away is no longer mere fiction. Internet enabled terrorism and resorting to remote plotting will grow as the twenty-first century advances". (MK Narayanan, "The Many and Different Faces of Terror", *The Hindu*, 3 April 2019, online at https://www.thehindu.com)

Terrorism supported by technology is indeed difficult to deal with. In view of all this, the fight against terrorism has become hi-tech and constant surveillance,

monitoring and strengthening of intelligence apparatus, information sharing between different countries is required. To combat terrorism, a democratic state cannot afford to be a soft state. It must become a strong state and curtail some civil liberties whenever required.

"Counter terrorism experts will need to lay stress on multi domain operations and information technologies and undertake 'terror gaming' to wrestle with an uncertain future that is already upon us". (Narayanan, *ibid*)

Whether it is Islamic far left or right wing terrorism, online radicalisation is an effective means to indoctrinate people into hateful and xenophobic ideas. Moreover, terrorism of any kind triggers a backlash at other places, the serial terrorist bombing in Sri Lanka being an example. Terrorism remains a big challenge with the potential to rip apart even the most developed and peaceful society. The continuance of Islamic terrorism, the emergence of right wing terror, advancements in technology placing immense power in the hands of individuals, the radicalisation of the youth—all these provide a combustible mix for terrorist activities. The future is uncertain and nobody has readymade answers. Preparations must be based upon possible scenarii and projections⬛.

Russian Geopolitics And Eurasia

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF RUSSIA'S ROLE IN EURASIAN INTEGRATION

Throughout history, Eurasia has been central to relations between Europe and Asia. It has been the crossroads of civilisations, contributing to the cultural and ethnic hybridity of the region. However, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and later the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, Eurasia lost its geostrategic importance in the US led liberal world order. In the 1920s, a group of Russian émigrés described the cultural and ethnic ties among the communities living across the vast Eurasian steppes as Eurasianism. Eurasianists divide the world into two opposing forces with Eurasianism including Russia and the European states favouring integration with it and Atlanticism including the US and European countries supporting an American led Atlantic order. Today, Russia is an important revisionist power in Eurasia, with huge stakes in the global order and the capability to help forge new relationships in the region.

SHAHZADA RAHIM ABBAS

INTRODUCTION

Eurasia has its own cultural and political uniqueness in historical discourse and as a purely geographical concept refers to the idea of a hybrid continent territorially stretching across Europe and Asia. (Mark Bassin,

"'Classical' Eurasianism and the Geopolitics of Russian Identity", *Ab Imperio*, no2, 2003, pp257–66) On the greater Eurasian landmass, Turkey and Russia are the transcontinental countries with anthropological and imperial histories as regional powers. With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey embraced the Westernisation project and lost its Eurasian centrality. (Yang Cheng, "The Eurasian Moment in Global Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Great Power Strategies for Regional Integration" in Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa (Eds), *Eurasian Integration: The View from Within*, New York: Routledge, 2015, pp274–90) With the ascension of the Bolsheviks in 1917, Russia maintained its Eurasian spirit in the form of the Soviet Union, creating an economic and political hybridity with the countries of Europe and Asia. (Karen Barkley and Mark von Hagen (Eds), *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires*, New York: Westview Press, 1997) For various historians, the victory of communism saved the country's cultural uniqueness from the Ottoman fate. Arnold J Toynbee in his work *A Study of History* asserts that Russia by embracing communism in 1917 saved its civilisation from being "arrested" by alien forces. According to him, Russia with its Orthodox Christianity identifies its cultural and ethnic genesis with Asia. Like the Sinic civilisation that experienced the full

> With the ascension of the Bolsheviks in 1917, Russia maintained its Eurasian spirit in the form of the Soviet Union, creating an economic and political hybridity with the countries of Europe and Asia. Arnold J Toynbee in his work *A Study of History* asserts that Russia by embracing communism in 1917 saved its civilisation from being "arrested" by alien forces.

cycle of the alternating rhythm of "yin and yang", Russia in the course of history has also undergone a period of "transfiguration and detachment". The "yin–yang" state is a particular form of general movement of "withdrawal and return" also known as "schism and palingenesia". The word palingenesia is a Greek term meaning "recurrence or rebirth". In a broader context, it refers to the "wheel of existence", which Buddhist philosophy takes for granted, seeking a break by a withdrawal into *nirvana*. If *nirvana* does not end with actual rebirth then it diffuses into a supra-mundane state.

Since, the fall of the Soviet Union, several Russian intellectuals have been obsessed with revisionism to reclaim the historically derived distinctive nature of the Russian nation on the Eurasian landmass. Early Eurasianists formulated a different worldview about the country's identity on the Eurasian landmass by emphasising a Russian civilisation as distinct from Western civilisation. (Peter J

Katzenstein and Nicole Weygandt, "Mapping Eurasia in an Open World: How the Insularity of Russia's Geopolitical and Civilisational Approaches Limits its Foreign Policies", *Perspectives on Politics*, vol15, no2, 2017, pp428–42) They developed the idea in the context of a conflict of civilisations, as most Western historians regarded Russia as part of Western civilisation. However, for Slavophiles, Russia was a part of Slavic civilisation with its cultural and ethnic genesis in Asia. (Vera Tolz, *Russia's Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) Today, neo-Eurasianists have widened this paradigm by placing Russia in the broader civilisational context of cultural and ethnic hybridity between Eurasian communities and Russian Slavs. (Bassin, 2003, *ibid*) For them, Russia is both Slavic and non-Slavic and includes multiple ethnic groups such as Celts, Mongols, Scandinavians and Turks. (Victor A Shnirelman, "Myths of Descent: Views of the Remote Past, as Reflected in School Textbooks in Contemporary Russia", *Public Archaeology*, vol3, no1, 2003, pp33–51)

Eurasianists have also navigated Russian civilisation along certain ideological and philosophical paradigms by reiterating its ethno-cultural uniqueness in a modified geopolitical narrative. (Katzenstein and Weygandt, *ibid*) The discourse of a separate Russian culture and morality first emerged in 1848, when revolutions swept across the European continent except in Russia. (Alexander Lukin, "Russia between East and West", *Medjunarodni Problemi/International Problems*, vol55, no2, 2003, pp159–85) Russian diplomat and poet Fyodor Tyutchev (1803–73), in *Revolution and Russia* divided Europe between two ideological forces. He emphasised the geographical specificity of Russia and predicted a battle between a degenerate Europe and Russia in the future. For Tyutchev, the ideological battle was to be in the political and religious domains and would decide the fate of the human realm for centuries to come. (Nikolaĭ Berdiáev, *The Russian Idea*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979) That is, the ideological struggle between revolutionary Europe and Russia was to be in the cosmic dimension and would determine the eschatological outcome. In this cosmic struggle, Russia would represent the realm of Christianity and Europe with its revolutionary fervour the anti-Christ. (Mikhail Suslov, "Geographical Metanarratives in Russia and the European East: Contemporary Pan-Slavism", *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, vol53, no5, 2012, pp575–95) Europe's degeneracy in the wake of revolutions provided a clear narrative to Slavophiles to assert Russia's superiority over Europe.

The discourse of Russian civilisational and cultural supremacy was not confined to Slavophiles. Even pro-Western Russian intellectuals such as Alexander Herzen expressed disenchantment with revolution from Europe. For him, the wave of revolutions across the continent represented the degeneration of European modernity and civilisation. According to Herzen, Europe had

destroyed itself while Russia needed to choose its own path to save the realm of humanity. (Shlomo Avineri, "A Note: Moses Hess on Alexander Herzen's Vision of Russia's Future Emancipatory Role in European History", *Government and Opposition*, vol18, no4, 1983, pp482–90) At the beginning of the twentieth century, Western historian Oswald Spengler also predicted the decline of Western civilisation and a looming cosmic ideological confrontation. (Georg G Iggers, "The Idea of Progress: A Critical Reassessment", *The American Historical Review*, vol71, no1, 1965, pp1–17) In his work, *The Decline of the West* Spengler used the philological approach to deconstruct the modernity of the West and warned of an impending confrontation across the civilisational domain. According to him, the West with its pseudo-modernity had lost its moral and cultural identity by morphing into morbid materialism. Thus, decline was the fate of Europe, just as it had been for other civilisations such as the Eskimo, Greek and Roman. Russia as an offshoot of Eastern Orthodox Christendom refused to accept Western modernity. The self-identification of the Muscovites was based on the dictum "as chosen by God to protect the true faith after the fall of Constantinople and eventually build a world empire around that true faith". Thus, while the democracy and industrialisation of the West failed to bring Russia under its yoke, the posture of Orthodox Christendom in Russia also rigidly opposed Western "enlightened" civilisation.

Later, communism in Russia acted as a "zealot" or "proselyte" and successfully kept the country away from the West based on ideological differences. (Arnold J Toynbee and DC Somervell, *A Study of History: Volume I: Abridgement of Volumes I–VI*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) Communism nurtured an anti-Western attitude among the people. As an ideology, it clashed with Western capitalism and resisted attempts to integrate Russia into Western society. (Yana Hashamova, *Pride and Panic: Russian Imagination of the West in Post-Soviet Film*, Bristol: Intellect, 2007) In contemporary discourse, in the post-Soviet era, Eurasianists have developed a similar counter ideology to compete with the

United States of America (US) led Atlantic order. (Heikki Patomäki and Christer Pursiainen, "Western Models and the 'Russian Idea': Beyond 'Inside/Outside' in Discourses on Civil Society", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol28, no1, 1999, pp53–77) For neo-Eurasianists, the US is the Carthage of the twenty-first century, which must be destroyed to rescue humanity from civilisational collapse. The following sections analyse contemporary Russia's role in the reintegration of the post-Soviet space through a neo-Eurasianist geopolitical approach, which provides the ideological justification for Russia as a multiethnic state. The geopolitical theories of Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman and Karl Haushofer have influenced the geostrategic thinking of Russian neo-Eurasianists. The geopolitical doctrines of the early twentieth century such as the Heartland Theory and Rimland Thesis remain important for Eurasianists in developing the Russian school of geopolitics. The dynamics of current Russian foreign policy in the light of present day geopolitics are also examined with a focus on Russia's presumptive vocation as a Eurasian hegemonic saviour, striving to mend the broken geographical and spiritual ties with other nations in the Eurasian region.

THE REBIRTH OF EURASIANISM

As a strategic country on the vast Eurasian landmass, Russia's geopolitical thinking has always vacillated between Europe and Asia. (Deborah W Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Russia says No: Power, Status and Emotions in Foreign Policy", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol47, nos3–4, 2014, pp269–79) Since the fall of the Soviet Union, domestic politics have been hampered by conflicts between communists, Eurasianists and Westerners. The fall of communism gave birth to political nostalgia, propelling Eurasianists to dominate the Russian political scene. (Andrei P Tsygankov, "Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia's Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Breakup", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol36, no1, 2003, pp101–27) Eurasianists advocate the reintegration of the post-Soviet space with Russia to restore its geographical and geopolitical uniqueness in the greater Eurasian region. (Petr Savitsky, "Geopolitical and Geographical Foundations of Eurasianism (1933)", *Geopolitika*, 2007, pp235–42 and online at https://eurasianist-archive.com) With the fall of communism, Eurasianism also became a popular discourse across the post-Soviet space especially in Central Asia. (Peter JS Duncan, "Westernism, Eurasianism and Pragmatism: The Foreign Policies of the Post-Soviet States, 1991–2001" in Wendy Slater and Andrew Wilson (Eds), *The Legacy of the Soviet Union*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp228–53)

The history of the concept of Eurasia dates back to the rule of Peter the Great

who won the war against Sweden and incorporated large European territories into imperial Russia. The geographical addition on the western frontier added to the uniqueness of Russia as a strategic multicultural flat land between Europe and Asia. (Tsygankov, 2003, *ibid*) In the nineteenth century, Russian scholar Nikolai Danilevsky (1822–85) introduced the word Eurasia as a vast unique geographical space, separate from both Europe and Asia. He expanded the geographical realm of Eurasia by elevating its territorial horizons to include the mountain ranges of the Alps, the Caucasus and the Himalayas as well as the vast external water bodies that form the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Danilevsky also declared the inner waters of the Baltic, Black and Caspian seas as strategic parts of inner Eurasia inherently determining its geographical uniqueness. (Mark Entin and Ekaterina Entina, "The New Role of Russia in the Greater Eurasia", *Strategic Analysis*, vol40, no6, 2016, pp590–603) As a political concept, Eurasia refers to

> **The early Eurasian thinkers perceived the term Eurasia as the core of the centuries old hybrid continent, neither Europe nor Asia but representing the centre of the world, a unifier, a true "middle" of the world, representing a strong connection between the European and Asian peripheries of the old world—a true symbol of classical legacy.**

a geopolitical ideology of the territorial and spiritual connection between the communities across the vast steppes of Europe and Asia. (Bassin, 2003, *ibid*) In this regard, some Eurasianists believe that the cultural and religious ties between the Eastern Slavs, Turanian and Turkic communities are essential elements of Russian history. (Shnirelman, *ibid*) This interconnection was articulated ideologically by Russian historian and Eurasianist Lev Gumilev who considered Eurasia as a synthesis of European and Asian principles. For Gumilev, the Eurasian civilisation was the product of centuries old harmony and interconnections among diverse Eurasian communities. (Bassin, 2003, *ibid*)

The early Eurasian thinkers perceived the term Eurasia as the core of the centuries old hybrid continent, neither Europe nor Asia but representing the centre of the world due to ancient interconnections between East European, Siberian, Caucasian and Central Asian communities. (Graham Smith, "The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, vol24, no4, 1999, pp481–94) For them Eurasia was a unifier, a true "middle" of the world, representing a strong connection between the European and Asian peripheries

of the old world—a true symbol of classical legacy. (Savitsky, *ibid*) Eurasian identity was indivisible or unbreakable as it was inherently and naturally an integrated entity. (Igor Torbakov, "A Parting of Ways: The Kremlin Leadership and Russia's New Generation Nationalist Thinkers", *Demokratizatsiya*, vol23, no4, 2015, pp427–57) Russia's geopolitical position on the vast Eurasian landmass forces it to reclaim the realm of Eurasian civilisation, as the Eurasianism of the Russian civilisation provides a basis for new intercivilisational international relations. (Bassin, 2003, *ibid*) The Eurasian nature of Russia is also a symbol of strength, representing a civilisational diversity necessary for the geopolitical stability of the Eurasian region. (Marlène Laruelle, "The Two Faces of Contemporary Eurasianism: An Imperial Version of Russian Nationalism", *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, vol32, no1, 2004, pp115–36)

After the collapse of Soviet communism, neo-Eurasianists gained significant political influence in domestic politics. Their anti-Western attitude led them to advocate a complete detachment from the West to maintain the Eurasian identity. (Duncan, *ibid*) Neo-Eurasianists have broadened the theoretical domain of Eurasianism based on the theory of ethno-genesis by asserting a Russian identity in the anthropological discourse of Indo-European identity. (Mark Bassin, "The Emergence of Ethno-Geopolitics in Post-Soviet Russia", *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, vol50, no2, 2009, pp131–49) In the 1990s, Aleksandr Dugin became a well-known face of the Russian Eurasian project who advocated the creation of a "supra-national empire" in which ethnic Russians would occupy a privileged position. (Laruelle, 2004, *ibid*) For Dugin, there was a shared identity between Russia and the countries of East Europe and Central Asia and the geographic unity of the Eurasian continent was a symbol of centuries old political reality. To achieve Dugin's dream, Russia needed to ensure strategic balancing in the Eurasian region by keeping Chinese and Iranian influence at bay. Dugin called China a dangerous neighbour and proposed Russia create a buffer zone around Tibet, Mongolia, Xinxiang and Manchuria to keep China away from Russian borders. (Şener Aktürk, "The Fourth Style of Politics: Eurasianism as a Pro-Russian Rethinking of Turkey's Geopolitical Identity", *Turkish* Studies, vol16, no1, 2015, pp54–79) Similarly, Iran also has huge stakes in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Russia's south) and Dugin advocated that Russia forge a grand alliance with Turania to establish a buffer zone between itself and the Islamic south. Neo-Eurasianism embraces nationalist politics and proposes a new type of sovereignty within the Russian Federation for the various nationalities in the post-Soviet space. (Andrei P Tsygankov, "Finding a Civilisational Idea: The 'West', 'Eurasia' and the 'Euro-East' in Russia's Foreign Policy", *Geopolitics*, vol12, no3, 2007, pp375–99) Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Eurasianists have

advocated an anti-Western policy and urged government officials not to be dependent on Western economic and military assistance. (Smith, *ibid*)

THE FOUNDATIONS OF RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS

The Great Game of the nineteenth century between the British and Russian empires for control of the Eurasian heartland gave birth to its geopolitical discourse. (Ronald Hyam, "The Primacy of Geopolitics: The Dynamics of British Imperial Policy 1763–1963", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol27, no2, 1999, pp27–52) Geographers were the first to speculate about the geopolitical significance of the Eurasian region. British geographer Halford Mackinder called the Eurasian heartland the geographical pivot of the world and warned the British Empire about imperial Russia's strategic outreach for warm waters. For Mackinder, whoever controlled East Europe would command the heartland, whoever controlled the heartland would command the world island and whoever controlled the world island would command the world. In his famous study *The Geographical Pivot of History* published in 1902, Mackinder warned about Russian ambitions in the Eurasian heartland, which would make it the strongest land power on Earth. His paper presented to the Royal Geographical Society warned the British crown about Russian control of Central Asia and northern Afghanistan. He used the term "geographical pivot" to describe the buffer zone between the Russian and British empires and included the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Mackinder argued that if Russia reached Afghanistan a direct confrontation could ensue with the British Empire in India. Two major geopolitical concepts later evolved from Mackinder's hypothesis—the implications of the concept of

> For Halford Mackinder, whoever controlled East Europe would command the heartland, whoever controlled the heartland would command the world island and whoever controlled the world island would command the world. In the wake of the Second World War, Mackinder broadened his analysis by claiming that if the Soviet Union appeared as the vanquisher of Germany, it would become the biggest land power. The heartland would make the Russian army an invincible garrison on the globe.

the Great Game and the warm waters narrative. In the wake of the Second World War, Mackinder broadened his analysis by claiming that if the Soviet Union appeared as the vanquisher of Germany, it would become the biggest land power with a strategically defendable position. The heartland as the biggest natural fortress on Earth would make the Russian army an invincible garrison on the globe. (Tuğçe Varol Sevim, "Eurasian Union: A Utopia, a Dream or Coming Reality", *Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics*, vol6, no12, 2013, pp43–62)

The domain of geopolitics deals with the strategic location of a country and its associated capabilities, opportunities and resources. The geopolitics of a state accounts for the struggle for power in the global system by the projection of capabilities through statecraft and available resources. Geopolitics is the worldview developed by a state for self-positioning and self-projection in the international system as a stakeholder. (Virginie Mamadouh and Gertjan Dijkink, "Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse", *Geopolitics*, vol11, no3, 2006, pp349–66) Swedish political scientist Johan Rudolf Kjellén coined the term *geopolitik*, later transformed and developed by German geographers Frederick Ratzel and Karl Haushofer. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the discourse of geopolitics was broadened by Mackinder and the American geographer Nicholas Spykman. (Atsuko Watanabe, "Greater East Asia Geopolitics and its Geopolitical Imagination of a Borderless World: A Neglected Tradition", *Political Geography*, vol67, 2018, pp23–31) Later, with the onset of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US, American geostrategists like Zbigniew Brzezinski adopted and adapted the term "geopolitics". (Alexandros Petersen, *The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West*, Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011)

American geographer Nicholas Spykman pioneered the Rimland Theory by modifying Mackinder's Heartland Theory, which was limited to the domain of land based imperial control and dominance. Mackinder had illustrated the geographical relationship between two neighbouring continents Europe and Asia. He saw it as a single continent, a continuous landmass with ice-girths in the north and water-girths in the south covering an area of twenty-one million square miles. Spykman modified Mackinder's thesis with his rimland dictum of "who controls the rimland rules Eurasia and who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world". (Robert D Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography*, New York: Random House, 2013) Rimland refers to the vast rich resources and inner sea-lanes or strategic trade routes in the peripheral areas of the Eurasian continent. Spykman projected the importance of the Eurasian rimland for maritime hegemony in the world. For him, although the Atlanticists relied on sea power, if they failed to control the Eurasian rimland, they would lose the war against Russia. Thus, Spykman

saw the coastal areas of West, South, Southeast and East Asia as strategically significant for controlling Eurasia and a means of keeping an eye on the land power of Russia. (Colin S Gray, "Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power and International Order", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol38, no6, 2015, pp873–97)

For Mackinder, Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia formed the "pivot" area around which the fate of empires would rely—what he called the heartland. As a founder of modern geopolitics, Mackinder summarised the discipline of geopolitics as "man and not nature initiates, but nature in large measure controls". (Geoffrey Sloan, "Sir Halford J Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol22, nos2–3, 1999, pp15–38) Likewise, Alfred Thayer Mahan's Blue Water Theory in the late nineteenth–early twentieth century had declared the sea as the "commons" of civilisations and stated that naval power was a decisive factor in global politics. For Mahan, "whoever controls the oceans, rules the destinies of the world" and therefore for him the Indian and Pacific oceans were important geopolitical arenas. (Kaplan, *ibid*) He anticipated the Indian Ocean to be the epicentre of the geopolitical competition between major powers. Mahan also coined the term Middle East by emphasising the sea-lanes between Arabia and India as significant for naval strategy, maritime security and imperial hegemony. Mahan's Blue Waters Theory was adapted as the Domino Theory in the 1950s and became part of the US's containment strategy during the Cold War. The theory projected the expansion of communism through a domino effect in other nations of the Asia–Pacific, threatening US maritime hegemony in the Pacific Ocean.

> **The fall of the Soviet Union forced foreign policy circles to devise a new multivector approach to reintegration. The Russian geopolitical vision of a Eurasian Union represented a new regionalisation process as a barrier to the influx of external powers in the post-Soviet space—a clear example being China's peaceful rise in Central Asia.**

After the fall of the Soviet Union, these geopolitical theories compelled Russia to reiterate its geopolitical position as a Eurasian power. Dugin laid the foundations of Russian geopolitics through his work *The Foundation of Geopolitics*, taught in Russian military schools today. (Alan Ingram, "Aleksandr Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia", *Political Geography*, vol20, no8, 2001, pp1029–51) The geopolitical treatise has political and strategic significance for Russian foreign policy as with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country suffered from political nostalgia for a prolonged

period of time. For Dugin, the New Great Game had already begun with new geopolitical players at the heart of Eurasia—a strategic threat to Russia's sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. (John B Dunlop, "Aleksandr Dugin's Foundation of Geopolitics", *Demokratizatsiya*, vol12, no1, 2004) Russia's Eurasian identity came under severe threat from new alliances formed in the greater Eurasian region. (Jacob W Kipp, "Aleksandr Dugin and the Ideology of National Revival: Geopolitics, Eurasianism and the Conservative Revolution", *European Security*, vol11, no3, 2002, pp91–125) Dugin proposed a Eurasia-centric foreign policy to reinvigorate Russian influence in the post-Soviet space through a series of economic and political collaborative agreements.

The main objective of Russian geopolitics has been to advance the process of economic integration of the post-Soviet space from the Baltic Sea to the Yellow Sea. The new economic conditions and collapse of Soviet security infrastructure pushed Russian leadership to reshape the geographic security of Eurasia. (Mikhail A Molchanov, *Regionalisation from Above: Russia's Asia "Vector" and the State led Regionalism in Eurasia*, 2009, online at https://www.researchgate.net) In addition, the dawn of the twenty-first century marked a new era of regionalism across the globe with multidimensional interstate integration across cultural, economic, political and security spheres. The fall of the Soviet Union forced foreign policy circles to devise a new multivector approach to reintegration. (Maria Lagutina, "Eurasian Economic Union Foundation: Issues of Global Regionalisation", *Eurasia Border Review*, vol5, no1, 2014, pp95–111) The new regionalism was influenced by the rising development and security concerns of major powers in the surrounding regions. (Shaun Breslin, Christopher W Hughes, Nicola Phillips and Ben Rosamond (Eds), *New Regionalism in the Global Political Economy: Theories and Cases*, London: Routledge, 2002) Thus, the Russian geopolitical vision of a Eurasian Union represented a new regionalisation process as a barrier to the influx of external powers in the post-Soviet space—a clear example being China's peaceful rise in Central Asia. (Marcin Kaczmarski, "Non-Western Visions of Regionalism: China's New Silk Road and Russia's Eurasian Economic Union", *International Affairs*, vol93, no6, 2017, pp1357–76)

RUSSIA AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION

The fall of the Soviet Union marked a new beginning in three major sub-Eurasian regions. After the dissolution, Russia emerged as the largest and most stable state among the newly independent post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The catastrophic Soviet disintegration also engendered major economic problems for the newly independent states. (Evgeny Vinokurov and Alexander Libman, *Eurasian Integration Challenges of Transcontinental Regionalism*, London: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2014) Facing dire economic challenges, the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Interstate Economic Committee, the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and a set of new trade agreements were intended to ensure an initial peaceful breakup with a fair distribution of assets. Along with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan supported the creation of the commonwealth and other regional projects with neo-regionalism aspirations. (Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, "The Commonwealth of Independent States 1991–98: Stagnation and Survival", *Europe–Asia Studies*, vol51, no3, 1999, pp379–415) The term neo-regionalism came into global discourse after the fall of the Soviet Union, describing a new pattern of regional integration across administrative, cultural, economic and political spheres. Russia's Eurasian project with a neo-Eurasianist foreign policy aims at achieving neo-regionalisation in the greater Eurasian area in the form of a Eurasian Union, a Eurasian Economic Union and a Eurasian Customs Union.

With China's announcement of its Belt and Road Initiative, Russia looked to it for a trustworthy partner to build new economic ties across Eurasia. The Chinese initiative comprises major economic and logistics projects for the twenty-first century. The New Great Game envisages China's growing influence in the Central Asian region as a strategic threat for Russia, which needs to be counterbalanced with shared geopolitical interests.

The creation of a Eurasian Union manifest the collective vision of the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan who saw the reintegration of the post-Soviet space as indispensable for security. For them, Eurasia is the historical space of Russia and its peripheries and their geographical and sociocultural unity. (S Frederick Starr and Svante E Cornell (Eds), *Putin's Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents*, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm, 2014, online at https://isdp.eu) The concept of an intergovernmental and supranational entity encompassing the Russian Federation and the countries in the post-Soviet space demonstrated a clear agenda for a neo-regionalisation process. The initial proposal for the establishment of a Eurasian Union came from the former President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev who perceived the integration project as a gradual process across economic, humanitarian and political spheres. (James Kilner, "Kazakhstan Welcomes Putin's Eurasian Union Concept", *The Telegraph*, 6 October 2011, online at https://www.telegraph.co.uk) According to American Eurasianism expert Marlène Laruelle, (*Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasian Union: Terminological Gaps and Overlaps*, Ponars Eurasia, Policy Memo 366, July 2015, online at http://www.ponarseurasia.org) there is a close overlap between

a Eurasian Union and the ideology of neo-Eurasianism as the latter provides the ideological foundations for the Eurasian project. For Laruelle, the geographical and geopolitical aspects of the term Eurasia are closely associated with the term Euraziski, which refers to a person of mixed European and Asian descent. She has highlighted the special relationship between Eurasia, Russian Eurasianism and the Eurasian Union project.

Since 2000, Russia has played an active role in Eurasian integration with support from Belarus and Kazakhstan. The vision for a Eurasian Union dominated the Russian political scene during the 2012 presidential elections, when Vladimir Putin and his United Russia Party formally announced their support for the integration project. (Starr and Cornell, *ibid*) The announcement was welcomed in Kazakhstan as Nazarbayev had always personally supported closer economic integration of the post-Soviet countries with Russia. (Kilner, *ibid*) The proposal for the Eurasian Union was made in 1996, when the Treaty on Deepening Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Areas came into force through a multilateral dialogue between the representatives of the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. (Paul Pryce, "Putin's Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism", *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, vol13, no1, 2013)

Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin ("A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making", *Izvestia*, 3 October 2011, online at https://russiaeu.ru) has always supported close cooperation between Europe and Asia, with the aim of creating a common economic space with the European Union and Eurasian Economic Union, like Mikhail Gorbachev before him. Putin has advanced the concept of a greater European community from Lisbon to Vladivostok stretching along a common economic and political space. The idea of greater Eurasia was also speculated upon by German geopolitical scientist Karl Haushofer who in the wake of World War Two called for a geopolitical bloc between the Soviet Union, Germany and Japan against the Anglo-Saxon marine civilisation. A similar idea was also contemplated by French President Charles de Gaulle in the 1950s when he called for the creation of a greater European Community from "the Atlantic to the Urals". (Anatoly Tsvyk, "'Greater Europe' or 'Greater Eurasia': In Search of New Ideas for the Eurasian Integration", *RUDN Journal of Sociology*, vol18, no2, 2018, pp262–70) The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) expansion eastwards soon became a major hurdle in Russia–European Union cooperation. On several occasions, Russian foreign policy circles urged Europe not to breach the trust between the two by supporting NATO's expansion. ("Was NATO's Eastward Expansion a Broken Promise", *Offiziere.ch*, 28 December 2018, online at https://www.offiziere.ch)

With China's announcement of its Belt and Road Initiative, Russia looked

to it for a trustworthy partner to build new economic ties across Eurasia. The Chinese initiative comprises major economic and logistics projects for the twenty-first century such as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Route. (Tsvyk, *ibid*) These are vast sprawling transport and logistics networks across Eurasia and include airports, gas and oil pipelines, highways and railway lines. In 2017, the Eurasian Economic Union Commission listed some priority projects in cooperation with the Chinese initiative including upgrading existing routes and the construction of new logistics centres. (Denis A Degterev, Li Yan and Alexandra A Trusova, "Russian and Chinese Systems of Development Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis", *Vestnik RUDN International Relations*, vol17, no4, 2017, pp824–38) Due to geostrategic challenges posited by NATO and its European supporters, Russia has turned towards greater Eurasia or the common economic space between Europe, the Eurasian Economic Union countries and Asia. (Peter Havlik, *The Silk Road: Challenges for the European Union and Eurasia*, Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, 1 December 2015, online at https://wiiw.ac.at) Moreover, the New Great Game envisages China's growing influence in the Central Asian region as a strategic threat for Russia, which needs to be counterbalanced with shared geopolitical interests. (Petar Kurečić, "The New Great Game: Rivalry of Geostrategies and Geoeconomies in Central Asia", *Hrvatski Geografski Glasnik/Croatian Geographical Bulletin*, vol72, no1, 2010, pp21–46)

> The Russian initiative of Eurasian integration has found support amongst several countries in the post-Soviet space. The *modus operandi* is multidimensional and contemporary Russian geopolitics favours détente as the country attempts to reintegrate the post-Soviet space of Central Asia and Eastern Europe across economic, humanitarian and political spheres.

Thus, the Eurasian economic integration project is a multidimensional attempt by Russia and its close allies in the Eurasian region to establish a new association by erecting common institutions and norms. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave birth to new geopolitical uncertainties and compelled Russia to find alternative ways to promote its interests in the Eurasian region. (Alexander Lukin and Vladimir Yakunin, "Eurasia Integration and the Development of Asiatic Russia", *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, vol9, no2, 2018, pp100–13) Accordingly, the Russian initiatives of a Eurasian Union and the Eurasian Economic Union are aimed at the reintegration of the post-Soviet space with Russia. Several Russian Eurasian projects through a "soft" balancing strategy are endeavouring to counter the Atlanticists influence in the Eurasian region and project a new "soft" image of Russia as a superpower.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary Russian foreign policy is based on the economic challenges and existential security threats facing the state. The Russian initiative of Eurasian integration has found support amongst several countries in the post-Soviet space. The *modus operandi* is multidimensional and contemporary Russian geopolitics favours détente as the country attempts to reintegrate the post-Soviet space of Central Asia and Eastern Europe across economic, humanitarian and political spheres. Since 2000, Russia has played an active role through various economic initiatives such as the Eurasian Customs Union, the Eurasian Development Bank and the Eurasian Economic Union. Pro-Russian regimes in East Europe and Central Asia today face various domestic problems. For instance Belarus, which is suffering from dire economic challenges, is still ruled by the pro-Russia strongman Alexander Lukashenko, whose regime has been criticised by the West for its undemocratic rule. Despite this, Lukashenko has struck a new deal with Russia on gas pipelines. Kazakhstan too is an important ally of Russia in the Central Asian region. It has always supported the Eurasian project and is a key state in the Russian sphere of influence. However, it too is facing economic and political challenges that could disrupt the pace of Eurasian integration. Nevertheless, Russia continues to play an important role in Eurasian integration. The Eurasian Union seems to be evolving and for it, the trajectory of Russia's foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is pertinent. Thus, Russia's multivectoral foreign policy approach aims to build new economic and security architecture for the integration of the post-Soviet space. ◼

Self-reliance : the keynote of our independence

Long before we won our freedom, self-reliance was the goal of those of our people who shed the shackles of dependence: men of foresight and determination, like Ardeshir and Pirojsha Godrej, who had confidence in the country's capabilities and shared the same ideals with Tilak, Tagore, Gandhi and Nehru who practised self-reliance.

In Godrej, self-reliance has been considered indispensable to progress, the aim being not just self-sufficiency for the organisation but for the whole country. Progress can only be achieved in a milieu of progress.

Based on our country's needs, and exploiting the country's own resources, Godrej have diversified.

Made to international standards and backed by continuous technical innovation, their products range from locks and security equipment, machine tools, forklift trucks, architecture and furniture, typewriters, refrigerators, computers and electronic business systems as well as soaps, detergents, toiletries, chemicals, animal feeds, agro-products and edible oils.

The Godrej industrial garden township at Vikhroli-Pirojshangar is an example of self-reliance and progress. For their workers Godrej have provided—in a unique environment—many social benefits: extensive housing, schools and adult education, recreation, medical and family-planning benefits...

Self-reliance is both a means and an end.

For Godrej it is the essence of independence.

The Unspoken Conflict
In Western Sahara

Western Sahara has been the most populous and largest non-self-governing territory since 1963. Conflict in the area remains one of the oldest unresolved ones in the world. The conflict mainly involves the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, which later formed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. These two disputants were in armed conflict between 1975 and 1991 when a ceasefire was signed. However, since then no viable peace process has been established in Western Sahara. This paper analyses the claims of the Sahrawi including their demand for self-determination, incorporating the different roles of players at regional and international levels. It also reflects on efforts made by the United Nations to contain the conflict. Lastly, the paper offers possible formulae to end the conflict keeping in mind the best interests of all disputants.

KANIKA SANSANWAL AND RAHUL KAMATH

INTRODUCTION

For Africa, the twentieth century was a period of decolonisation from countries like France, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. The last region to be decolonised was Western Sahara in 1976 when Spain left as per the terms of the Madrid Accords signed on 14 November 1975 between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. The treaty ended Spanish presence in erstwhile Spanish Sahara and Morocco and Mauritania annexed territories wherein they controlled most of the northern and southern portions respectively. As per the agreement, only administrative control was to be given to the two nations

and not sovereignty. Both parties were successful in annexing parts of Western Sahara even though they were resisted by the Polisario Front backed by Algeria. The front had started as an insurgency group in 1971 against Spanish forces in Spanish Sahara. A group of students at the University of Morocco organised the Embryonic Movement of the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro. Spain had divided these two territories as per the geography of the region. The group consists largely of the Sahrawi people—nomadic Berbers who inhabit southern Morocco, Algeria, Western Sahara and Mauritania and speak the Arabic dialect of Hassaniya. The Polisario Front was recognised by Libya and Mauritania in 1975, after it received the backing of the Tropas Nómadas (nomadic troops), composed of Sahrawi tribesman equipped with small arms and weapons.

In 1975, to aid the decolonisation process of Spanish Sahara, the United Nations (UN) dispatched a mission to the area and surrounding countries. The mission concluded that the Sahrawi support for independence was stronger than other options such as Spanish rule or integration with neighbours. The mission added that the Polisario Front was the most powerful force in the country, which later became a political organisation and ultimately the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on 27 December 1976 a day after Spain retreated from Spanish Sahara. In 1984, SADR became a member of the Organisation of African Union (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union. However, due to its admission, Morocco withdrew from the organisation. Even though the government is in exile, forty United Nations member-states maintain diplomatic relations with the SADR.

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Western Sahara has been the most populous and largest non-self-governing territory since 1963. In 1965, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution, asking Spain to decolonise the territory and in 1966, passed a new resolution for a referendum to be held by Spain on the self-determination of the Sahrawi people. This was the first time that the concept of self-determination was linked to the Sahrawi. The anti-Spanish agitation in Spanish Sahara however had not demanded independence but rather union with Morocco. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1975 issued a non-

binding opinion on Western Sahara, which resulted in a UN mission touring the region. It concluded that the Sahrawi people favoured independence from Spain and Morocco and based on this claim it was decided that the territory was not *terra nullius*. The ICJ acknowledged that Western Sahara had historical links with Mauritania and Morocco but there was not enough evidence to prove the sovereignty of either state over the territory.

The conflict between the Polisario Front and Morocco reached its peak during the Western Sahara War 1975–91. This armed conflict started when Morocco invaded Western Sahara with the Green March, a mass demonstration organised by King Hassan II, whereby more than 350,000 Moroccan civilians escorted by 20,000 troops entered Western Sahara to establish a presence in the region. The Polisario met this intrusion, but could not contain the influx. The guerrilla warfare that followed was known as the Western Sahara War, which lasted for sixteen years. The main objective of the Polisario Front was to establish an independent state for the Sahrawi. Although initially they fought both Mauritania and Morocco, in 1979 Mauritania signed a peace agreement with the Polisario and withdrew from the conflict. Throughout the 1980s, the two remaining parties continued a low-intensity conflict even though Morocco had greater military strength aided by France, Israel and the United States of America (US). The Polisario devised a new strategy of building desert sand walls lined with millions of land mines. These were later termed the Moroccan Western Sahara Wall, which stretches for approximately 2,700 kilometres.

In 1991, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the Polisario Front and Morocco. Since then, the nature of the conflict has shifted from military hostilities to civilian resistance. By the end of the armed conflict, Morocco had captured over 80 per cent of the total land including the coastline. The SADR controls the remaining 20 per cent and operates from Tindouf in Algeria where over 125,000 Sahrawi refugees live. Since the cessation of war, several attempts have been made to formulate a peace process to resolve the conflict, but no permanent solution has been produced. In 1991, the United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was deployed to resolve the issues of Western Sahara—the last remaining colony whose status had not been legitimised. The mission's main mandate was to constitute an exercise for Sahrawi self-determination but the plan never met its goal, as there was conflict over voter eligibility. Since then several peace processes such as the Houston Agreement, Baker Plans I and II have all failed and as of 2019, there were no

plans for holding a referendum.

THE SAHRAWI AND SELF-DETERMINATION

The right to self-determination is the right of people to determine their own destiny based on the principles of equal rights and equality of opportunity, the right to choose freely their sovereignty and political legitimacy without any external interference. The right allows people to choose their own political status and determine their own form of cultural, economic and social development. The principle is *jus cogens* and is embodied in Article I of the UN Charter. While the concept may be traced back to the 1860s, American President Woodrow Wilson and Soviet leader Vladimir I Lenin embraced the principle during and after the First World War. According to Wilson, self-determination is the belief that all people have the right to choose and select their form of government and sovereignty. People should be dominated and governed only through their consent and any use of force be considered an oppressive act.

> **The idea of self-determination as a universal guiding principle continues to be imprecise with conflicting definitions. It does not state how decisions are to be taken, what the outcome of self-determination is to be—independence, protection, a federation, an autonomous region or full assimilation—nor does it define delimitations between people. The larger disagreement is often on who precisely is the "self".**

The idea of self-determination as a universal guiding principle continues to be imprecise with conflicting definitions. It does not state how decisions are to be taken, what the outcome of self-determination is to be—independence, protection, a federation, an autonomous region or full assimilation—nor does it define delimitations between people. The larger disagreement is often on who precisely is the "self". In 1960, self-determination was developed as a coherent principle with the passage of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The goal was to free people under alien subjugation, domination and exploitation. UNGA resolutions 1514 and 1541 listed three ways through which a territory could achieve self-

government—independence, free association with an independent state or assimilation into an independent state. The definition of realisation of self-determination was established in the Declaration of Friendly Relations in 1970. A specially created UN Special Committee was to play an advisory role in the final stages of self-determination. In the process, the UN was to supervise a self-determination referendum on the request of the colonial power to ensure orderly transition from colonisation to decolonisation.

The etymology of Sahrawi is "inhabitant of the desert". The Sahrawi are originally nomadic Berbers who settled in Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and Western Sahara in the eighth century. After the arrival of Islam in Africa, they became a composite tribe of mixed heritage by combining Arab, Berber and other Sahel clans. Cultural and political differences between pre-colonial and colonial eras are apparent. After the Berlin Conference of 1884, most of the tribal groups fell under French or Spanish rule. France ruled over North and West Africa whereas Western Sahara and parts of Morocco were controlled by Spain. Colonisation introduced Christianity in the region, which created lasting cultural and political divides within the population and disrupted traditional practices. The lifestyle of the nomadic Sahrawi and loyalty to their territory proved troublesome for the colonisers. The French and Spanish administrations soon imposed their own systems of governance and education over the occupied territories. Colonisation radically changed things in the region from educational systems and power structures to the creation of a legacy of arbitrary borders drawn on paper with little relation to ethnic and tribal realities—laying a map for chaos and destruction.

As stated earlier an ICJ ruling of 1975 stated that although there had been ties between the Moroccan Sultan and the tribes of Spanish Sahara, they were not adequate to abrogate Western Sahara's right to self-determination. Hence, the court advised the UN to pursue self-determination for the Sahrawi, allowing them to choose between forming an independent state or annexation by Morocco or Mauritania. As stated previously, in 1973 the Sahrawi students at the University of Morocco started resisting Spanish rule and formed the Polisario Front. Their goal was to gain independence from the colonisers, but their pursuit was halted when Morocco and Mauritania took over Spanish Sahara after Spain's departure in 1976. The next day, the Polisario Front proclaimed itself the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic with the support of Algeria and thus began the sixteen-year war with Morocco and three-year war with Mauritania. Armed conflict ended

in 1991 with a ceasefire signed between Morocco and the Polisario. To oversee the ceasefire the UN established the MINURSO to prepare for a referendum on self-determination based on the census of 1974 held by Spain. This proposal was rejected by Morocco, which infiltrated Western Sahara with its own citizens and demanded a new census. Later in 1997, former US Secretary of State James Baker was appointed as the UN Secretary General's personal envoy to Western Sahara. Baker established new terms for a census based on demographic surveys from both sides. However, despite the completion of the census, the Polisario Front rejected the proposal (Baker Plan I) as it did not guarantee independence as an option but instead offered Western Sahara autonomy within the Kingdom of Morocco. The UN Security Council demanded the plan be redrafted, as it was inconsistent with the principles of the MINURSO. Hence, a new plan (Baker Plan II) was presented in 2003. This plan proposed a referendum for integration or continued autonomy or independence after a period of four to five years under Moroccan administration. Despite meeting all the requirements, the plan was scrapped as Morocco rejected the referendum, which offered independence as an option. Ultimately, the plan was abandoned and since 2005, there have been no plans for a referendum in Western Sahara.

Algeria supports the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi due to the sanctity of post-colonial boundaries and commitment to the principle of self-determination. The alignment of Algeria against Morocco is due to self-interest over three main resources namely, phosphate reserves around the Bou Craa, fishing grounds off the Saharan coast and access to a port on the Atlantic for export of hydrocarbons and iron ore.

REGIONAL RIVALRY: MOROCCO VERSUS ALGERIA

Morocco and Algeria are two key players in the Western Sahara conflict. Both countries came under French rule—Algeria as a regency in 1837 and Morocco as a protectorate in 1912. France and other European powers created borders that disrupted regional tribal practices. In 1938, France drew borders that brought the Draa Valley, including the Tindouf region inhabited by the Sahrawi into Algerian territory. Rabat has always claimed that the Draa Valley

was under Moroccan rule before the Berlin Conference. Throughout the 1960s, both countries were involved in skirmishes, which eventually led to the Sand War in 1963. This heightened tensions between the two for several decades even though Morocco failed to conquer the lands it sought. The two countries have had longstanding hostile relations, which led to Algeria supporting the Polisario Front against Moroccan troops. Algeria has been home to the Polisario Front ever since its exile and the Tindouf region is now home to over 100,000 Sahrawi refugees. Algeria supports the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi due to the sanctity of post-colonial boundaries and commitment to the principle of self-determination. Even during the Western Sahara conflict, the Polisario Front was backed by Algeria, which in turn received arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union whereas Morocco relied heavily on France and the US for military support. The alignment of Algeria against Morocco is also due to self-interest over three main resources namely, phosphate reserves around the Bou Craa, fishing grounds off the Saharan coast and access to a port on the Atlantic for export of hydrocarbons and iron ore.

Morocco's aim has been control of Western Sahara, which it claims as its rightful territory as part of Greater Morocco. Over the years, the international community has preferred to stay silent on the issue. The US, an ally of Morocco, has iterated that allowing a vote on Sahrawi independence could potentially destabilise the Moroccan monarchy and throw the Maghreb region into turmoil. Morocco has been reluctant to grant independence to Western Sahara and views autonomy as an ideal solution for both parties. France and the US have supported the autonomy plan and Morocco has been slowly gaining international clout to weaken Algeria internationally. The UN too considers autonomy as the most viable option rather than full independence.

Algeria for its part has also been vocal on international and multilateral stages in support of the Sahrawi and helped them enter the OAU in 1984, which led to Morocco's withdrawal. A common factor between Morocco and Algeria is France. Algeria's argument has been that even France, an ally of Morocco, does not recognise its claims on Western Sahara. Algerian tactics have been shrewd in terms of portraying Morocco as the aggressor in the region but it has ensured that the matter does not go beyond the Sahrawi cause. Algeria has also been successful in preventing the marginalisation of the Polisario Front by strictly refusing to participate in negotiations. Thus, in the whole conflict scenario between Morocco and Western Sahara, Algeria has been a shadow fighter—it has

pressed its own views without being directly involved in negotiations. A major reason for the survival of the Polisario Front has been Algeria's unconditional support. It has played by UN rules, undermined Morocco's objectives and kept the Polisario Front as a threat and deterrent to the integration of Western Sahara with Morocco.

The détente of the 1970s between the Soviet Union and the US had a positive impact on the Maghreb as Moscow maintained its neutrality and Washington chose to side with Morocco by providing military and technical support. The US felt that Algeria was no longer a radical and revolutionary state and was convinced that it would not back the toppling of King Hassan. Moreover, the Polisario was not a Marxist–Leninist movement and neither the Soviet Union nor any European country recognised the SADR. The US believes that if the Western Sahara conflict continues, tensions in the area would increase and could change the balance of power in the Maghreb region. Algeria's refusal to participate in any peace talks with Rabat has frustrated the Moroccan government. Algiers maintains that its aim is independence for the Sahrawi people and has pushed this agenda at international fora, weakening Morocco's stance. Algeria and South Africa have brought up the issue of the Sahrawi at the United Nations Security Council to build a case against Morocco. However, Rabat has been selling resources such as phosphates and sardines from Western Sahara to its European allies. Until the Western Sahara conflict is resolved, Morocco will continue to view Algeria as an obstacle to the peace process, whereas Algeria views itself as a defender of the right of self-determination for the Sahrawi.

> The EU believes in the rule of law and respect for human rights. Hence, its relationship with Morocco must balance its desire for trade with the need to maintain the credibility of its human rights record. Today, the EU could play a major role in shaping the destiny of 100,000 Sahrawi living as vulnerable refugees. The EU as a strong regional bloc could influence Morocco's decision to conduct a referendum in Western Sahara.

Morocco and Algeria have been counterbalancing each other and have stalled economic and political cooperation and integration in the region. Both countries aim to be the regional hegemon but their ambitions are a threat to regional stability. The Maghreb region, consisting of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania,

Morocco, Tunisia and Western Sahara, is a volatile area, exposed to regional instability, growing crossborder security threats and the rise of active non-state actors. Although calls for regional cooperation have grown in recent times, Morocco and Algeria—the two biggest economies of the region—have jeopardised regional harmony over opposing allegiances to Western Sahara and unresolved border disputes. An economic grouping known as the Arab Maghreb Union came into being in 1988, which aimed at economic and political unity. It however remains dormant—the union has made no progress due to intense political disagreements between Morocco and Algeria, especially on the issue of Western Sahara.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT

Since the military intervention in Western Sahara, Morocco has been isolated on the issue. As noted earlier, in the 1960s, the principle of self-determination was formulated and the UN asked Spain to conduct a referendum in Spanish Sahara. Morocco however had requested the case be heard at the ICJ. The 1975 ruling recognised the right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. This was the first time an international body had intervened in the case. However, after the war between the Polisario Front and Morocco began, no multilateral institution played a role. The SADR was granted membership of the OAU in 1984 but the organisation itself remained dormant until it was re-established as the African Union in 2001. Morocco only joined the latter in 2017. At the 1976 and 1977 meetings of the OAU, the Moroccan government did dissuade the UNGA and Nonaligned Movement members from taking positions on Western Sahara.

In 1985–86, Morocco participated in indirect negotiations under the aegis of the UN secretary general and the chairman of the OAU. This was mainly due to growing diplomatic and international pressure. The MINURSO was commissioned to oversee the ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario Front. Since then UN peacekeeping forces have been in Western Sahara—one of the longest peacekeeping missions in the world. The forces were deployed almost three decades ago to oversee the ceasefire and conduct a referendum in Western Sahara. However all efforts have failed to date. This is often seen as a conspicuous

failure of the UN, primarily due to the reluctance of Security Council members, mainly France and the US, both strong allies of Morocco.

Morocco's relations with the European Union (EU) are revealing. In 2015, the Court of Justice of the EU suspended an agricultural trade agreement between the EU and Morocco as the latter had included Western Sahara within its territorial scope. The case also involved European states fishing in the territorial waters of Western Sahara, which by itself was a breach of international law. The Saharan coastline is rich in fish and European states have been accused of supporting Moroccan claims on Western Sahara in their own interests. (*MEPs seek European Courts Opinion on EU–Morocco Fisheries Agreement's Compatibility with International Law*, Human Rights Watch, 11 February 2019, online at https://www.hrw.org) The EU's recognition of products from Morocco gives effect to *jus cogens* violations. The EU implicitly recognised Morocco's control over the territory as lawful in its internal law that breached its obligations under Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations and its member-state obligations under Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. The EU has never taken a coherent position on the legality of Western Sahara and

The solution most discussed has been the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco in 2006 by which the Sahrawi would control their own cultural, economic, justice and social policies through domestic representative bodies but Morocco would control the trifecta of sovereignty, defence and foreign affairs. This is the optimal option, as it avoids the zero-sum game or winner takes all characteristic of integration or independence.

equivocated on the position of Morocco controlling the territory. The EU has neither supported the Polisario Front/SADR nor explicitly supported Morocco's claims. This ambiguity prevails due to the need to maintain cooperation with Morocco, a stable ally of the EU and a staunchly conservative power. However, EU members have varied views on the Western Sahara conflict. France is Morocco's second-largest arms supplier and biggest supporter in the EU. In the past, Paris has threatened to use its veto power if the UN favours a solution that undermines Morocco's position at the negotiating table. Spain suffers from collective guilt for its failure to contain the conflict. In 1975, instead of conducting a referendum, Spain had handed over Spanish Sahara to Mauritania and Morocco as per

the Madrid Accords. Since decolonisation, Spain has improved relations with Algeria and supported the idea of conducting a referendum for the Sahrawi. Other EU members such as Germany, Netherland and Sweden have called for an immediate referendum.

It is vital for the EU to be lucid on over the issue. It should take steps to identify its legal stance on the conflict and negotiations with Morocco could help resolve the problem. The EU should clarify that a delayed referendum could lead to regional instability and that trade agreements with Morocco should exclude products from Western Sahara as otherwise it would be a violation of international law. The Moroccan position is stronger in comparison to Algeria. It is one of the few North African countries to invest in counterterrorism and acted as the EU's gatekeeper in managing the refugee crisis of 2014. Morocco understands the risk of losing out on trade agreements with the EU especially as it has been included in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Morocco worked hard to achieve its advanced status in 2008, which opened doors to high levels of political cooperation. Morocco has benefited the most from the EU's financial support as a part of neighbourhood assistance. It has also become a regional specialist in artificial intelligence and has often hosted summits that have helped it grow in the field of science and technology. Morocco aims to be the Silicon Valley of North Africa. As of 2019, artificial intelligence has been used predominantly in the agricultural sector offering over 200,000 new jobs. (Anna Schaeffer, "Artificial Intelligence in Morocco: Not just for Silicon Valley", *Morocco World News*, 24 July 2018, online at https://www.moroccoworldnews.com) Morocco has also received vast funding from France, Israel and the US in its development efforts for social stability.

Trade, security and migration are at the heart of EU–Morocco relations. The fisheries agreement between the two is one such example. By the pact, European vessels are allowed fish in Moroccan waters, including in the territorial waters of Western Sahara, in exchange for monetary benefits. Morocco has also helped Belgian and French authorities with cooperation and intelligence sharing after terror attacks in the two countries. The EU believes in the rule of law and respect for human rights. Hence, its relationship with Morocco must balance its desire for trade with the need to maintain the credibility of its human rights record. Today, the EU could play a major role in shaping the destiny of 100,000 Sahrawi living as vulnerable refugees. The EU as a strong regional bloc could influence Morocco's decision to conduct a referendum in Western Sahara.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

The Western Sahara conflict is one of the oldest unresolved ongoing conflicts in the world today. Several international observers have criticised the Polisario Front for its recruitment of child soldiers, administration of camps and unlawful detention of Moroccan prisoners of war. A concrete solution is necessary to address all the issues of this four-decade long conflict. The solution will have to ensure the self-determination of the Sahrawi, who have never had a formal opportunity to discuss, debate and vote on their status since the Madrid Accords.

Finding an optimal solution will be difficult. The solution most discussed has been the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco in 2006 by which the Sahrawi would control their own cultural, economic, justice and social policies through domestic representative bodies but Morocco would control the trifecta of sovereignty, defence and foreign affairs. This is the optimal option, as it avoids the zero-sum game or winner takes all characteristic of integration or independence. The Polisario Front and Algeria have rejected the proposal, arguing that independence is their only goal. However, the independence of Western Sahara as an alternative to autonomy seems unlikely. The Polisario Front has always functioned as an armed group without proper administrative control in an area larger than the United Kingdom. Independence and granting full control to the Polisario would be catastrophic, as a civil war may ensue and the SADR could become a failed state threatening the stability of the region. The SADR would not be able to defend its territorial boundaries and given its porous borders, terrorist groups and smugglers could take shelter in the newly independent state. Neighbouring countries Algeria, Mali and Mauritania already face internal security problems due to the rise of terrorism in the Maghreb and Sahel regions.

> **Compromise is the need of the hour, as its refusal could lead to further casualties. Without a compromise, the Polisario Front will deliver neither peace nor prosperity to the Sahrawi. Meanwhile, Morocco will continue to be regarded as an aggressor by the international community. The Western Sahara peace process whether through autonomy, independence or integration must deliver a solution that brings justice to all.**

An alternative resolution could be through compromise—functional or territorial. Territorial partition was tried in 1974 after the Madrid Accords, when Spanish Sahara was divided between Mauritania and Morocco but no land was given to the Polisario Front. However, by 1979 the Polisario had defeated Mauritania and claimed its land. In 2001, Algeria proposed a division of territory with the southern part controlled by the Polisario and the northern part by Morocco, however eventually both parties rejected the proposal. Functional divisions are incorporated in the autonomy proposal. Through these, the region would have its own government via the principle of self-determination but under Rabat. That is under Moroccan sovereignty the Polisario would have internal control through domestic elections and would administer its territory. Through functional divisions, both parties get what they want but only if they mutually compromise. While this alternative has its merits, it also has its disadvantages. Making Western Sahara an autonomous region of the Kingdom of Morocco has its risks. As seen in the case of Eritrea, autonomy could lead to secession and independence. The status of autonomy could be sought by other Moroccan regions especially those that lie beyond the Atlas Mountains. The Moroccan government has clearly stated that the proposed Western Sahara autonomy would be unique in stature and would not be replicated elsewhere in the country. Along with domestic concerns about secession, there is also a fear in the international community of setting a dangerous precedent for other neighbouring countries such as Algeria, Mali and Niger with diverse ethnic populations.

Morocco and the Polisario Front have rarely negotiated with each other and no positive outcome has ever emerged. A viable peace process is needed to end the conflict. The matter might not be of intrinsic interest to world leaders, but it is important because of the issues involved. The coastline of the Mediterranean is a strategic gateway and the Maghreb provides a bridge to the unstable area in the east. Morocco and Algeria have competing ties with the US as both cooperate with Washington in efforts to control terrorism. The two countries are also regional "great powers" with transitioning economies. Morocco is a modernising monarchy that has made significant strides in democratisation and economic liberalisation under King Mohammed VI. Algeria under the military junta and now under contested civilian rule has made slow progress on performance but due to its size and oil and gas reserves is regarded as a leader in Arab rejectionist politics. While, some scholars have criticised and deemed UN action in Western Sahara a failure, others have praised its efforts in containing the conflict. As international bodies

sometimes lack knowledge and local experience compared to regional bodies, the African Union (AU) has the potential to play the role of a mediator between the SADR and Morocco since it officially recognises both entities. However, the AU's capability to act on the conflictual issue is debatable. The AU could be more useful and effective alongside the MINURSO. The complexity of the conflict makes it difficult for any institution to address the challenges on its own. In 2017, the UN and AU signed a Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. Compromise is the need of the hour, as its refusal could lead to further casualties. Without a compromise, the Polisario Front will deliver neither peace nor prosperity to the Sahrawi. Meanwhile, Morocco will continue to be regarded as an aggressor by the international community. The Western Sahara peace process whether through autonomy, independence or integration must deliver a solution that brings justice to all.

CONCLUSION

The Western Sahara conflict is among the oldest in the world. Over 100,000 Sahrawi are living as vulnerable refugees in Algeria. The people fighting for their land evoke cultural aspirations, expectations and fears, yet they have been staying on foreign land for over two decades. Ever since the ceasefire in 1991, both Morocco and the Polisario Front have never been on the same page. For nearly three decades, for one reason or another, both sides have rejected the plan for a referendum, which eventually led to dissatisfaction and suspension of negotiations. Finding a solution for this conflict is a mammoth task. The Moroccan stance is clear—autonomy or nothing. Functional autonomy has worked positively in other cases and may resolve this conflict as well. Functional and regional autonomy is the closest the SADR will get to achieving independence. For the Polisario Front and the Sahrawi, time is a luxury that they cannot afford. For the 100,000 Sahrawi in exile, every new day in a foreign land with depleting aid reduces their hope to return home. Without compromise on the part of the Polisario Front, there will be no change in the lives of the Sahrawi. A realistic and pragmatic approach is needed to resolve the conflict of Western Sahara. The Polisario Front has fought for nearly half a century, but has refused to surrender. Morocco's violations of international law and failure to recognise Sahrawi rights to self-determination have also prolonged the conflict. ⬛

Tackling Venezuela's Hyperinflation

This article highlights some of the major factors accounting for Venezuela's economic crisis and hyperinflation, rooted in the almost exclusive dependency of the country on oil exports as well as profligate and corrupt public policies. Having been the wealthiest nation in Latin America, Venezuela has now become a case study in dysfunctional financial and monetary management with consequences aggravated by sanctions and other penalties inflicted by the US and its Western allies. This paper invokes the "natural resources trap" theory to explain Venezuela's disastrous situation and suggests various possible remedies. A reform of the monetary system would require a change of government and political ideology. It would also necessitate international assistance to bring back confidence in the national currency and economy.

SUYASH CHANDAK

For a while now, Venezuelan inflation has been at astronomical levels. As Caracas refuses to publish official statistics, Graph 1 indicates skyrocketing prices represented by the increase in the cost of a cup of coffee since 2018. ("Venezuela Café Con Leche Index", *Bloomberg*, online at https://www.bloomberg.com) Anecdotal stories such as people using Bolivar notes to make hand-woven bags, rather than purchasing the raw materials generally used, illustrate the heightened state of the crisis. (Adriana Diaz, "Venezuelan Boy makes Purse out of Money", *CBS News*, 8 May 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com) A massive recession and an unbearable standard of living have accompanied this crisis with gross domestic product having almost halved over the last 4 years and the average Venezuelan having lost 19 pounds of weight due to food shortages. (*Gross Domestic Product: Venezuela*, World Economics, 2018, online at http://www.

worldeconomics.com)

Graph 1: The Rising Price of a Cup of Coffee in Bolivars

Based on the price of a coffee from a bakery in Caracas. In the year to the end of January 2019 the price rose from 0.45 to 1,700.00 bolivars. The currency devaluation in August 2018 means 1,700.00 new bolivars equal 170,000,000 old bolivars.

Source: Bloomberg, *ibid*

Before delving into how to tackle Venezuela's hyperinflation, it is imperative to examine its cause as well as its appalling impact. The story begins in the 1970s, when Venezuela was considered the richest country in Latin America and had the largest oil reserves in the world. The situation improved further when Hugo Chávez became president in 1998, as global oil prices surged to over $100 a barrel causing Venezuelan wealth to rise. (Garth Friesen, "The Path to Hyperinflation: What Happened to Venezuela", *Forbes*, 7 August 2018, online at https://www.forbes.com) With a strong financial backing, the government invested export earnings in combatting inequality and poverty in the economy, leading to significant improvements as tracked by the child mortality rate, poverty rate and the like. However, from health initiatives like the Mission Barrio Adentro (Mission into the Neighborhood) to literacy programmes like Mission Robinson, the government's spending obligations became too high and somewhat unsustainable. (Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, *Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the Decline of an "Exceptional Democracy"*, *Latin American Perspectives in the Classroom*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007)

When oil prices plummeted in 2014, the demand for the Venezuelan Bolivar

crashed. The lower currency value increased the real cost of imports and sent the economy into a crisis. Unfortunately, President Nicolás Maduro's solution, to the despair of most economists, was to print money profusely. (Diego Restuccia, "The Monetary and Fiscal History of Venezuela: 1960–2016", *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2018, online at https://papers.ssrn.com) While printing money to fund government spending worked for a short-term shock, the further fall of oil prices drove international investors away and exacerbated the issue. The government triggered a vicious cycle—as prices skyrocketed, it printed more money to finance spending—starting one of the worst episodes of hyperinflation in history. (Jose Luis Saboin, "Seigniorage, (Hyper)Inflation and Money Demand in Venezuela in the Twenty-First: A First Estimation Attempt", *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2018, online at https://papers.ssrn.com)

The quantity theory of money and government budget constraint explain the effects of this form of government spending on inflation. The government budget constraint shows the three avenues of funding at the government's disposal, (William J Frazer, "The Government Budget Constraint", *Public Finance Quarterly*, vol6, no3, 1978, pp381–7) out of which the government printed more money, raising seigniorage by increasing the money stock in the Venezuelan economy.

Government Funds = Tax Revenue + Δ(Borrowing) + Δ(Money Stock)

The change in money stock then influenced inflation through the quantity theory of money. (Yi Wen, "The Quantity Theory of Money", *Economic Synopses*, no25, 2006, online at https://files.stlouisfed.org)

$$\text{Price Level} = \frac{\text{(Money Supply) x (Velocity of Money)}}{\text{Real GDP}}$$

Using growth rate formulae, this may be written as:

Inflation rate
= Growth rate in Money supply + Growth rate in velocity
– Growth rate in real GDP

This evidences how an increase in the growth rate of money supply in Venezuela led to a one- for-one increase in the inflation rate.

Diagram 1: Inflation Fuelled by Excess Monetary Growth

Source: Jocelyn Blink and Ian Dorton, *Economics: IB Diploma Programme Course Companion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012

The effects of that period on inflation and real output may be illustrated through a LRAS–AD (long run average supply–aggregate demand) diagram. Milton Friedman's famous saying, "Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon", fits well here. (*Wincott Memorial Lecture: The Counterrevolution in Monetary Theory*, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1970) The increase in money supply to fund government spending feeds into the aggregate demand equation. (Blink and Dorton, *ibid*)

AD = Consumption + Investment + Government Spending + (Exports – Imports)

This causes AD to shift rightward (or upward) significantly from AD_0 → AD_1 since at the same price level a larger real output is produced. This leads the economy from point E_0 → E_1. However, the high inflation leads to a number of costs that the Venezuelan economy needs to bear. These include shoe leather costs, menu costs, wealth redistribution from creditors to debtors if loans are in nominal terms, erosion of purchasing power as well as widespread uncertainty. (Robert E Lucas, "Inflation and Welfare", *Econometrica*, vol68, no2, 2000, pp247–74) The higher the inflation, the stronger the effect, which over some periods shifted the long

run average supply (LRAS) curve leftward as these costs increased, investment in capital, research and development and education decreased and the size of the labour force shrank drastically due to significant emigration. Even though investment and consumption in AD decrease, government spending and exports, due to a weaker Venezuelan Bolivar, grow strongly, causing the AD to shift further upwards from $AD_1 \rightarrow AD_2$. This combined effect of leftward LRAS ($LRAS_0 \rightarrow LRAS_1$ and further on) and upward AD shifts create a spiral, leading Venezuela towards the top left corner of the graph causing simultaneous hyperinflation and massive drops in real gross domestic product over time—the economic state it has been in for the past few years.

Hyperinflation has caused abject poverty and disastrous economic conditions across Venezuela, accentuating the importance of solving this problem at the earliest. To find a solution, it is important to consider first the root cause of the hyperinflation. Economic mismanagement and corruption under the Maduro regime has been a central cause. Maduro's victory in the boycotted election of 2018 is also a red flag, (William Neuman and Nicholas Casey, "Venezuela Election Won by Maduro amid Widespread Disillusionment", *The New York Times*, 20 May 2018, online at https://www.nytimes.com) as is the rise of military officials who support Maduro and enjoy the wealth of Venezuela. Chávez's "natural successor", Maduro especially enjoys the support of many impoverished regions that had benefitted from Chávez's investment in education and healthcare when oil prices were booming in the 2000s. However, any solution would require a new leader and ruling party, possibly Juan Guaido, one of the leaders of the opposition who has been since largely discredited, to be elected through fair and credible elections. Simply trying to eliminate the problem without looking at the initial cause would be like trying to trap rats in a house, without plugging the cavities through which they come in.

The solution most likely to succeed is a dollarization of the economy. The term does not necessarily mean that the economy should adopt the American dollar as its official currency but rather that it should drop the Bolivar and adopt a strong international currency to bring inflation under control. This has proven to be a good solution in the past for some of the biggest episodes of hyperinflation, such as Ecuador in 2001 and Zimbabwe in 2008. (Pablo Uchoa, "How do you Solve Catastrophic Hyperinflation", *BBC News*, 22 September 2018, online at https://www.bbc.com) Venezuela would lose control over its monetary policy, which in fact could be a

blessing in disguise, since neither the government nor the central bank would be able to manipulate the economy through the monetary policy. The American dollar is a strong currency with the monetary policy outlook for the United States of America looking positive with rate cuts having brought interst yild to near zero. However, getting a new government into power will not be easy and thus considerations with respect to the expected time it would take will be important for which currency to adopt given the current global crisis and the explosion in US debt.

Venezuela could look at strong economies across the world and pick one at a similar point in its business cycle so that the expansionary monetary policy of that country could help Venezuela lift itself out of its deep economic recession. In case Caracas prefers to maintain control of its economy and currency, it could adopt a new currency like Greece in 1944, Hungary in 1946 and Yugoslavia in 1994. (Uchoa, *ibid*) This move lets the government start afresh and set expectations on currency value backed by real assets and world currency reserves. However, alongside government policy, an important factor of inflation is the economy's expectations and thus, if agents are not able to understand the effects of governmental actions, they may set high expectations and prices, keeping inflation at a high level. Since the public's trust in the Venezuelan government has considerably weakened, this may have a significant effect. Thus, it may be preferable to set up a currency system, which bars the government from influencing monetary policy or the printing of new money. Two options along this line include the dollarization of the economy and setting up a currency board. A currency board may be more complicated and likely to fail if certain conditions like a ban on discretionary monetary policy are not met as seen in Argentina's 1991 bid to stop hyperinflation. (Steve Hanke, "How to Stop Venezuela's

Hyperinflation has caused abject poverty and disastrous economic conditions across Venezuela, accentuating the importance of solving this problem at the earliest. The solution most likely to succeed is a dollarization of the economy. The term does not necessarily mean that the economy should adopt the American dollar as its official currency but rather that it should drop the Bolivar and adopt a strong international currency to bring inflation under control.

Fatal Inflation", *Forbes*, 2017, online at https://www.forbes.com) However politically unpalatable, dollarization may be the simpler, low-risk option to solve Venezuela's currency maelstrom.

Alongside changes in its currency, Caracas would need to focus on two other priorities—ensuring the provision of essentials like food and medicine in the short term as the economy recovers and facilitating long-term growth. Without access to sufficient funds, foreign support and investment is imperative. In 2007, when the Venezuelan economy was soaring, Chávez had paid off the country's debts to international lenders and severed ties with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Despite this, as a per an interview last year, former IMF, Managing Director Christine Lagarde had said that the IMF through sizable financing from the international community, would be willing to assist Venezuela if the country's leaders asked for support. (Valentina Sanchez, "Venezuela Hyperinflation Hits 10 Million per cent: 'Shock Therapy' may be only Chance to Undo the Economic Damage", *CNBC* 5 August 2019, online at https://www.cnbc.com) The American government has also said that it would invest and offer credit to Venezuela if the regime changed to a "democratic" one friendly to the United States of America under Juan Guaido. The option of major international support and investment, which Venezuela has in fact pushed against in the past, could help develop infrastructure and set it on a path to relive some of its past glory as a South American powerhouse. Bolivia in 1985 and Chile in the 1970s received large loans from international institutions, (Sanchez, *ibid*) which played a crucial role in their economic recovery and strengthens the case for rebuilding Venezuela this way. Investment in long term growth through supply side policies would shift the LRAS in Diagram 1 back to the right and possibly even past the original $LRAS_0$ to a lower average price level and a higher real output.

If Venezuela were able to tackle its hyperinflation and move onto a path for a better economic future, it would be paramount to learn from past mistakes and maintain financial discipline going forward. Economic irresponsibility caused the hyperinflation in the first place and ensuring that money is not printed endlessly like before would be vital. Chile ensured this after its 1970s hyperinflation and ever since has been one of the strongest South American economies despite its current social unrest, which challenges the "economic miracle" engineered by Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship. Zimbabwe conversely

hit 176 per cent monthly inflation just years after "resolving" its massive 2008 hyperinflation. (Rene Vollgraaff, "Zimbabwe Edges Closer to Hyperinflation", *Bloomberg*, 15 November 2019, online at https://www.bloomberg.com) A new responsible, corruption-free government, along with the solved currency crisis, would help strengthen institutions ranging from financial institutions for fair lending to uncorrupt tax collection systems to just legal systems. As the natural resource trap explains, resources like oil act as intensifiers, making poor countries poorer and rich countries richer and thus reforms have a multiplier effect on the economy. In essence, combating Venezuelan hyperinflation begins with Venezuelans realising the benefits of a new system, pushing for

The option of major international support and investment, which Venezuela has in fact pushed against in the past, could help develop infrastructure and set it on a path to relive some of its past glory as a South American powerhouse. Bolivia in 1985 and Chile in the 1970s received large loans from international institutions, which played a crucial role in their economic recovery and strengthens the case for rebuilding Venezuela this way.

it and then the new regime solving the currency conundrum and generating long-term investment through the channels explained above.

Citizens' Trust In Local Government

Evidence From Ethiopia

This study assesses citizens' trust in local government in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia. A questionnaire was administered to a cross-section of society and the data obtained through convenience sampling with 357 valid responses analysed. One sample t-test, independent samples t-test and one-way analysis of variance were used to assess respondents' level of trust based on gender, age, educational level, income and political affiliation. The findings reveal that participants have a low level of trust in the local administration. The results also indicate that among the five socioeconomic and political backgrounds of respondents only gender, age and political affiliation impact the trust level of the public in local government. However, there is little data to support the claim that respondents' level of education and income affect their level of trust in the local administration.

TAYE DEMISSIE BESHI AND RANVINDERJIT KAUR

INTRODUCTION

Trust in government is indispensable for the effective functioning of a democratic government. It is one of the most decisive factors for the legitimacy and relative permanency of a political system. (Vesselin Popovski, "Conclusion: Trust is a Must in Government" in G Shabbir Cheema and Vesselin Popovski (Eds), *Building Trust in Government: Innovations in Governance Reform in Asia*, New York: United Nations University Press, 2010) Undeniably, building the trust of citizens requires a real commitment from the government

in power. (Taye Demissie Beshi and Ranvinderjit Kaur, "The Mediating Role of Citizens' Satisfaction on the Relationship between Good Governance Practices and Public Trust in Ethiopian Local Government", *Journal of the Global South*, vol7, no1, 2020, pp80–106) As Larry Diamond, ("Building Trust in Government by Improving Governance", paper presentation, *Seventh Global Forum on Reinventing Government: Building Trust in Government*, Vienna, 26–29 June 2007) has argued trust between citizens and their officials and elected representatives is of the utmost importance in a well-governed society. It has the potential to take concrete steps in achieving peace and stability, protect the interests of the people and promote cooperation between citizens and the existing government. (*Government at a Glance*, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2013, online at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org) The greater the trust in the administration, the less a government will have to invest valuable resources to gain public cooperation. (Meredith Rowen and Gerard A Finin, "Trust in Government in the Pacific Islands" in Cheema and Popovski, *ibid*, p135)

The rising expectations of citizens often exacerbate dissatisfaction with or lead to a lack of trust in government. (Dennis A Rondinelli, "Governments Serving People: The Changing Roles of Public Administration in Democratic Governance" in Dennis A Rondinelli (Ed), *Public Administration and Democratic Governance: Governments Serving Citizens*, New York: United Nations, 2007) A lack of public trust undermines and even destroys political stability. (Elia Armstrong, *Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in Public Administration: Recent Trends, Regional and International Developments and Emerging Issues*, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2005, online at https://www.insightsonindia.com and Rowen and Finin, *ibid*) However, to sustain and promote trust requires daily work. (Popovski, *ibid*, p235) This study assesses the level of citizens' trust in local government in Ethiopia in reference to the Bahir Dar city administration. It also examines the effect of respondents' socio-demographic backgrounds on their level of trust in local government. To implement policies and strategies effectively, it is important to improve citizens' trust in all levels of government. (Taye Demissie Beshi and Ranvinderjit Kaur, "Public Trust in Local Government: Explaining the Role of Good Governance Practices", *Public Organisation Review: A Global Journal*, vol20, no2, 2020)

> **Trust between citizens and their officials and elected representatives is of the utmost importance in a well-governed society. It has the potential to take concrete steps in achieving peace and stability, protect the interests of the people and promote cooperation between citizens and the existing government. The greater the trust in the administration, the less a government will have to invest valuable resources to gain public cooperation.**

LITERATURE REVIEW

According to Frank Bannister and Regina Connolly, ("Trust and Transformational Government: A Proposed Framework for Research", *Government Information Quarterly*, vol28, no2, 2011, pp137–47) trust is a subject that has long been of interest in a variety of fields of human endeavours. Over the last two decades, social scientists have realised its significance and shown considerable interest in the issue. (Gregory A Porumbescu, "Using Transparency to Enhance Responsiveness and Trust in Local Government: Can It Work", *State and Local Government Review*, vol47, no3, 2015, pp1–9 and Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process: A Three-Dimensional Approach", *Sociology*, vol41, no1, 2007, pp115–32) Trust in government is a subjective phenomenon seen as both an attitude and a behavioural variable influenced by several factors. (Heungsik Park and John Blenkinsopp, "The Roles of Transparency and Trust in the Relationship between Corruption and Citizen Satisfaction", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, vol77, no2, 2011, pp254–74; Tom Van der Meer, "In What we Trust: A Multi-Level Study into Trust in Parliament as an Evaluation of State Characteristics", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, vol76, no3, 2010, pp517–36; Kaifeng Yang and Marc Holzer, "The Performance–Trust Link: Implications for Performance Measurement", *Public Administration Review*, vol66, no1, 2006, pp114–26 and Geert Bouckaert and Steven Van de Walle, "Comparing Measures of Citizen Trust and User Satisfaction as Indicators of 'Good Governance': Difficulties in Linking Trust and Satisfaction Indicators", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, vol69, no3, 2003, pp329–43)

Trust in government, among others things, reflects whether the citizenry has a positive attitude towards public institutions, the people in power and the policies of the existing regime. (Eric M Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) Trust in government refers to the level of confidence citizens have in their government to "do the right thing", to act appropriately and honestly on behalf of the public. (Cheryl Barnes and Derek Gill, *Declining Government Performance: Why Citizens Don't Trust Government*, State Services Commission, Working Paper 9, 2000, p4, online at http://www.ssc.govt.nz) This important point serves as the foundation for looking at the issue of trust and all others are its derivatives. Empirical research in recent years shows a growing dissatisfaction with government. (Naila Yosuf and Binish Nauman, "Examining Citizen's Confidence in Institutions of Pakistan: An Analysis of Citizen's Trust", *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, vol5, no5, 2015, pp144–53; David J Houston and Lauren H Harding, "Public Trust in Government Administrators: Explaining Citizen Perceptions of Trustworthiness and Competence", *Public Integrity*, vol16, no1, 2013, pp53–75 and Eric W Welch, Charles C Hinnant and M Jae Moon, "Linking Citizen Satisfaction with E-Government and Trust in Government", *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, vol15, no3, 2005, pp371–91) The results of studies largely indicate a strong dissatisfaction and low level of citizens' confidence not only in institutions but also in officials. The declining public trust in government seems to be a general trend, witnessed in almost all advanced industrial democracies as well. (Peri K Blind, "Building Trust in Government in the Twenty-First Century: Review of Literature and Emerging Issues", paper presentation, *Seventh Global Forum on Reinventing Government: Building Trust in Government*, Vienna 26–29 June 2007; Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker,

"Political Trust and Trustworthiness", *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol3, 2000, p475–507 and for Latin America – Matthew L Smith, "Building Institutional Trust Through E-Government Trustworthiness Cues", *Information Technology and People*, vol23, no3, 2010, pp222–46)

As trust in government declines, it reduces the ability of governmental institutions to run their businesses effectively. (Robert B Denhardt, "Trust as Capacity: The Role of Integrity and Responsiveness", *Public Organisation Review: A Global Journal*, vol2, no1, 2002, pp65–76) Citizens who distrust the government not only have a high-level of dissatisfaction with public affairs but sometimes also refuse to participate in government activities. (Simon Parker, Phil Spires, Faizal Farook and Melissa Mean, *State of Trust: How to Build Better Relationships between Councils and the Public*, London: Demos, 2008, online at https://www.demos.co.uk and Denhardt, *ibid*) They may engage in political protests in the form of boycotts, civil disturbances, demonstrations, strikes and even violence or may withdraw completely from all political action and participation. (Ken Newton, "Trust and Political Disenchantment: An Overview" in Christina Eder, Ingvill C Mochmann and Markus Quandt (Eds), *Political Trust and Disenchantment with Politics: International Perspectives*, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2015) The most common explanation for the growing dissatisfaction and low level of public trust in government is the failure of government and the public sector to perform. (Steven Van de Walle, Steven Van Roosbroek and Geert Bouckaert, "Trust in the Public Sector: Is there any Evidence for a Long-Term Decline", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, vol74, no1, 2008, pp47–64)

> **Citizens who distrust the government not only have a high-level of dissatisfaction with public affairs but sometimes also refuse to participate in government activities. They may engage in political protests in the form of boycotts, civil disturbances, demonstrations, strikes and even violence or may withdraw completely from all political action and participation.**

To function well and implement government policies and strategies, an important asset a government in general and public institutions in particular need is the people's trust. However, this presupposes that the government acts in the best interest of the citizens and they are treated fairly. According to Yong-duck Jung and Sea Young Sung, ("The Public's Declining Trust in Government in Korea", *Meiji Journal of Political Science and Economics*, vol1, 2012, pp36–48, online at http://mjpse.meiji.jp) public trust in government is one of the key factors determining governmental competitiveness. It speaks to the quality of the relationship between the citizenry and the state. (Porumbescu, 2015, *ibid*) Trust in government acts as the glue that keeps the system together as well as the oil that lubricates the policy machinery. (Van der Meer, *ibid*)

Therefore, to develop an effective strategy and enhance trust, it is necessary

to recognise the determinants of trust in government (Newton, *ibid* and Houston and Harding, *ibid*) including demographic, ideological, institutional and personal factors. (Xiao Hu Wang and Montgomery Van Wart, "When Public Participation in Administration leads to Trust: An Empirical Assessment of Managers' Perceptions", *Public Administration Review*, vol67, no2, 2007, pp265–78) Some surveys show that women trust government more than men. (Eric Gleave, Blaine Robbins and Beth Kolko, "Trust in Uzbekistan", *International Political Science Review*, vol33, no2, 2012, pp209–29 and Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, "Trust in Government: The Relative Importance of Service Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography", *Public Performance and Management Review*, vol28, no4, 2005, pp487–511) In terms of age, it has been noted that trust in the government rises, as people get older. (Bannister and Connolly, *ibid*; Gleave, Robbins and Kolko, *ibid* and Christensen and Lægreid, *ibid*) The level of education also has a significant effect on trust, (Bannister and Connolly, *ibid*; Gleave, Robbins and Kolko, *ibid* and Christensen and Lægreid, *ibid*) as does the level of income. (Bannister and Connolly, *ibid*) Political affiliation too has a more profound effect on trust than if a person simply follows politics in the media or holds a general interest in political matters. (Annelin Gustavsen, Pierre Jon and Asbjørn Røiseland, "Participation or Satisfaction: Examining Determinants of Trust in Local Government", *Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration*, vol21, no3, 2017, pp3–16 and Christensen and Lægreid, *ibid*) Based on the review of literature and results of previous research, the following hypotheses are proposed:

- H1a: Male respondents exhibit lower levels of trust towards local government than female respondents
- H1b: Older respondents display higher levels of trust towards local government than younger respondents
- H1c: Respondents with higher levels of education exhibit lower levels of trust towards local government than respondents with lower levels of education
- H1d: Respondents with a higher income are more likely to trust local government than respondent's with a lower income
- H1e: Respondents with pro-ruling party affiliation show significantly higher levels of trust towards local government than others

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESULT

In this study, a cross-sectional quantitative approach using a survey tool was employed to collect data. A questionnaire was developed following a review of the related literature in the field of public trust. The adapted items were validated and wordings changed to tailor the instrument for the purpose of the study. The

questionnaire was administered in Amharic, the working language of the region. That is, every effort was made to ensure that the items in the questionnaire did not lose their original identity. Prior to the actual study, a pilot study was carried out using 120 residents of Bahir Dar, whose main purpose was to avoid participants' confusion and misinterpretations as well as detect and identify ambiguities and errors. The pilot study was also used to test the reliability of measurement items used in the questionnaire. As a result, the items showed adequate reliability. Following an appropriate revision of the questionnaire, data was obtained through convenience sampling and 357 valid responses (81 per cent) were used in the analysis. One sample t-test, independent samples t-test and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to assess respondent's level of trust with differences in gender, age, educational level, income and political affiliation. Prior to entering the statistical analysis, basic assumption tests for independent t-test and one way ANOVA such as linearity, normality, independence of errors and homogeneity of variance were checked and the data met all the required assumption tests. The assessment for checking outliers was done using skewness and kurtosis test. The following sections summarise the result.

Public trust in government is one of the key factors determining governmental competitiveness. It speaks to the quality of the relationship between the citizenry and the state. Trust in government acts as the glue that keeps the system together as well as the oil that lubricates the policy machinery.

SAMPLE PARTICIPANTS

The study had a greater number of males (201/56.3 per cent) than females (156/43.7 per cent). Participants were predominantly young 18–35 years in age (216/60.5 per cent). The highest educational level reported for approximately half the participants (174/48.7 per cent) was of university graduates. As for the economic status, respondents were asked to indicate their average monthly income. However, for analysis purpose responses were categorised into three levels (low, middle and high income) based on Ethiopian public sector salary ranges. Accordingly, nearly half the respondents (174/48.7 per cent) were categorised

under the low-income group. The final category was the political affiliation of respondents with results showing that the highest number of respondents (213/59.7 per cent) reported being neutral.

T-TEST AND ANOVA RESULT

As a first step to compute the respondents' level of trust towards the city administration, the mean value of respondents overall public trust was computed and the researchers determined three as the test value, which is the middle ground in the survey questionnaire. Hence, the result shows that there is a significant difference between the test value and respondents actual mean (t=-18.444, df = 356 and p= <. 001). Thus, it may be concluded that the level of public trust in the Bahir Dar city administration is low.

GENDER

The mean level of trust between male (M = 2.15, SD = .66, N = 201) and female (M = 2.46, SD = .78, N = 156) shows a numerical difference. Thus, an independent sample t-test was conducted to test whether or not this difference was significant. Table 1 shows that an independent sample t-test found this pattern to be significant, t (304.3) = -4.006, p= < .001.

Table 1: Independent Sample T-Test of Respondents' Level of Trust towards the City Administration by Gender

Gender	N	M	SD	SE	T-value
Male	201	2.1493	.66394	.04683	t (304.3) = -4.006, p= < .001*
Female	156	2.4615	.77829	.06231	

Note: M= mean; SD= Standard deviation; SE= Standard error; *A t-value based on equal variance not assumed

Further, to determine the magnitude of the mean difference, more analysis was performed using Jacob Cohen's *d* test to assess the magnitude of the effect of gender on the level of public trust in the city administration. Based on Cohen's criteria, (*Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioural Sciences*, Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1988) the magnitude of difference in the level of public trust in the city administration between two groups was shown to be a medium effect size (0.46). This suggests

that male respondents exhibit lower levels of trust in the city administration than female respondents. Therefore, the hypothesis H1a, which states that male respondents exhibit lower levels of trust towards local government than female respondents, was supported.

AGE

The descriptive statistics associated with the respondents' level of trust towards local government across the three age groups showed a numerically different mean level of trust towards local government. The first age group (18–35 years old) was associated with the numerically smallest mean level of trust (M = 2.18) whereas the group of respondents identified as greater than 50 years old was associated with the numerically highest mean level of trust (M = 2.89). To test the hypothesis a between groups ANOVA was performed. The result yielded a statistical significant difference in mean (F (2,354) = 15.95, p = < .001) between the age groups. Further, to evaluate the nature of the difference between the three means, the statically significant ANOVA was followed-up using a Tukey test. As indicated in Table 2, the Tukey test showed that the difference between the first age group (18–35 years old) and the second age group (36–50 years old) was not statistically significant (p = > .05). Whereas, the difference between the first age group (18–35 years old) and the third age group (> 50 years old) was statistically significant (p = < .001). Similarly, the difference between the second age group (36–50 years old) and the third age group (> 50 years old) was also statistically significant (p = < .001). Thus, the H1b hypothesis, of older respondents displaying higher levels of trust towards local government than younger respondents, was supported as well.

Table 2: One-Way ANOVA: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons by Age (N=357)

Dependent Variable: Av_OPT						
Tukey HSD						
(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
18–35	36–50	-.14717	.08444	.191	-.3459	.0516
	>50	-.68789*	.12228	.000	-.9757	-.4001
36–50	>50	-.54072*	.13232	.000	-.8521	-.2293

LEVEL OF EDUCATION

The descriptive statistics associated with the respondents' level of trust in Bahir Dar city administration by level of education also revealed a numerically different mean level of public trust. Thus, a one-way between groups ANOVA was conducted to compare the level of trust in the city administration. However, there was no statistically significant difference between group means as determined by one-way ANOVA (F (4,352) = 1.559, p = >.05). The hypothesis H1c, which states that respondents with a higher level of education exhibit lower levels of trust towards local government than respondents with lower level of education, was therefore not supported.

LEVEL OF INCOME

The descriptive statistics associated with the respondents' level of public trust in the city administration across three income groups showed a numerically different mean level of public trust towards local government. The higher income group was associated with the numerically smallest mean level of trust (M = 2.18) whereas the middle-income group of respondents was associated with the numerically highest mean level of trust (M = 2.40). Therefore, to test the hypothesis, which states that respondents with higher amounts of income are more likely to have higher levels of trust towards local government than respondents with low income, a between groups ANOVA was performed. Results of the one-way ANOVA showed that there was no statistically significant difference between group means (F (2,361) = 2.236, p = >.05). The hypothesis H1d, which states respondents with higher incomes are more likely to have higher levels of trust towards local government than respondents with lower income, was therefore not supported as well.

POLITICAL AFFILIATION

The descriptive statistics associated with the respondents' level of public trust in the city administration with regard to political affiliation showed a numerically different mean level of trust towards local government. Respondents

who identified themselves as the pro-ruling party had a numerically higher mean level of public trust in the city administration (M = 2.99), whereas the group of respondents identified as pro-opposition parties was associated with the numerically smallest mean level of public trust in the city administration (M = 1.75). Therefore, to test the hypothesis, which states that respondents with pro-ruling party affiliation show significantly higher levels of trust towards local government than others, a between groups ANOVA was performed to compare the level of public trust in the city administration.

Table 3 One-Way ANOVA Test of Respondents' Level of Public Trust in the City Administration by Political Affiliation (N=357)

Dependent Variable: Av_OPT						
Tukey HSD						
(I) Political affiliation	(J) Political affiliation	Mean Difference (I-J)	SE	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pro-ruling party	Pro-opposition parties	1.23322*	.13931	.000	.8736	1.5928
	Neutral	.81623*	.08983	.000	.5843	1.0481
	I don't know	.84023*	.12280	.000	.5232	1.1572
Pro-opposition parties	Neutral	-.41699*	.12328	.004	-.7352	-.0988
	I don't know	-.39299*	.14903	.043	-.7777	-.0083
Neutral	I don't know	.02400	.10427	.996	-.2452	.2932

As displayed in Table 3, the one-way ANOVA between groups result indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in mean (F (3,353) = 36.81, p = < .001) between different groups of respondents based on their political affiliation. Therefore, the Tukey test showed that the difference between the pro-ruling party and the other groups was not statistically significant (p = > .05). However, there was no significant difference between respondents who identified themselves as neutral and those who did not indicate their political affiliation. Thus, the hypothesis H1e, which states that respondents' pro-ruling party affiliation shows significantly higher levels of trust towards local government than others, was supported. After all people are likely to approve of officials who belong to the party they support and whom they voted for. They may also have better access to and find a more positive attitude among such officials.

DISCUSSION

In the current study, the first research objective was intended to measure the level of public trust towards local government. Accordingly, a one sample t-test was performed and the overall level of public trust towards local government found to be low (M = 2.19, SD = .77). The result of the one sample t-test showed a statistical significant difference between the test value and respondents actual mean score (t = -20.186, df = 363 and p = < .001). Thus, one may conclude that the level of public trust towards Bahir Dar city administration is low. Previous studies aimed at determining the level of public trust in government yielded similar results, for example the study carried out by Yosuf and Nauman. (*ibid*) In their research work, they found that trust in government has been declining worldwide. This declining public trust in government seems to be a general trend witnessed in almost all advanced industrial democracies as well. (Blind, *ibid*; Levi and Laura, *ibid* and Smith, *ibid*)

The current study assumed differences in the level of trust between the two sexes (male and female). Thus, the mean level of trust towards the city administration between male (M = 2.20) and female (M = 2.54) shows the numerical difference. Besides, the independent sample t-test depicted that the numerical difference was found to be significant t (310.13) = -4.15, p = < .001, with the support of the stated hypothesis. From this, one may deduce that females are more prone to trust local government as compared to their male counterparts. Correspondingly, various studies that have investigated the effect of gender on trust in government, have all yielded similar results. (Gleave, Robbins and Kolko, *ibid* and Akira Nakamura and Soonhee Kim, "Public Trust in Government in Japan and South Korea: Does the Rise of Critical Citizens Matter", *Public Administration Review*, vol70, no5, 2010, pp801–10) That is they found that compared to their male counterparts, females have higher levels of trust in government.

The research presupposes that the younger age group has more demands than the older one, resulting in lower levels of trust in local government. This presumption was also supported by the results of between groups ANOVA *(F* (2,361) = 16.69, p = < .001), which indicated a statistically significant difference between the younger and older age groups. The hypothesis, which states that older respondents display higher levels of trust towards local government than younger respondents, was therefore supported. This finding also relates to the argument that trust in government increases with age. (Christensen and Lægreid, *ibid*;

Bannister and Connolly, *ibid*; Gleave, Robbins and Kolko, *ibid* and Nakamura and Kim, *ibid*) Thus, the level of trust differs based on the age of the respondents as the needs and interests of younger and older respondents differ.

Even though the research presupposes differences in the respondents' level of education towards trust, there were no statistically significant difference between group means as determined by one-way ANOVA ($F (4,359) = 1.657$, $p = >.05$). The hypothesis, which states that respondents with higher levels of education exhibit lower levels of trust towards local government than respondents with lower levels of education, was therefore not supported. This result also went against the findings of many researchers, who found that highly educated respondents were more likely to express a high level of trust in the government. (Christensen and Lægreid, *ibid*; Bannister and Connolly, *ibid*; Gleave, Robbins and Kolko, *ibid* and Nakamura and Kim, *ibid*)

The fourth variable under consideration to test the level of trust towards local government was the respondents' average monthly income. The descriptive statistics associated with the respondents' level of trust towards local government across three income groups showed a numerically different mean level of trust towards local government. The higher income group was associated with the numerically smallest mean level of trust (M = 2.18) whereas the middle-income group was associated with the numerically highest mean level of trust (M = 2.40).

This study demonstrates that the respondents' level of trust in local government in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia is low. Accordingly, age, gender and political affiliation demonstrate a significant effect in determining citizens' level of trust, while educational and income levels do not.

However, there was no statistically significant difference between group means as determined by one-way ANOVA ($F (2,361) = 2.236$, $p = >.05$). The hypothesis, which states that respondents with higher incomes are more likely to have higher levels of trust towards local government than respondents with lower income, was therefore not supported. This result was also against the findings of Bannister and Regina (*ibid*) who stated that people's trust in government varies with income levels.

The final variable was the political affiliation of respondents. The one-way ANOVA between groups result indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in mean $F (3,360) = 32.40$, $p = < .001$ between different groups of respondents based on their political affiliation. Thus, the hypothesis, which states

that respondents with pro-ruling party affiliation show significantly higher levels of trust towards local government than others, was supported. This finding was in line with the argument of Gregory A Porumbescu, ("Assessing the Link between Online Mass Media and Trust in Government: Evidence from Seoul, South Korea", *Policy and Internet*, vol5, no4, 2013, pp418–43) which states that political ideology has a large positive influence upon citizens' perceptions of public sector performance and trust in government. In addition, Christensen and Lægreid, (*ibid*) in their research work confirm that citizens who are members of the ruling party have a greater trust in governmental institutions than those with no party affiliations. The rationale behind considering political affiliation of respondents in assessing the level of trust is that politics matter in many ways in determining the level of trust. People who support the ruling political party may be participant in the decision making process and have information on the happenings at the local level.

CONCLUSION

This study examines public trust towards local government, specifically the effect of demographic and political backgrounds of respondents towards trust in local administration. The research demonstrates that the respondents' level of trust in local government in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia is low. The paper also identifies factors affecting public trust. Accordingly, age, gender and political affiliation demonstrate a significant effect in determining citizens' level of trust, while educational and income levels do not. Therefore, as an essential component of modern day governance, the government should take citizens' needs and interests into consideration to enhance trust towards the city administration. 🅆

Violence On Women

An "Acceptable" Assertion in Pakistan

Women in Pakistan live in a world structured by strict codes of family ties, religion and tribal customs. In recent years, pervasive repression and violence, often perpetrated with impunity, have literally pushed women back into their homes for fear of reprisals. There are many customary practices found throughout Pakistan that result in harmful outcomes for women. These include dowry deaths, honour killings, acid attacks, exchanging women in marriage with no consideration for their consent, forced marriages, forced religious conversions, etc. In addition, the mounting trend of Islamist extremism, which underpins terrorism in Pakistan, has added to the existing deluge of violence against women. Dismal poverty, ignorance and lack of education create fertile grounds for a fundamental furthering the perpetration of violence on the female population. Pakistan today is juggling between repressive customs and borrowed modernisation, causing irreparable damage to the social milieu, of which women are a fundamental component.

SANCHITA BHATTACHARYA

INTRODUCTION

"'Violence against women' means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether

occurring in public or in private life. (It encompasses, but is not limited to) physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family … and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the state, wherever it occurs". (*Violence against Women*, World Health Organisation, 1997, p1, online at https://www.who.int and *Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women*, United Nations, Articles 1 and 2, 1993, online at https://www.un.org)

In human society, violence meted out on the female population has deep historical roots. It is a universal phenomenon cutting across communities, countries, creeds and religions. Violence against women is often explained as a universal and natural consequence of the biological differences between men and women. Since time immemorial in most societies, women have been conditioned to think of themselves as inferior to men both physically and socially. Likewise, the ingrained sense of superiority among men leads to the perpetration of violence on the other half of society. Such violence is inversely proportional to the status of women. In many patriarchal societies where women are objectified and equated with honour, money and property, violence is omnipresent.

Gender violence inflicts physical and mental harm, restricts access to education, incurs medical and legal costs, diminishes productivity and lowers incomes. Such viciousness undermines the wellbeing, dignity, health and human rights of the millions of individuals who experience it and the public health, economic wellbeing and security of nations.

Gender violence occurs because of unequal power dynamics between the sexes. The perpetrator of aggression is usually the father, brother, husband or another male member of the extended family/clan. Gender violence has a persistent model and becomes a habit with the passage of time. Habitual offenders are triggered into violent behaviour at the slightest provocation. As a result, the woman whether a daughter, sister or wife becomes the target of aggression. Violence based on gender violates human rights and presents a serious public health challenge with civic, economic, political and social consequences for individuals, communities and whole societies. Gender violence inflicts

physical and mental harm, restricts access to education, incurs medical and legal costs, diminishes productivity and lowers incomes. Such viciousness undermines the wellbeing, dignity, health and human rights of the millions of individuals who experience it and the public health, economic well-being and security of nations. Gender violence is a global plague inflicted upon men, women and children. However, women and girls are at the greatest risk and the most affected by gender-based violence. The legitimacy given by society to the act of violence committed by males, results in an increasing number of attacks on women. Strangely, the persons behind such acts are extremely confident and often justify the atrocities with great élan.

SOCIAL BACKDROP OF PAKISTAN

"Westerners usually associate the plight of Pakistani women with religious oppression, but the reality is far more complicated. A certain mentality is ingrained deeply in strictly patriarchal societies like Pakistan. Poor and uneducated women struggle daily for basic rights, recognition and respect. They live in a culture that defines them by the male figures in their lives, even though these women are often the breadwinners for their families". (Zara Jamal, "To Be a Woman in Pakistan: Six Stories of Abuse, Shame and Survival", *The Atlantic*, 9 April 2012, online at https://www.theatlantic.com)

Gender is an organisational principle in Pakistan. Patriarchal values, rooted in local customs and culture, encode the social assessment of gender. A divide has been created resulting in the sexual division of labour—the woman as the reproductive caregiver in the house and the man as the breadwinner provider. In such a backdrop, women are generally unaware of not only their vital human and legal rights, but also the mechanisms, procedures and processes they could access and use for their own benefit. (Maliha Zia Lari, *Honour Killings in Pakistan and Compliance of Law*, Aurat Foundation, 2011, p10, online at https://www.af.org.pk) In most cases, women are not even aware of their rights and eventually accept violence as something natural. Men on the other hand are taught by the family and society to be "strong" and "righteous". The sense of importance inculcated in men in terms of being the protector often manifests negatively in determining their relations with the female members of the family/clan. A woman is considered a "social captive" of her father, brother or husband. The man often acts as the owner of his spouse and guardian of his

mother, sister and daughter.

Pakistan is an Islamic Republic and therefore every rule and regulation in the country is based on Islamic law. Simultaneously however, some customs and traditions are commonly practiced that are against Islamic laws. (*Forgotten: Dowry–A Socially Endorsed form of Violence in Pakistan*, United Nations Women, 2011, p20, online at http://www.sachet.org.pk) Unfortunately, cultural patterns do not let women enjoy their legal and religious rights protected by law and provided by Islam. Although Pakistan is an Islamic state, with regard to women's rights it derives its interpretation of the faith from customs and cultural norms. (Faiqa Ibrahim, *Honour Killings under the Rule of Law in Pakistan*, Master of Laws with Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 2005, p103, online at https://escholarship.mcgill.ca) The parallel justice system of *jirgas* and *panchayats* is usually apathetic to women and their grievances and therefore legal and religious measures and safeguards do not percolate the social structure. A *jirga* is an assembly in the rural areas of the Pashtun/Pakhtoon belt of Pakistan and Afghanistan. There are three types/levels of *jirgas*—a *maraka* (local *jirga*), a *qawmi* (tribal *jirga*) and a *loya jirga* (national assembly). (Jim Gant and William McCallister, "Tribal Engagement: The *Jirga* and the *Shura*", *Small Wars Journal*, 2010, p2, online at https://smallwarsjournal.com) A *panchayat* is an indigenous local level governing body of the Indian subcontinent. In Pakistan, most are run by feudal lords, local elites and powerful members of communities. They are not accountable to anyone and in rural areas enjoy unlimited power over the underprivileged sections of society like women, low ranking clan members, landless tenants etc. The fear factor also prevents women from asserting their rights. These bodies unlawfully impose punishments on those who assert their individual rights against the prescribed norms of the community/tribe. (Farzana Bari and Saba Gul Khattak, "Power Configuration in Public and Private Arenas: The Women's Movement's Response" in Anita M Weiss and S Zulfiqar Gilani (Eds), *Power and Civil Society in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p230) Thus, the malevolence of parochial culture overshadows the religion of Islam.

Pervasive repression and violence, often perpetrated with impunity, have literally pushed women back into their homes for fear of reprisals. An emerging alternative narrative and history of Pakistani women is erasing their past. In 1947, the vision of the new Pakistani state included women as equal citizens. Today, the dominant narrative is of a socially conservative society where the marginalisation and silencing of women is depicted as "normal".

"The gendered exercise of power within the family provides a foundation, often reinforced in schools, for socially accepted norms of women's participation in spheres outside of the home". (Anita M Weiss, "Gendered Power Relations: Perpetuation and Renegotiation" in Weiss and Gilani, *ibid*, p66)

"The tribal social set up is a system dominated and run by the male, where women's status is no more than that of property. To make things worse for the women, males in the tribal society consider it their right to control not only the body but also every movement of the women". (*Role of Tribal Jirga in Violence against Women: A Case Study of Karo Kari in Sindh*, Participatory Development Initiatives, Karachi, 2005, pp14–5, online at http://www.pdi.org.pk)

Women in Pakistan live in a world structured by strict family, religious and tribal customs. They are subjected to bigotry and violence if not daily, at least on a regular basis. Women face various forms of violence, prejudice and inequality in almost every aspect of life. Often in such circumstances, brutality against women is not even conceived as a violation of human rights but rather as a normal facet of life. Many women live in an ambiance of dread with their lives guaranteed in barter for obedience and compliance to social norms and traditions. The public and the private patriarchal culture in Pakistan grants men the power to control women, as they are considered lower and subordinate in all aspects of life. (Maliha Gull Tarar and Venkat Rao Pulla, "Patriarchy, Gender Violence and Poverty amongst Pakistani Women: A Social Work Inquiry", *International Journal of Social Work and Human Services Practice*, vol2, no2, 2014, p56) The element of remorse or fear of judicial punishment is somehow non-existent in the psyche of the male populace. The persons responsible for the heinous crimes always have a justification for the act—for family honour or in the name of religion or tribal customs. They do not even consider violence against women a serious criminal offence—they see it is as a birthright that men are entitled to.

In recent years, pervasive repression and violence, often perpetrated with impunity, have literally pushed women back into their homes for fear of reprisals. An emerging alternative narrative and history of Pakistani women is erasing their past. In 1947, the vision of the new Pakistani state included women as equal citizens. Today, the dominant narrative is of a socially conservative society where the marginalisation and silencing of women is depicted as "normal". (*Reclaiming the Progressive Past: Pakistani Women's Struggle against Violence and Extremism*, International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN), New York, Brief 10, Winter 2014, p2, online at http://www.icanpeacework.org) Moreover, laws too have been turned against women. The Qanoon-e-Shahadat/Law of Evidence Order of 1984, the Hudood Ordinances of 1979, the Qisas and Diyat

Ordinances are all apathetic towards women and have become weapons for anti-social elements and criminals.

> "The Hudood Laws, promulgated in 1979 and enforced in 1980, are a collection of five criminal laws, collectively known as the Hudood Ordinances. The Offences against Property Ordinance deals with the crime of theft and armed robbery. The Offence of Zina Ordinance relates to the crime of rape, abduction, adultery and fornication. The word *zina* covers adultery as well as fornication. The Offence of Qazf Ordinance relates to a false accusation of *zina*. The Prohibition Order prohibits use of alcohol and narcotics. The last is the Execution of Punishment of Whipping Ordinance, which prescribes the mode of whipping for those convicted under the Hudood Ordinances". (Rahat Imran, "Legal Injustices: The Zina Hudood Ordinance of Pakistan and its Implications for Women", *Journal of International Women's Studies*, vol7, no2, 2005, p85)

The Shahadat Law has reduced the legal status of women. It bars them from giving evidence in cases of rape or any other harm. The Zina Ordinance has resulted in a rape victim being jailed for *zina* unless proven otherwise by four Muslim male witnesses. (Asma Afzal Shami, "Political Empowerment of Women in Pakistan", *Pakistan Vision*, vol10, no1, 2003, p145) The *hadd* (maximum) punishment for *zina* and *zina-bil-jabr* for a married person is stoning to death in public and for an unmarried person 100 lashes. (Rachel Rosenbloom, "Islam, Feminism and the Law in Pakistan under Zia" in Muhammad Aslam Syed (Ed), *Islam and Democracy in Pakistan*, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 2005)

The Council of Islamic Ideology created under the Constitution of Pakistan by former President Zia ul Haq has been responsible for some of the most retrogressive opinions on women's status. (Arab Naz, Ibrahim and Waqar Ahmad, "Sociocultural Impediments to Women Political Empowerment in Pakhtun Society", *Academic Research International*, vol3, no1, July 2012, p164) Pakistan ranks low on the gender development and equality index and its women are considered the foremost vulnerable populace. It was the second-worst country in the world for the second consecutive year in 2016. According to the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 2016, (online at https://reports.weforum.org) Pakistan ranked 143 out of 144, a fall from the rank of 112 in 2006, the first year of the report. It ranked 135 in 2013, 141 in 2014 and 143 in 2015. (Mubarak Zeb Khan, "Gender Gap Index puts Pakistan in Second-Last Place", *Dawn*, 26 October 2016) Women in Pakistan live in a world of austere family, religious and tribal customs that compel them to dwell in a constant state of fear of persecution. As a result, male "superiority" leads to the socially accepted trend of violence, validated by religion.

GENDER VIOLENCE

Customary practices throughout Pakistan result in adverse outcomes for women. These include the honour killing of women wanting to marry of their free will or over a suspected romantic involvement, exchanging women in marriage with no consideration for their consent, compensation marriage to resolve disputes between families/clans/tribes, forcing women not to claim their share of inheritance, child marriage and marriage to the Holy Quran. (Sarah Zaman, *Forced Marriages and Inheritance Deprivation in Pakistan*, Aurat Foundation, 2014, pxxiii, online at https://www.af.org. pk) Women are treated as objects, preordained to perform various duties and as sole custodians of honour. Accordingly, they are subjected to various forms of violence detailed in the following sections.

Dowry Death

One of the most monstrous customs prevalent in the Indian subcontinent is the maltreatment of a newly married girl, whose value is defined based on the price of her dowry. When the demands of dowry are not fully met, the bride is tormented and often murdered. (Shazia Gulzar, Muhammad Nauman, Farzan Yahya, Shagafat Ali and Mariam Yaqoob, "Dowry System in Pakistan", *Asian Economic and Financial Review*, vol2, no7, 2012, p785) In Pakistan, such a heinous act has been legitimised. Like other social evils, the most dangerous element attached to dowry is its legitimacy. The Dowry and Bridal Gift Restriction Act 1976 extends to all citizens of Pakistan. It states that the value of dowry should not exceed Rs.5000. Dowry means any property given directly or indirectly to a bride by her family before, at the time of or after marriage. It does not include property given under the Law of Inheritance. Clause 7 of the act states that the list of dowry items must be displayed and given to the marriage registrar. (Anadil Iftekhar, "The Dowry Dilemma", *The News e-paper*, 2014, online at http://e.thenews.com.pk) In a society hostile to the female populace, the legal sanction of such an evil leads to the further belittling of the status of women.

Although, dowry is not sanctified as a religious requirement in Islam, many men claim it as a religious tradition initiated by the founders of the religion. This provides men with another excuse to justify an unfair expectation of the women they marry. (Muhammad Jehanzeb Noor, *Daughters of Eve: Violence against Women in Pakistan*, Semantic Scholar, 2004, p19, online at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org) In Pakistan, in spite of the frequency

of domestic violence and cases of stove deaths, dowry related violence is neither perceived nor recognised as a form of violence nor is it documented in social science literature. The concept of *jahez* (dowry) does not exist in Islam. It is a purely cultural phenomenon and even considered un-Islamic. The Sharia does not make any expense incumbent on the bride or her parents. It even recommends that marriage expenses be borne by the bridegroom. (United Nations Women, *ibid*, p14 and p22) However, in Pakistan, dowry is practiced widely in every social stratum from poor households to elitist urban families. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Dowry, Bridal Gift and Marriage Functions Restriction Act of 2017 states that the total expenditure on marriage, including on members attending the marriage from the groom's side and wedding reception, shall not exceed Rs.75,000. The law also limits to Rs.10,000 the maximum value of gifts that may be given to a bride by her parents, family members or any other person. It is also illegal for anyone from the groom's family to ask, demand or harass the bride's family for dowry. If they do, they shall legally incur a two-month prison term, a fine of Rs.300,000 or both. (Fiza Farhan, "Dowry: a Unique form of Gender Based Violence", 20 March 2018, *The Express Tribune*, online at https://tribune.com.pk) In the marriage setup the husband (as a male member of "his" family/clan and not as a husband) is often the main perpetrator of violence. Men, who take refuge in Islam to justify their hatred and crimes towards women, intentionally forget the concept of companionship as envisaged in the Holy Quran between a man and a woman.

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Honour Killing

In Pakistan, the concept of honour signifies that a woman's place is inside the *chaardivari* (four walls) of the home and when she goes out, she must be wrapped from head to foot in a *chaadar* (winding sheet). (*Report on Issues Faced by Minorities in Pakistan*, South Asians for Human Rights, 2009, p5, online at http://www.southasianrights.org) Honour killing is the

practice of killing an "adulterous" woman and at times her illicit partner to erase shame and restore honour. (Rabia Ali, *The Dark Side of "Honour": Women Victims in Pakistan*, Shirkat Gah, Lahore, 2001) It has been accepted as a necessary evil by society and as a legitimate defence for murder by the judicial system. The element of "shame" so evidently attached to the woman in the patriarchal society, results in uncertainty in her behaviour to exert her own presence. Ironically, on the one hand society guards its "honour" by banning women in almost every aspect of life and on the other shamelessly dishonours them by abduction, burning, killing, raping, throwing acid, etc.

Women have been conceptualised in terms of two opposing types—*mor* and *tor*. *Mor* are the pious, sanctified pure women—the motherly figures with all the virtues of ideal women. However, when their chastity is compromised and the honour of the father, brother or husband is at stake, they are considered in a state of *tor* or *siyah* (black) emoting shame and dishonour. In *tor* cases, both actors, especially the woman, are killed by her closest male kin. (Akbar S Ahmed, "Women and the Household in Baluchistan and Frontier Society" in Hastings Donnan and Frits Selier (Eds), *Family and Gender in Pakistan: Domestic Organisation in a Muslim Society*, New Delhi: Hindustan, 1997, p72) The regional variations of honour killing are *karo-kari* in Sindh, *siyah-kari* in Baluchistan, *kala-kali* in Punjab and *tor-tora* in the tribal areas of the northwest.

The existence of two parallel justice systems in Pakistan complicates the legal status of honour killings. On one hand, is the formal legal system of legislative mechanisms and judicial rulings that consumes both time and money before reaching a conclusion. On the other, is the informal justice system of customary laws that allows elders to make decisions based on their wisdom and local traditions. (Neha Ali Gauhar, *Honour Crimes in Pakistan: Unveiling Reality and Perception*, Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme, 2014, online at http://www.camp.org.pk) Often, cases of honour killing are dealt with at the local level by the village or tribal council. Even in urban centres, like Karachi such cases are "solved" by elders within a particular locality. Male members of a girl's family, who is said to have committed the crime, are instigated by neighbours to kill her to maintain the family's honour.

Acid Attack

A woman's face is targeted in acid attacks because unfortunately her worth is linked to her appearance and through it to her marriageability and social status. (Taiba Zia, *Acid Violence in Pakistan*, Center for the Study of Women, University of California Los Angeles, 2013,

pp17–8, online at https://escholarship.org) The reasons behind such heinous acts vary from domestic or land disputes to dowry demands to jealousy and revenge. In some cases, a woman may have rejected a marriage proposal or had some kind of relationship with the attacker in the past. (Neha Ali Gauhar, *ibid*) The male perspective of "ownership" of a woman's body also plays a major role in such a vicious crime. Male members of a family/clan/society are invested with the right to control the actions of the women in their family and surroundings.

In a society obsessed with a "certain kind of woman" who has to be beautiful, acid attacks cause permanent damage to the psyche and confidence of women. After the attacks, their "commoditisation" becomes impossible and they are left as redundant elements in a male dominant society. In most cases, the victims also suffer from administrative and judicial negligence due to rampant corruption, ignorance, a lack of training and gender sensitivity and unprofessionalism. (Taiba Zia, *ibid*, p21) The multiple judicial systems in Pakistan (high courts, sharia courts and tribal courts) further complicate the issue. Despite acid attacks being prohibited by both international and local laws, they continue unabated in Pakistan because of deep-rooted customs, the weak law and order situation and the availability of cheap acid in the market. (*ibid*, p40) High incidences of acid attacks occur along the "cotton belt", that is, in southern Punjab and upper Sindh where the cotton and garment industries are concentrated and use acid in production. Acid attackers perpetrated 77 per cent of all reported attacks in Pakistan's "core" cotton zone area of the Punjab region. (Sital Kalantry and Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, *Combating Acid Violence in Bangladesh, India and Cambodia*, Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper, 2011, p46, online at https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu)

> **In a society, obsessed with a "certain kind of woman" who has to be beautiful, acid attacks cause permanent damage to the psyche and confidence of women. After the attacks, their "commoditisation" becomes impossible and they are left as redundant elements in a male dominant society. In most cases, the victims also suffer from administrative and judicial negligence due to rampant corruption, ignorance, a lack of training and gender sensitivity and unprofessionalism.**

Forced Marriage/Ghag

Ghag or *avaaz lagaana* (to make something known), is when a man announces his intention to marry a particular woman. Regardless of how *ghag* is announced, the impact on the girl, her family and her future is destructive, as it is sometimes used to exact *badla* (revenge) on the girl's family by claiming, without approval, their most prized possession. (Maria Kari, "Do you know what *Ghag* is", *The Express Tribune Blogs*, 10 September 2016, online at https://blogs.tribune.com.pk) Socially forced marriages are unlikely to be reported in Pakistan where women are considered and treated as repositories of family honour, whose defiance or disobedience is tantamount to public shame and humiliation. This attitude crosses class and ethnic divisions. The rigid control on women's bodies and their sexuality, besides dictating whom they can or cannot marry, also lead to pandemic proportions of domestic and sexual violence, including denial of contraception, forced abortion, rape as well as maternal morbidity and mortality. Forced marriage, being kept from marriage or being subjected to brutal physical and emotional abuse are all used as strategies to prevent women from laying any rightful claims to the family estate. (Sarah Zaman, *ibid*)

In a country where the majority of the populace is driven by a dogmatic understanding of local customs, marriage by force is common. Surprisingly, there is no scope for forced marriage in Islam. According to Islamic Law, women cannot be forced to marry anyone without their consent. (Jamal A Badawi, *The Status of Woman in Islam*, 1980, online at http://www.sultan.org) As such, *ghag* is an appalling practice that undermines the basic tenets of Islam. The Hadith also state that a woman's agreement is essential for marriage and her parents or others cannot impose their will on her on whom to marry. (Mohamed Fathi Osman, *Muslim Women: The Family and the Society*, Omar ibn al Khattab Foundation, 1990, p6, online at http://arabwidows.org) This historical but un-Islamic custom sanctifies a man's declaration of claiming a woman for marriage. Through it, males (particularly paternal cousins) have a "birthright" to marry their female cousins, even if the match is incompatible. (Neha Ali Gauhar, *ibid*, p80) The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Elimination of Custom of *Ghag* Act 2013 has been decreed to negate this atrocious tradition. The act criminalises *ghag* by law. However, paradoxically it is not valid in the frontier region where the custom is most widespread and has ruined the lives of many young girls. Sadly, in a society driven by the ingrained custom of justifying male violence and atrocities, *ghag* confines women to a derogatory position.

Forced Religious Conversion

Forced conversions are those where violence, physical, emotional and/or psychological is used to pressure a change in religion. Victims are usually abducted and submitted to intimidation or threats and coerced to select between bearing abuse and converting. The violence is directed not only at the victims, but is also used or threatened on their close relations. Pakistan has recently witnessed a large number of cases of abductions and forced conversions and subsequent marriages of girls from minority communities. However, finding reliable data on this issue is difficult. According to a US based Sindhi foundation, every year over 1000 young Sindhi Hindu girls between the ages of 12 and 28 are abducted and then forcibly converted to Islam and married. ("Pak Hindu Bride Abducted, Converted to Islam, Forcibly Married to Muslim", *Business Standard*, 27 January 2020, online at https://www.business-standard.com) A 2015 report by the South Asia Partnership Pakistan in collaboration with Aurat Foundation also found that at least 1,000 girls are forcibly converted to Islam every year and most conversions take place in the Thar region, particularly in the districts of Tharparkar, Umerkot, Ghotki, Sanghar, Jacobabad and Mirpur Khas. The report added that a nexus of wealthy landlords, extremist religious organisations, weak local courts and indifferent administrations works together to allow the perpetration of this forced arrangement. (Mehmal Sarfraz, "In Pakistan, the Problem of Forced Conversions", *The Hindu*, 13 April 2019, online at https://www.thehindu.com)

At least 1,000 girls are forcibly converted to Islam every year and most conversions take place in the Thar region. A nexus of wealthy landlords, extremist religious organisations, weak local courts and indifferent administrations works together to allow the perpetration of this forced arrangement.

This issue affects women differently from men, as they are the main victims of forced conversion and subsequent marriage. The matter is related not only to democratic rights, but also to discrimination based on class and gender. Pakistan's prevalent feudal and patriarchal society makes women more susceptible to forced conversion. They are poor, considered subordinate to men and in many cases, their identification documents are not in order. Birth registrations of girls are disproportionately lower than for boys. Similarly, there is considerable disparity between the identity registration of girls and boys. Girls are not considered

important enough or an employable member of a household. Therefore, getting their identification document is deemed unnecessary. (Sanchita Bhattacharya, "Pakistan Government unable to Prevent Forced Marriages, Conversions of Minority Women", *South Asia Monitor*, 21 December 2019, online at https://southasiamonitor.org)

In July 2019, the Sindh Assembly unanimously passed a resolution demanding the practice of forced conversion and abduction of Hindu girls be stopped and action taken against those involved. The resolution was adopted months after the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, in its annual report, raised concerns about the incidents of forced conversion and marriage of Hindu and Christian girls, stating that a thousand such cases had been reported in southern Sindh alone in 2018. According to the Centre for Social Justice, at least 159 cases were reported between 2013 and 2019. About 16 girls and young women have gone before the Sindh High Court asking for support against their forced marriage. There are no concrete numbers for the rest of the country, which is about 96.28 per cent Muslim, according to the official Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. (*ibid*)

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON WOMEN

As stated earlier, the story of discrimination and violence against women in Pakistan starts at home, from an early age and proceeds in all walks of life. A woman is often considered a lesser human being with no rights over her own body and existence. Although she is taught to be "the family's pride", there is no pride in her own self. In the space outside the house, women find themselves amongst socially excluded groups, unable to participate in or influence programmes, laws and policies that directly or indirectly affect them. (Sarah Zaman, *ibid*, p2) The various terrorist groups in Pakistan are products of such a mind-set and the tinge of religious fundamentalism boosts their false sense of legitimacy of domination and right to perpetrate violence. The rising trend of Islamist extremism, which underpins terrorism in Pakistan, has added greatly to the current rise of violence against women. They are the collateral damage in the ravages of war. A poll conducted by Thomson Reuters Foundation in 2011, listed Pakistan as the third most dangerous country for women. ("Pakistan Ranks Third on List of most Dangerous Countries for Women", *The Express Tribune*, 15 June 2011, online at https://tribune.com.pk)

In the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the gender issue was initially not

as central to the conflict as the demand for Islamic law. However, at a later stage the focal point became the destruction of girls' schools and the killing of working women. (Saira Bano Orakzai, "Conflict in the Swat Valley of Pakistan: Pakhtun Culture and Peace building Theory–Practice Application", *Journal of Peace Building and Development*, vol6, no1, 2011, p42) A majority of rights based activists particularly women's rights advocates fear that in the current milieu, marked by rising extremism, hatred, intolerance, vigilante mob rule and violence, there is no rule of law or even fundamental human rights. The persecution and harassment of the female population cuts across religious and sectarian lines—for the Ahmadi, Christian, Hazara, Hindu, Shia or Sunni girl, there is no safe place, not even within the premises of her own home. The main objective of Islamist terrorists is to frighten girls and women to exclude them from the public sphere and deny them the basic needs of life. For militants, monitoring women's independence as well as their sexuality has become the easiest way of showcasing their authority and control and in Pakistan they benefit from the pre-existing patriarchal traditions towards women.

> "The patriarchal family system has strong roots in the tribal setting. Under this family structure, one of the male members of the family, usually the eldest is considered the head of the family and enjoys the powers with regard to any form of decision or action on behalf of the whole family. The male-dominated patriarchal family system considers women family members as inferior/subordinate members". (Participatory Development Initiatives, *ibid*, p13)

Women as identity markers assume a central position in the Taliban's understanding of culture and religion and extremism focuses on controlling women's bodies and sexuality. A prominent feature of Taliban extremism is its gendered nature. It uses political violence to ensure continuity in the sexual hierarchy and gender status quo. (Farzana Bari, *Gendered Perceptions and Impact of Terrorism/ Talibanisation in Pakistan*, Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2010, p33, online at https://www.boell.de) The Taliban confine women to their homes, they cannot leave their house without a veil or without being accompanied by a close male relative. Women cannot be treated by male doctors, be educated or get jobs. (Shakil Ahmad, *The Taliban and Girls' Education in Pakistan and Afghanistan: A Case Study of the Situation in the Swat District*, Master Thesis Lund University, 2012, p19, online at http://lup.lub.lu.se) Terrorism adversely impacts the situation of women and girls, who are the consistent prime targets. (*Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Pakistan*, United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Fifty-Fourth

Session, 2013, online at https://www2.ohchr.org) Taking advantage of the already biased social setup of Pakistan, militant groups launched a reign of terror against the female population of the country. The image of a veiled woman begging in the streets of a frontier area is synonymous with such a mind-set—a woman cannot act of her own accord but is allowed to beg in public under the Taliban's legal system.

The American war on terror forced Pakistan to alter its strategy of supporting fundamentalist forces and display instead an "enlightened moderation" with a "soft" image that protects women's rights. (*Pakistan: Country Gender Profile November 2007– July 08*, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad and Japanese International Cooperation Agency, p12, online at https://www.jica.go.jp) The war also escalated the phenomenon of the internal displacement of people from conflict zones. Internally displaced women represent the most visible toll that the conflict has taken on Pakistani women. Today scant attention is being paid to the complex conglomeration of existing tribal customs and the strategic choices made by Pakistani and international forces to defeat the Taliban as well as the failure of the Pakistani state to address the ever-deteriorating impact of the culture of violence on the most vulnerable section of the population. (Rafia Zakaria, "Terror, Tribes and the War on Women in Pakistan", *Asian Conflicts Reports*, no8, 2009, online at http://www.operationspaix.net) Moreover, it is well known that in refugee or displaced people's camps, women become victims of torture and violence. They face much harsher conditions due to various forms of gender-based violence such as kidnapping, forced marriage, sexual harassment and trafficking. (Farzana Bari, *ibid*, p5)

The impact of terror on women in Pakistan needs deeper analyses at the provincial level. The interplay between centripetal and centrifugal forces of society must be examined to determine the status of women. The overall climate of terror, with women as the main targets, has spread throughout Pakistan, especially in the areas controlled by fundamentalists. Women in such regions have become an invisible community. Even after the terrorists were flushed out of these areas by the military, the situation for women has remained the same. Even girls' schools have been attacked, scaring women to remain in their homes. Female workers have been banned in both the public and private sectors. (Bushra Khaliq, "Rising Extremism, War on Terrorism and Women's Lives in Pakistan", *International Viewpoint*, 16 February 2010, online at http://www.internationalviewpoint.org)

Today in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where the conflict is most prevalent, women are literally on the frontlines of warfare, as widows, victims and survivors of suicide bomb blasts and done stikes and displaced persons. (ICAN, *ibid*, p8) The

disturbing Nizam-e-Adl Resolution of 2009, legalised the atrocities and crimes committed by terror groups in tribal areas. Emboldened by the law, the Taliban announced a campaign to impose the Sharia throughout the country. (MJ Akbar, *Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan*, Noida: Harper Collins, 2011, p302) Women have become a punching bag for local militant groups, attempting to impose their own brand of Islam on them. They want to establish a Taliban style government in Pakistan. It is vital for Islamabad to foster an atmosphere of peace and security for its women. Given the undercurrent of Islamism that underpins politics in Pakistan and Islamabad's track record of dealing with extremism, it remains unlikely that an environment ensuring a greater measure of security for women will be established in the near future. (Sanchita Bhattacharya, "Pakistan: Women – Unseen, Unheard, Targeted", *South Asia Intelligence Review: Weekly Assessments and Briefings*, vol12, no2, 15 July 2013, online at https://www.satp.org)

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CONCLUSION

Ironically, Pakistani women have had the right to vote since independence in 1947. They also have a right to own and inherit property, drive cars and have equal access to all educational facilities in the country. (Maliha Gull Tarar and Venkat Rao Pulla, *ibid*, p57) Nonetheless, these apparent and enshrined rights do not guarantee women an equal status in society. Under such circumstances, frequent awareness and training programmes need to be conducted to make women aware of their rights and equip them for exercising just demands. In addition, various public and private cottage industries should be set up to provide job opportunities to rural women to earn an income and help with household expenses. (Mohammad Jalal-ud-Din and Munir Khan, "Socioeconomic and Cultural Constraints of Women in Pakistan with Special Reference to Mardan District, Northwest Frontier Province", *Sarhad Journal of Agriculture*, vol24, no3, 2008, p489) According to a Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Report, (*Status of Human Rights*, 2012, p163, online at http://hrcpweb.org) the needs of rural women were acknowledged

when economic empowerment projects were established by both government and civil society groups. For instance, the Benazir Income Support Programme introduced a vocational skills development agenda in which each participant was given a US $12 cash grant every month along with health insurance.

Abject poverty, ignorance and lack of access to education create fertile grounds for a divisive society. In such a background, women are often denied basic education or even fundamental human rights. They are therefore largely unequipped to lead a fulfilling life and succumb to male dominance and various abuses associated with it. For most women it is a never-ending cycle of emotional and physical constraints. Male members of society are rarely condemned for their actions and behaviour. Women carry the "burden" in terms of preserving honour and maintaining a certain "chaste" image, which goes with being fragile and docile. In several accounts, women have stated that they consider the acts of violence meted out to them as their destiny and give men the right over their physical and mental wellbeing and fate. The family setup and society as a whole condition the female population to believe that they deserve the violence.

Thus, it is apparent that on the status of women, Pakistan is juggling between repressive customs and borrowed modernisation. Due to a lack of knowledge, religion has come to include the un-Islamic traditions of the land and their continuance is ensured by force. However, as in any other post-colonial society, modernisation has been imposed on Pakistan from above without transforming society from within. Constant altercation between the two factors tradition and modernity has taken a toll on the female population. Unfortunately, the rising graph of state radicalisation has divested the country of an enlightened environment, essential for the implementation of legislation that protects the female population. It is imperative for Islamabad to provide a peaceful and supportive environment to protect its women. Given the fact that Islamist extremism underpins the entire sphere of politics in Pakistan and Islamabad's record in dealing with social radicalisation, it is highly improbable that an environment that safeguards and grants a greater measure of security for women will be established in the foreseeable future.

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CONTRIBUTORS

SHAHZADA RAHIM ABBAS
Independent Researcher, International Affairs, Research Assistant, Iqbal Research Dialogue, Islamabad, Pakistan

TAYE DEMISSIE BESHI
Assistant Professor of Governance, Department of Political Science and International Studies, Bahir Dar University, Bahir Dar, Amhara, Ethiopia

SANCHITA BHATTACHARYA
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India

SUYASH CHANDAK
Undergraduate Student in Economics and Political Science, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA

RAHUL KAMATH
Master of Arts, International Studies, Symbiosis School of International Studies, Pune, Maharashtra, India

RANVINDERJIT KAUR
Assistant Professor of Governance, Department of Public Administration, Punjabi University, Patiala, India

PAOLO RAIMONDI
Economist; Author; Member, BRICS working Group, EURISPES Italian Research Institute; Member, Board of Directors, ISIAMED and Editorialist, Italia Oggi, Rome, Italy

KANIKA SANSANWAL
Masters of Arts, International Studies, Symbiosis School of International Studies, Pune, Maharashtra, India

RAVI PRATAP SINGH
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Allahabad Degree College, University of Allahabad, Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh, India

SUDHANSHU TRIPATHI
Professor of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Uttar Pradesh Rajarshi Tandon Open University, Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh, India

ANDREY VOLODIN
Principal Research Fellow, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russian Federation